date:2005-11-10T03:40:00
source:Embassy Wellington
origin:05WELLINGTON880
destination:This record is a partial extract of the original cable.
The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L WELLINGTON 000880

SIPDIS

STATE FOR CA/P/IP, EAP/ANP, DS/IP/EAP AND DS/CR/CIL
SINGAPORE FOR MATT KING (ICE)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/09/2015
TAGS: PTER, ASEC, CASC, CVIS, PGOV, PREL, PINR, NZ
SUBJECT: NEW ZEALAND WANTS TO MOVE AHEAD ON HSPD-6
INITIATIVE

REF: A. STATE 200695
B. WELLINGTON 758
C.   WELLINGTON 739
D.   STATE 173539
E.   WELLINGTON 718
F.   STATE 158827

(U) Classified by Political-Economic Counselor Katherine B.
Hadda. Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d).

1. (C) Summary: The New Zealand government remains eager to
move quickly toward bilateral sharing of terrorist lookout
information. To move forward, however, the government needs
to know more about how the information it supplies to the
United States would be used, details on how such an
information-sharing system would work, and specifics on the
technical requirements. New Zealand officials expressed hope
that U.S. experts could visit Wellington soon to provide
detailed information on the Terrorist Screening Data Base and
how New Zealand could participate in the sharing of terrorist
information. Post believes such a visit would be necessary
to make progress toward an HSPD-6 agreement. End summary.

2. (C) As requested in ref A, post officers met November 7
with Mike McBurney, manager of the counter terrorism branch
of the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service. McBurney
confirmed his government,s continued interest in the HSPD-6
terrorist lookout information sharing initiative. "We are
happy to move as fast as the U.S. is happy to move,8 he said.

3. (C) McBurney said, however, that his government seeks
additional information on the initiative to determine how it
might be able to participate. His questions included: would
the information that New Zealand provided ever be made public
by the U.S. government; would the United States restrict the
use of information it provided to New Zealand; who on each
side would have access to the information and how much would
be classified; and, would the source of the information be
identified.

4. (C) His questions also focused on technical aspects of the
Terrorist Screening Data Base (TSDB): Would New Zealand have
to install a dedicated computer terminal, or would access be
provided via internet? How much encryption would be
involved; would it be commercial- or high-grade?

5. (C) In essence, McBurney said his government wants to move
ahead on the initiative but, before it could do so, needs
more details on what would be required of New Zealand and
whether it has the technical capability to participate. He
asked whether U.S. experts could visit Wellington to help
provide such details and assess New Zealand,s capabilities.
A visit could be accommodated before Christmas or after the
first two weeks of January.

6. (C) Meanwhile, McBurney said he was conferring on the
initiative with other relevant New Zealand agencies,
including New Zealand Customs, Immigration Service, Police,
Government Communications Security Bureau and the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs and Trade. All have expressed interest in
exploring the initiative.

7. (C) As also requested in ref A, post officers met November
10 with Arron Baker, national manager of border security and
compliance operations of the New Zealand Immigration Service.
The officers discussed the information-sharing initiative
and Baker,s request for possible access to TSA,s no-fly
list (ref B). He was informed of the USG,s preference for
sharing information under the HSPD-6 rather than through an
ad-hoc sharing of the no-fly list. Baker supports his
government,s preference for an agreement to obtain data from
the entire TSDB.

8. (U) Post believes a visit by U.S. experts would help move
this initiative forward and welcomes Department guidance on
the next steps it should take.
McCormick