From:
<a href="http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/226083">The Guardian</a><br>
Date: 2009-09-21
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Monday, 21 September 2009, 07:38
C O N F I D E N T I A L THE HAGUE 000568
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 09/17/2019
TAGS MARR, MOPS, NATO, PINS, PREL, NL
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/JSF: CONCERN ABOUT SECOND ENGINE
REF: A. THE HAGUE 271 B. THE HAGUE 264 C. THE HAGUE 543
Classified By: POLECON Counselor Andrew C. Mann for reasons 1.5(b,d)

1. (C)
SUMMARY: The Netherlands Minister of Defense (MOD) has
expressed concern over the JSF second engine (F-136) being
omitted from the U.S. 2010 Defense Budget. Dutch industry has
high-value contracts supporting the development of the F-136
engine. The MOD has struggled to retain the necessary support
for the JSF program in what has become a politically charged
battle. Cancelling the F-136 program could scuttle Dutch
participation in JSF and raise doubts about American defense
partnerships as we ask the Dutch to stay the course with us in
Afghanistan. END SUMMARY.

Background:
-----------

2. (U)
The concept of having two competing engines for the JSF dates
back to the "Great Engine War," when Congress funded the
development of a second engine in 1979 for the Air Force's
fighter aircraft. The Air Force and Congress cite the
competition as a huge success, yielding both cost savings and
a better product. This "standard" of competition drove a two
engine solution (F-135 and F-136) for the JSF program.
Participating countries in the JSF Program are allowed to
choose the F-135, F-136, or both when they issue their
procurement request per the JSF Production, Sustainment, and
Follow-on Development MOU. The GONL believes based on the MOU
they have an engine choice, and are currently in a study with
Norway and Italy to compare both engines before a placing
their orders to the JSF Program.

Dutch Industry Support on the F-136:
------------------------------------

3. (SBU)
Two companies in the Netherlands are responsible for the
co-design and production of critical components on the F-136.
(Netherlands industry is not participating in the development
of the F-135, but is seeking maintenance contracts with Pratt
&amp; Whitney, the manufacturer.) The F-136 contractors
(General Electric/Rolls-Royce) list potential F-136 business
with the Netherlands -- across the life of the program -- at
over one billion dollars. Dutch labor unions and local
governments are currently applying pressure to the Labor Party
(PvdA), which has the pivotal vote to keep the JSF alive in
the Netherlands by approving the purchase of the second test
jet. The MOD is currently working with Parliament to obtain
approval for the purchase the second test aircraft by December
2009. (Note: Post has ensured both the F-135 and F-136 have
been equally represented during this process. End Note.)

Comment / Risk of Cancelling JSF in the Netherlands:
--------------------------------------------- -------

4. (C)
COMMENT: The JSF debate in the Netherlands remains politically
charged, with the Parliament nearly scuttling Dutch
participation in JSF (reftels A, B). The Dutch MOD is using
the successes of the JSF in Dutch industry as an argument to
keep the JSF in the Netherlands. The Dutch are aware that the
U.S. defense budget has excluded the F-136 every year since
2006, but to date Congress has overturned that decision and
maintained support for the F-136. However, if the second
engine does not survive the budget process, significant U.S.
effort will be required to keep the Dutch as a partner in the
program. Opponents of the JSF, including the Labor Party (in
the three-party governing coalition), would likely argue the
U.S. had changed the terms of the Qwould likely argue the U.S.
had changed the terms of the agreement upon which Dutch
participation was based and we are unreliable. Prospects for
winning continued Dutch support of the JSF are dim without
continuation of the F-136 program (the two engine option).
Furthermore, we are engaged in an delicate effort to keep the
Dutch in Afghanistan after 2010. The Labor Party has the
pivotal role on this issue as well. When we are asking the
Dutch Cabinet and Parliament to make a difficult decision to
stay with us as partners in Afghanistan, being perceived as an
unreliable partner on JSF could prove to be a large hurdle to
overcome. END COMMENT.

LEVIN
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