ID: 09THEHAGUE418
DATE: 2009-07-13 15:45

VZCZCXRO5914
OO RUEHSL DE RUEHTC #0418/01 1941545 ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 131545Z JUL 09 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3025
INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 2825
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0407
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 2229 
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 THE HAGUE 000418
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/07/2019
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, NATO, AF, NL
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/AFGHANISTAN: ENROUTE TO YES ON MOST
"ASKS" POST-2010
REF: A. 09 THE HAGUE 0268 B. 09 THE HAGUE 0238 C. 09 THE HAGUE 0092
D. 09 THE HAGUE 0078 E. 09 SECSTATE 31102
Classified By: Politcial-Economic Counselor Andrew C. Mann
for reasons 1.4 (b,d)

1. (U)
This cable follows up on post’s “Netherlands /Afghanistan:
Getting to YES post-2010” (reftel C).

2. (S/NF)

SUMMARY: The Dutch consensus-based political process for
post-2010 commitments in Afghanistan remains on track for a
Cabinet decision in the fall followed by a parliamentary
review in late 2009 or early 2010. We understand Labor Party
(PvdA) leader/Deputy PM/Finance Minister Wouter Bos is the
only cabinet member not in agreement with the details of a
continued role in Afghanistan. The Dutch consider this an
internal decision; overt lobbying will likely provoke greater
resistance to our desired goal. Therefore, discreet,
coordinated engagement is necessary to assist committed Dutch
leaders in gaining consensus from Bos and later approval by
Parliament. END SUMMARY.

----------
The Stakes
----------

3. (S/NF)
Prime Minister Balkenende (Christian Democrats - CDA), Foreign
Minister Verhagen (CDA) and Defense Minister van Middelkoop
(Christian Union - CU) reportedly agree the Dutch should
support most of the “Afghanistan Asks” (reftel E).
Specifically they want to retain the Provisional
Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Uruzgan with a force protection
of up to 500 personnel, and provide F-16’s, intelligence
assets, airlift and attack helicopters, military trainers and
mentors, police mentors, medical units, special operations
forces, support for counter-narcotics initiatives,
agricultural development, and increased support for governance
and development programs. Bos, however, is highly skeptical
and he has failed to tip his hand as to his actual position
yet. We understand he may be supportive of most “asks” except
the PRT and helicopter assets.

-------------------
The Critical Player
-------------------

4. (S/NF)
Verhagen recently expressed great concern about the Labor
Party and specifically Bos, who continues to balk at the Dutch
presence in Afghanistan, particularly in Uruzgan post-2010.
Privately, Verhagen stated the Labor Party could support
“staying in Afghanistan in some roles but not continue in
Uruzgan.” This contrasts with confidential comments from the
Labor Party defense spokesperson, MP Angelien Eijsink, who
favored continuing the PRT in Uruzgan because of the
investments to date in time, effort, funds and lives.
Additionally, she stated that as a member of NATO the Dutch
have a commitment to remain a viable part of the mission.
However, for the Labor Party to support continuing with the
PRT in Uruzgan, she said there must be a clear understanding
and commitment that the mission is solely dedicated to
“stabilization and reconstruction.”

5. (S/NF)
The poor showing of the Labor Party in the June European
Parliament elections (dropping from 23.7% of the vote in 2004
to 12%, its all time lowest vote percentage in any election)
has put Bos under pressure from the rank and Qany election)
has put Bos under pressure from the rank and file supporters,
who generally oppose the military mission in Afghanistan. His
leadership of the party is questioned regularly in the press -
Labor Party faithful complain Bos gave in on authorizing the
purchase of a JSF test aircraft earlier this year even in this
difficult economic environment and they are concerned the
party leadership will support raising the retirement age in
Cabinet deliberations this autumn. Still, as the party leader,
he is key to the future of the Dutch engagement in Afghanistan
beyond 2010.

THE HAGUE 00000418 002 OF 003

--------------------
Engagement Strategy
--------------------

6. (S/NF)

Our outreach plan and talking points detailed in reftel C
remain the basis for our engagement with the Dutch: - We
appreciate the long-standing and significant contribution in
Afghanistan, specifically in Uruzgan, that the Dutch have
made. - The Dutch are a valued partner in NATO’s efforts to
address a common threat in a dangerous region. - While it is
an internal decision by the Dutch whether they will stay in
Afghanistan, we hope they will continue with other NATO allies
and other countries in ISAF as it implements its new strategy.
- We hope the Dutch will continue their stability and
development efforts in Uruzgan to build upon the considerable
Dutch achievements there.

7. (S/NF)
Bos, as Finance Minister and party leader, does not deal
directly with Afghanistan on a regular basis. Bos is extremely
skeptical of any discussion on this subject by U.S. officials.
He considers any discussion about post-2010 Afghanistan
engagement to be an internal Dutch political decision.
Reportedly, Bos “was not surprised” but “not pleased” when
Afghanistan was brought up in his June 29 meeting with
Secretary Geithner. He argued the Netherlands was a small
country which had already been doing its fair share in
Afghanistan. He also suggested other, bigger countries were
not pulling their weight.

8. (S/NF)
Success in getting the Dutch to keep their PRT in Uruzgan will
hinge upon the Labor Party’s recognition that the Uruzgan
mission is developmental in nature and sustained commitment is
needed to ensure the success of their peacebuilding and
development investments there. The Labor Party could also be
influenced by how much other countries are “stepping up to the
plate” in support of ISAF’s new strategy.

9. (SBU)
The Cabinet has started its summer break, until mid-August.
When it returns, it will focus on the budget which must be
agreed on and presented to Parliament by September 15
(Prinsjesdag). Since Bos is Finance Minister, he will be
pre-occupied until then.

10. (S/NF)
MFA Deputy Director General Robert de Groot discussed a plan
with POLMILOFF on July 2 for engaging Bos in forums considered
to be “inclusive” - to avoid the appearance of outside
pressure. He suggested a cascade of visits/forums/meetings
involving USNATO Ambassador Daalder, SRAP Ambassador
Holbrooke, and perhaps UN Special Representative Kai Eide.
Obviously, we will take our cue from the discussions PM
Balkenende has with the President in Washington July 14. After
that, we suggest using the courtesy call on Bos by the new
U.S. Ambassador to the Netherlands (whenever confirmed and
credentials presented) to find out what his concerns are, with
an offer to put Bos in contact with those senior U.S.
officials who can respond to them. We anticipate having USNATO
Ambassador Daalder give a public address on the new NATO
strategy in Afghanistan in the autumn. General Petraeus,
CENTCOM Commander, is planning to visit the Netherlands in
mid/late September to participate in commemoration activities
for WW II 65th anniversary Qcommemoration activities for WW II
65th anniversary liberation events. We hope to have him speak
to a small group of parliamentarians, if his schedule permits.
Likely at the invitation of FM Verhagen or Development
Cooperation Minister Koenders (both of whom he has met), SRAP
Ambassador Holbrooke could then follow up with a visit and
talk effectively about the new strategy, the importance of
Dutch 3D efforts in Uruzgan and the contributions other
countries are making.

11. (S/NF)
We continue to be on the lookout for opportunities to engage
with decision makers locally as well as having Washington
leaders meet with senior Dutch officials. Furthermore, we
continue to engage other members of the Labor Party who may be
able to exert influence on Bos in the run-up to the cabinet
decision. Development Cooperation Minister

THE HAGUE 00000418 003 OF 003

Koenders, Defense Spokesperson Eijsink, Floor Leader Mariette
Hammer, and Foreign Affairs Spokesperson MP Martijn van Dam to
name a few. It will take teamwork and coordinated engagement
with the Dutch at all levels to ultimately obtain their
commitment post-2010.

FOSTER