114457, 7/5/2007 16:17, 07THEHAGUE1295, SECRET//NOFORN,
VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB
DE RUEHTC #1295/01 1861617
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 051617Z JUL 07
FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9745
INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 2662
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0283
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAFVS/OSD WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
S E C R E T THE HAGUE 001295
SIPDIS
NOFORN
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA, EUR/RPM, EUR/UBI
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/05/2017
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, NATO, AF, NL
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/AFGHANISTAN: EXTENSION REVIEW OFFICIALLY BEGINS
Classified By: Ambassador Roland Arnall, reasons 1.4 (b,d)
1. (C)
Summary: The GONL sent a letter to the Dutch Parliament on
June 30 noting it will decide this summer whether to extend
its ISAF mission in Afghanistan. The decision will follow an
exhaustive review of all options, including staying in the
mission's current capacity, reducing its contribution or
moving to another location, or even withdrawing altogether.
Cabinet officials have stressed that "all options are on the
table," while public statements by Defense Minister Eimert
van Middelkoop in favor of remaining in some capacity may have
tipped the hand of the GONL and temporarily unsettled the
political process. Dutch officials are cautiously optimistic
that the conditions are in place to arrive at a positive
extension decision, but stress that sequencing is vital: first
the review of options, then consultations with Allies,
followed by a decision and subsequent debate with Parliament.
End summary.
Important First Step
--------------------
2. (C)
Following its June 29 meeting, the Dutch Cabinet sent a letter
to Parliament stating that the GONL will decide this summer
whether it will extend its ISAF mission in Afghanistan beyond
August 2008, and if so, in what capacity. The letter notes
that the Cabinet will investigate the "options and
desirability of continuing to make a contribution" to ISAF.
The review will be conducted in accordance with the set
criteria required for parliamentary consent prior to deploying
Dutch troops abroad ("toetsingskader"). The letter formally
begins the Article 100 process -- more importantly, it means
the GONL can formally solicit contributions from other NATO
Allies to team with the Dutch in Uruzgan province.
3. (S)
In a July 2 meeting with Ambassador Arnall, Pieter de Gooijer
(MFA Director General for Political Affairs) confirmed that
issuing the letter represents an important step toward a
possible extension. Although, for political reasons, the GONL
remains restricted from expressing support for a particular
option, de Gooijer said it "was fair to say" that the Cabinet
appears to be quietly moving in that direction. He stressed,
however, that there is not yet a firm consensus within the
Cabinet, and some members are still holding out for
significant concessions (e.g., more money for Defense, a
significant mission in Africa for Development). De Gooijer
noted that the six key ministers (the Prime Minister, two
Deputy Prime Ministers, and the ministers of Foreign Affairs,
Development and Defense) will meet on July 12 to consider next
steps and hopefully steer the process in a positive direction.
One Step Beyond
---------------
4. (C)
Following the June 29 Cabinet meeting, Cabinet ministers
emphasized to the press that "all options were currently on
the table," and that the GONL would decide whether to extend
once the review of options had been fully completed. During
one of the press interviews, however, Defense Minister van
Middelkoop seemingly tipped the hand of the GONL by noting
that "the political intention is to stay, be it in a more
modest form." He explained that other Allies should take more
responsibility, and that some tasks could be phased out to
Allies, thereby leading to a trimmed-down Dutch extension. Van
Middelkoop acknowledged that ending the mission was an option,
but "the intention is to continue in some form."
5. (C)
Van Middelkoop's remarks prompted a firestorm of criticism
from both supporters and critics of the current mission.
Supporters lamented that van Middelkoop hamstrung the
extension review before it started as critics will argue that
any such review will be subjective in nature as the GONL
attempts to achieve van Middelkoop's stated desire to remain
in Uruzgan. Critics worried that van Middelkoop's remarks
might send the wrong signal to NATO and Washington, thereby
lifting them off the hook by telling them it was not necessary
for military planners to initiate contingencies should the
Dutch opt not to extend. 6. (C) Following van Middelkoop's
remarks, Prime Minister Balkenende clarified the GONL
"official position" -- the Dutch will investigate whether to
continue, and if so, "how and in what way." But in no sense
had the GONL made any decision on an extension. He emphasized
that "matters should be done in the right order," and
declined to acknowledge any current political intention to
extend. Balkenende added that the decision should be made with
careful consideration of all arguments -- "all options remain
on the table." He said the GONL's decision would be made this
summer, perhaps as late as September, following a "very
intensive process."
... And a Step Backwards
------------------------
7. (C)
Van Middelkoop began the July 2 parliamentary hearing on
Afghanistan by backtracking on his earlier comments. He
characterized his remarks as a "slip of the tongue," and
emphasized that the GONL would first review all options prior
to making any decision to extend. Van Middelkoop reiterated
this clarified position on July 3 in a meeting with Ambassador
Arnall. He stressed that "all options were on the table" and
that his suggestion that the Dutch remain in a limited
capacity was "a mistake," and not a case of "being too
honest." Van Middelkoop said his remarks required an apology
to Parliament, for which he was "beaten up for 15 minutes,"
and then the Afghanistan debate continued as it had
previously.
8. (C)
In his meeting with Ambassador Arnall, van Middelkoop
commented on the Dutch participation in heavy fighting around
Chora in the previous few weeks. He said the Dutch had been
"very lucky" that the Dutch commander on the ground had made
the right tactical decision to stay and fight. Van Middelkoop
also praised the Afghan security forces, noting that they had
"fought well." He said there was still some fighting and
instability in the region, which was one of the major reasons
why he was visiting Afghanistan on July 5-6.
9. (C)
Van Middelkoop also commented on prospects of persuading the
Dutch Parliament to support an extension. He said part of his
challenge with Parliament involves the position of his
predecessor and current parliamentary member Henk Kamp, who
has adamantly stated that the Dutch deployment in Uruzgan
should last for two years, and "only two years." In order to
overcome Kamp and others, van Middelkoop said the GONL must
present sound arguments -- "the military, political, and
financial lines of reasoning all must be convincing."
Ambassador Arnall commented that van Middelkoop has more
flexibility on the ground than Kamp, to which the Defense
Minister smiled.
10. (C)
Officially, the GONL does not yet have an opinion on any
particular option. But in private, van Middelkoop said the
best option to extend in Afghanistan probably involves a more
modest contribution with the support of additional partners.
He characterized the partnership with Australia as good, but
said more help was needed from other Allies in order to
convince Parliament. He said the next step was for he and
Foreign Minister Verhagen to travel to NATO and make the case
for additional assistance. He assessed the political situation
on a possible extension as typical "coalition politics," and
repeated previously made remarks that "we are still in the
fog" regarding an extension, "but we are moving in the right
direction."
Parliamentary Hearing
---------------------
11. (C)
In a three hour parliamentary session o July 2,
parliamentarians from both sides of thepolitical spectrum
raised concerns regarding the heavy fighting around Chora and
subsequent civilian casualties. They initially lambasted van
Middelkoop for his comments regarding the political intent to
extend, but later seemed to accept his apology.
Parliamentarians from the left, including Socialist Harry van
Bommel and Green Left Mariko Peters, said van Middelkoop's
comments will send NATO and Washington the "wrong signal,"
especially as NATO is "responsible" for finding an Ally to
replace the Netherlands -- "now NATO will think that the Dutch
will extend and plans to replace us will not commence," said
van Bommel.
12. (C)
No new arguments were raised during the hearing. While all
members of the parliamentary foreign affairs committee raised
concerns about civilian casualties, all comments made were
reasoned and emotionally restrained. Both Verhagen and van
Middelkoop noted four on-going investigations (the Dutch
military, the UN, ISAF, and Human Rights Watch) following the
fighting in Chora, and promised to deliver results of the
investigations as soon as they become available. Separately,
MFA Task Force Uruzgan Coordinator Pieter Jan Kleiweg de Zwaan
told emboffs July 3 that they expect the Dutch military
investigation to be completed on or around July 10. Privately
Kleiweg was worried that the investigations might contradict
one another, further muddling an already confusing situation.
13. (C)
Other concerns voiced by parliamentarians included the cost of
the deployment, poppy eradication, and relations with
Pakistan. Both Verhagen and van Middelkoop said it was "too
simplistic" to classify the Dutch deployment as either a
military or reconstruction mission -- both are necessary in
order to be successful. Verhagen argued that intense fighting
in Chora did not mean that reconstruction in Uruzgan was
impossible. Development Minister Koenders began to lay the
foundation necessary to make the argument later in the summer
and fall that reconstruction was not only possible, but in
fact working in Uruzgan. In response to a question from Labor
Party (PvdA) spokesperson Angelien Eijsink, van Middelkoop
refuted claims made in the Dutch periodical Elsevier that the
Dutch military had released a senior Taliban leader. He
explained that Afghan authorities had initially made the
arrest, and the Dutch offered to hold the individual briefly
before returning him to Afghan authorities.
Government Strategy
-------------------
14. (S)
While cautiously optimistic, the working level continues to
emphasize PM Balkenende's message that the GONL "check all the
boxes" during its review prior to making an official extension
decision. Kleiweg told emboffs July 2 that the six ministers
most responsible for making a decision to extend (Balkenende
and Verhagen from the Christian Democratic Alliance, Deputy
Minister/Finance Minister Bos and Koenders from the Labor
Party, and Deputy Minister/Minister for Youth and Family
Affairs Rouvoet and van Middelkoop from the Christian Union)
have already met on several occasions, and dynamics among the
ministers are "good." Kleiweg characterized the ministers as
"moving in the right direction," and deflected suggestions
that Finance Minister Bos might be problematic. He said "The
Six" will meet again on July 12 prior to the summer break to
discuss various extension options.
15. (C)
Kleiweg noted that the Dutch have yet to formally solicit
contributions from other NATO Allies to any Dutch etension in
Uruzgan. He said the GONL first will idntify options and
possible tasks that could be flled by others prior to
approaching Allies. Kleweg acknowledged that the Dutch are
"picky" whenit comes to the question of which Allies to
apprach -- any potential partner has to "speak the sae
language" and possess a "similar outlook" when i comes to
reconstution efforts. He also noteda certain reluctance on the
part of the Dutch miitary to incorporate elements from yet
another mlitary -- but such hesitancy will need to be overome
should the review determine the best chance f an extension
involves teaming with another Ally.
16. (C)
Once tasks and partners are identified, Kleiweg said the USG
and SACEUR could be helpful in persuading these Allies to team
with the Dutch -- provided the government opts for an
extension. When asked about possibly teaming with U.S. forces,
Kleiweg said the Dutch "have no problem" with U.S. forces
under ISAF command. He noted, however, that OEF/ISAF
deconfliction continues to be a sensitive issue in the
Netherlands, especially as the dividing line between the two
becomes more blurry.
17. (C)
Low public support for both the current mission and any
extension continues to be a problem. Kleiweg said the GONL is
looking at respected "international voices" to enlist to try
and influence public opinion. He noted that the GONL had
arranged through NATO the visit of several Afghan
parliamentarians to the Netherlands. While the trip was a
success, Dutch and Afghan media considered the visit "NATO
propaganda," Kleiweg said. He noted that the individual with
the most power to change Dutch public opinion was Afghan
President Karzai, but acknowledged even that might have
changed in recent weeks given Karzai's criticism of the Dutch
military action in Chora. Kleiweg said Karzai intends to visit
the Netherlands in December -- "hopefully long after the Dutch
have made a decision on extending," he added. Uruzgan Gov.
Monib might be another option, although Kleiweg said GONL
relations with Monib are no longer that strong as Monib
appears more interested in events in Kabul than in Uruzgan,
while Monib's travel ban remains problematic. Other
international respected voices might include individuals such
as UN SYG Ban Ki-Moon, Kleiweg said.
Detention Policy
----------------
18. (C)
Kleiweg told emboffs July 3 that the GONL has circulated a
draft letter among RC-South contributing nations to the Afghan
government requesting greater access for the Afghan
Independent Human Rights Council to detainees held in Afghan
prisons. The draft letter was an action item derived from the
latest RC-South conference held in The Hague in June 2007.
According to Kleiweg, the GONL, as well as the governments of
Canada, the United Kingdom, Denmark, and Australia have all
approved the draft letter. He inquired if the USG had reviewed
the letter and had any comments; emboffs said they would check
with Washington.
Inter-Governmental Dynamics
---------------------------
19. (S//NOFORN)
Working level contacts describe the relationship between
Verhagen and Koenders as "contentious but not outright
hostile." Instead of direct confrontation, the two often wage
battles through their staffs at the working level, said MFA
Security Affairs Chief Robert de Groot. That said, when the
two ministers agree, the resulting decision has added weight
and is often "ironclad." Van Middelkoop is described as "the
third wheel," or the "inexperienced junior partner" by working
level contacts. While substantively knowledgeable, his
inexperience in the government is obvious, and he often defers
to Verhagen and Koenders.
20. (S//NOFORN)
According to working level contacts, Koenders has a "voracious
apetite" for information on Afghanistan -- "he want to know
how many grains of sand are in Uruzgan," said Kleiweg. While
he has an almost equal statu to Verhagen on Afghanistan behind
closed doors,Koenders resents being viewed as subordinate to
he other two ministers in public. "He cannot stad waiting for
two hours to speak during a parliaentary hearing, and then be
restricted to only tn minutes of speaking time," said Task
Force Deput Coordinator Dewi van de Weerde. Working level
ontacts also describe him as incapable of making decision,
which could play into extension consierations.
Comment
-------
21. (S)
Van Middelkoop's comments -- while seemingly positive from our
perspective -- temporarily unsettled the political debate on
extending. Cabinet members were reportedly incensed by van
Middelkoop's blunder, but his public mea culpa seems to have
appeased naysayers in Parliament. Despite it, the GONL once
again appears to be on the same page in its efforts to create
the conditions necessary to arrive at a positive extension
decision. There is a process -- an exhaustive review followed
by consultations -- that must be followed in order for this to
work, and Balkenende is shepherding it through. Finance
Minister Bos could still prove problematic, but working level
contacts suggest he will be reasonable. As the Dutch are fond
of saying, "do not disturb the brooding hen" -- which we will
no doubt hear often over the course of the summer and into the
fall.
ARNALL
Note the damage to the text: in Section 15 about 1 out of every 48 characters is lost. Add the missing characters in red:
15. (C) Kleiweg noted that the Dutch have yet to formally sollicit contributions from other NATO Allies to any Dutch extension in Uruzgan. He said the GONL first will identify options and possible tasks that could be filled by others prior to approaching Allies. Kleiweg acknowledged that the Dutch are "picky" when it comes to the question of which Allies to approach -- any potential partner has to "speak the same language" and possess a "similar outlook" when it comes to reconstruction efforts. He also noted a certain reluctance on the part of the Dutch military to incorporate elements from yet another military -- but such hesitancy will need to be overcome should the review determine the best chance of an extension involves teaming with another Ally.