ID: 09THEHAGUE514
DATE: 2009-08-25 14:59

VZCZCXYZ0014 OO RUEHWEB DE RUEHTC #0514/01 2371459 ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 251459Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3195
INFO RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 2831 
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0414
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY 5254
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 2236
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY 
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY 

S E C R E T THE HAGUE 000514
NOFORN
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/25/2019
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, AF, NATO, NL
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/AFGHANISTAN: POST-2010 DEPLOYMENT
POSSIBLE BUT NOT IN URUZGAN
REF: A. THE HAGUE 0419 B. THE HAGUE 0092
Classified By: Ambassador Fay Hartog Levin for reasons 1.4 (B, D).

1. (C)
This cable continues reporting on post’s efforts to get the Dutch to
“yes” on a post-2010 deployment in Afghanistan (reftels).

2. (S/NF)
SUMMARY: Labor Party leader Bos told the Ambassador in
confidence (STRICTLY PROTECT) the Dutch will likely stay in
Afghanistan post-2010 but not in Uruzgan. The cabinet will
probably not take that decision until the end of the year.
Post recommends next steps in our engagement (para 7). END
SUMMARY.

3. (S/NF)
At the end of her August 24 courtesy call, Ambassador talked
one-on-one with Wouter Bos, the Labor Party (PvdA) leader,
Finance Minister and Deputy Prime Minister, about Afghanistan.
(COMMENT: Senior Dutch officials had identified the Labor
Party and Bos, in particular, as the most reluctant member of
the three-party governing coalition to agree on staying in
Afghanistan beyond the current 2010 mandate. END COMMENT.)
Bos told the Ambassador in confidence the issue of staying in
Afghanistan was politically unpopular, especially within his
own party. “The Dutch have gone as far as they can go.” Two
years ago, when the Dutch decided to extend the mission in
Uruzgan, everyone agreed that would be the last time. If we
now extend again, Bos said, we will be asked every two years
to stay on. It is important to stick to our word and wrap up
the mission. This, Bos argued, was the official Labor Party
position.

4. (S/NF)
Bos then said the Government, with Labor Party support, will
be able to stay in Afghanistan after its current mandate
expires, but not in Uruzgan. The Ambassador pressed Bos that
it was more logical for the Dutch to remain in Uruzgan where
they had developed important contacts with local tribes and
leaders as well as funded numerous projects. Bos admitted this
was true, but did not know if staying in Uruzgan would fly
with his party.

5. (S/NF)
The Ambassador mentioned the Embassy would be hosting a number
of senior USG officials in the near future who would be
willing to discuss Afghanistan with Bos (such as USNATO Amb.
Daalder and CENTCOM Gen. Petreaus). He said Development
Cooperation Minister Koenders was advising him on all issues
involving Afghanistan, including how to handle it politically.
If Bos is not available to meet with U.S. visitors, he will
make sure Koenders is. He also advised the Ambassador the
Cabinet would probably not make a final decision on the
deployment question until the end of the year, December.

6. (S/NF)
COMMENT: Queen Beatrix commented to the Ambassador during her
credentialing ceremony on August 19 that finding a way forward
on Afghanistan “would be difficult,” but must be done. It
appears the senior leadership of the body politic agrees. We
had heard from other Cabinet members, including Foreign
Minister Verhagen, that Bos and the Labor Party would likely
agree to extending the Dutch mission in Afghanistan past 2010.
Bos’s statement, however, was the first time any senior Labor
Party leader had made that clear. Although appearing to draw a
line in the sand about leaving Uruzgan, Qappearing to draw a
line in the sand about leaving Uruzgan, Bos did not seem
categorical about that issue. In our engagement, we need to
continue to stress the Alliance need for the Dutch to remain
in Afghanistan and in Uruzgan, in particular; the progress the
Dutch have made in Uruzgan and the need to build upon their
stability and development efforts there; the increased U.S.
contribution in military and civilian personnel and resources
in Afghanistan; and the enhanced contributions of NATO and
other partners. A word of caution - the Dutch are concerned
Jan Mohammed, the former governor and local warlord, might be
re-appointed governor of Uruzgan if Pres. Karzai is
re-elected. If that were to happen, everyone, including our
strongest supporters, says the Dutch will not/not return to
Uruzgan under any circumstances. END COMMENT.

7. (S/NF) ENGAGEMENT PLAN: (A) The Ambassador continues her
courtesy calls, seeing Foreign Minister Verhagen and Defense
Minister van Middelkoop August 31. She will raise Afghanistan
and extending the Dutch mandate in both meetings. She will
also meet with parliamentary leaders in the near future. (B)
USNATO Amb. Daalder visits Sept. 3 and will have meetings with
senior MoD and MFA officials. He will meet with Verhagen and
we have requested a meeting with Minister Koenders. Amb.
Daalder will also give a public address talking about NATO in
Afghanistan and will conduct several press interviews. (C)
Defense Minister van Middelkoop plans to meet with Secretary
Gates in Washington September 10. (D) CENTCOM Gen. Petreaus
will visit the Netherlands in support of the 65th anniversary
of the WWII Market Garden operation (“A Bridge Too Far”) in
mid-September. He will deliver three speeches throughout the
country, which are expected to get significant media
attention. We are working with his staff to identify
opportunities for him to meet appropriate ministers and
parliamentarians. (E) We recommend SRAP Amb. Holbrooke call
Minister Koenders, whom he met in late March in The Hague, to
thank him for the Dutch support of the Afghan elections (8
million Euros contribution to UNDP, long and short-term
staffers to the EU election observers mission, 30 military
personnel), to discuss the recent Friends of Pakistan
conference in Istanbul (they pledged 86.7 million Euros in
assistance over three years at the Tokyo conference) and to
talk about regional developments. Amb. Holbrooke could offer
to visit the Netherlands if Koenders thought it would be
helpful. (F) Finally, we will re-examine our engagement plan
at the end of September in light of Gen. McCrystal’s strategic
review and the results of these meetings.

LEVIN