83120

Embassy The Hague

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

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RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 THE HAGUE 002316
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
STATE FOR EUR/UBI (RREITER), EUR/RUS (SGUHA)
MOSCOW FOR DNYSTROM
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: EPET, ENRG, ECON, PREL, NL
SUBJECT: SHELL/SAKHALIN II: A VIEW FROM THE NETHERLANDS
REF: MOSCOW 10984
THIS MESSAGE IS SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED AND CONTAINS
PROPRIETARY INFORMATION. PLEASE HANDLE ACCORDINGLY.

1. (SBU) SUMMARY. A Shell representative recently offered
his version of events at Sakhalin II and confirmed that the
Government of Russia (GOR) had not revoked the project´s
environmental permit. Shell will continue to meet project
deadlines and commitments without seeking to use political
channels, unless GOR actions intensify. END SUMMARY.

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Shell and Sakhalin II: An Environmental History
-----------------------------------------------

2. (SBU) In a follow up to Embassy Moscow reporting (reftel),
Econoff recently spoke with John Crocker, Senior Advisor on
the Middle East and Russia and Head of International
Government Relations at Shell International, to hear his
company´s views on Russia´s claims of environmental
violations at Sakhalin II. He confirmed that the project´s
environmental license had not been revoked. Prior to its
start in 2003, Crocker said Russian authorities provided the
project with a State Environmental Expert Review (SEER)
certification. The Russian Ministry of Natural Resources
(MNR) then issued an Executive Order (EO), he added, that
gave official power to the SEER and permitted work to
commence on the project.

3. (SBU) Crocker explained that the SEER contained some 90
recommendations of which 49 have been completed. He said the
remaining 41 were being addressed by Sakhalin Energy, a joint
venture (JV) between Shell, Mitsubishi, and Mitsui, or were
scheduled to be addressed at an appropriate time in the
project. Crocker stressed that these were not violations, as
reported by the press or as "alleged" by Oleg Mitvol, Deputy
Chief of RosPrirodNadzor (RPN), the Russian Federal Service
for Environmental Protection and Enforcement under the
authority of the MNR.

----------------------------
Recent Events: Shell´s Story
----------------------------

4. (SBU) According to Crocker, both Minister of Natural
Resources Yuri Trutnev and Mitvol had suggested that Shell´s
Sakhalin environmental permit be canceled. After learning
that a cancellation would entail a repeat of the approval
process, both Russian officials sought to cancel the EO
instead. He said MNR then forwarded a recommendation to
cancel the EO to RosTekhNadzor (RTN), Russia´s Federal
Service on Ecological, Technological, and Nuclear
supervision, and issued a press release announcing the
cancellation. However, RTN refused to support MNR´s
recommendation and issued its own press release, Crocker
added, confirming that nothing had been canceled.

-----------------------
Relations with RPN, MNR
-----------------------

5. (SBU) Shell´s relations with RPN and MNR, Crocker said,
were good until mid-2006, when "something changed." No
further meetings were held until the week of September 25
when Mitvol sought to bring 60 journalists and
environmentalists to Sakhalin. Despite misgivings about
Mitvol´s intent, Shell agreed. Crocker said the Russian team
staged "stunts," including requests for a 25-person boat for
their 60-person party and complaints of "obstruction" upon
receipt of a smaller boat. The team also sailed to meet
divers who had "discovered" three-legged starfishes and later
failed to appear for a meeting with Shell´s Chief Executive.
Instead, the team held a press conference where Mitvol
announced $50 billion in environmental damage, Crocker said.

6. (SBU) Crocker expressed concern that Russian authorities
now sought to conduct a rolling audit that would "look at
everything." Since two hundred audits had already been
completed in 2006, this would be a repeat review. The
Russians indicated that they would report by October 20,
although from Shell´s perspective "the conclusions are
already written," he added.

THE HAGUE 00002316 002 OF 002

-----------------------------------------
Explaining Russian Behavior: Shell´s View
-----------------------------------------

7. (SBU) Reiterating that the majority of the 41 outstanding
recommendations could not be completed until later stages of
the project, Crocker indicated that Russia´s actions were
designed to "soften up" and encourage Shell to "volunteer or
give up something" in the future. Mitvol´s accusations of
violations and obstructionism by Shell were hard to counter
when supported by false statements by RPN, he added. Shell
was willing to accept professional, regular, and predictable
environmental monitoring -- as had been the case up until the
summer -- but since these difficulties had started, Shell had
sought but been denied meetings with relevant senior Russian
officials. Crocker said that some officials had even
indicated to Shell that GOR actions were "not environmentally
driven."

------------------------------------------------------
Explaining Russian Behavior: The Dutch Government View
------------------------------------------------------

8. (SBU) On October 10, Econoff discussed recent events with
Natascha Soons, Policy Officer, Eastern Europe and Central
Asia Division, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). Soons
agreed that GOR actions were for "more than environmental
reasons." Soons added that the GOR was pressuring Shell
because of higher than expected project costs and because
Gazprom sought involvement in the effort. Soons added that
there would be no Dutch government involvement at this stage
as Shell still needed to "sit down and negotiate" with the
GOR.

--------------------------------
Shell´s Thoughts on Path Forward
--------------------------------

9. (SBU) Meanwhile, Crocker said Shell was not worried given
its good environmental record. Moreover, Shell had no
intention of changing its plans as the project was already 80
percent complete, and Sakhalin II would be the first to
export Russian Liquified Natural Gas (LNG) and the first to
deliver Russian gas to the U.S. Crocker would not comment on
the future of the Sakhalin Energy JV, but noted that Sakhalin
II was the only natural gas project in Russia without a
Russian partner. He did indicate that having a Russian
partner would be a "good thing."

10. (SBU) Crocker said Shell still planned to complete the
project on time. He said Shell did not want to use political
channels at this time or spark a "war of words" between the
West and Russia, particularly as they had not had an
opportunity to have a "sensible" meeting with Russian
authorities to discuss and resolve current issues. "It may
turn out that we need friends to speak," he commented, "but
not for now." Crocker said he was meeting with State
Department officials on a quarterly basis and would call on
Embassy Moscow during a visit in November.

ARNALL