From:
<a href="http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/38987">The Guardian</a><br>
Date: 2005-08-22
<p>
<pre>
Monday, 22 August 2005, 17:01
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 07 THE HAGUE 002309
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 08/18/2025
TAGS PREL, PGOV, PTER, ECON, EAID, NL, EUN, USUN
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S PARTING THOUGHTS ON TAKING THE DUTCH
TO THE NEXT LEVEL
Classified By: AMBASSADOR CLIFFORD SOBEL FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).

1. (S)
SUMMARY: With the EU divided and its direction uncertain, the
Dutch serve as a vital transatlantic anchor in Europe. As one
of the original six EU members, the Dutch ally with the
British to counter Franco-German efforts to steer Europe off a
transatlantic course. The Netherlands' solid European and
international credentials create a powerful "multiplier"
effect. In Iraq, Dutch forces provided the physical and
political cover for Japan to deploy and the Dutch are using
their NATO Training Mission commitment to push others to do
more. In Afghanistan, the Dutch drove much of the Phase III
planning for ISAF and deployed Dutch troops in combat
operations for the first time in more than 30 years. The Dutch
have led Europe in launching pilot projects to strengthen
international counterterrorism cooperation, and initiated the
U.S.-EU dialogue on terrorist financing which laid the
groundwork for a proposed major international Terrorism
Financing Conference in 2006.

2. (S)
(SUMMARY CONTINUED) The Dutch are expanding their leadership
beyond Europe. Dutch strategic interests in the Caribbean make
them logical partners to counter Venezuelan meddling in the
region. They are expanding their military involvement in
Africa, in part to provide a secure environment for their
robust development assistance program, and in part to add
"eyes and ears" on the ground. In the Middle East, the Dutch
enjoy good relations with Israel and the Palestinians and
would welcome a more active role; they quickly promised funds
for an expanded Multinational Observer Force (MFO) and might,
under the right circumstances, commit troops. Even in areas
where we disagree, such as drugs and trafficking in persons,
Dutch views may be shifting. As the headquarters for major
international legal institutions, the Netherlands offers a
unique opportunity for advancing foreign policy goals far
beyond Dutch borders.

3. (S)
(SUMMARY CONTINUED) The coalition government, headed by PM
Balkenende, is naturally inclined to work closely with the
U.S. The balance could shift toward Brussels, however, if a
center-left government comes to power in 2007 (or earlier), as
predicted by most polls. The nearly one million Muslim
immigrants are largely non-integrated, which is forcing the
Dutch to question long-standing assumptions about Dutch
"tolerance" and "identity." The murder of Theo van Gogh
focused attention on Islamic extremism, and the Dutch feel
they are ahead of much of Europe in addressing this growing
problem. Strengthening U.S.-Dutch ties across the political
spectrum is necessary to ensure that the Dutch continue to
enlist others to pursue interests in line with the U.S.,
especially in the political-military sphere. Early and active
consultations are the key to harnessing Dutch energies in
enhanced pursuit of U.S. interests. END SUMMARY.

LEADERS IN EUROPE
-----------------

4. (S)
Along with the British, the Dutch form a strong, reliable
transatlantic anchor in Europe. As a founding member of NATO,
one of the original six members of the EU, and Britain's
strongest ally on continent, the Dutch are an influential
voice in Europe despite having a population of just under 16
million. Prime Minister Balkenende states often that the Dutch
"take their responsibilities seriously" and therefore expect
to be heard. While the Dutch "no" to the EU's constitutional
treaty embarrassed Balkenende, the vote revealed that the
search for EU integration and consensus has its limits,
capping a trend that started in the 90's with then Liberal
Party leader (and later EU Commissioner) Fritz Bolkestein's
proposals to redefine the scope of European integration to
protect Dutch national interests.

5. (S)
With the French-German engine of European integration stalled,
German elections pending, and the EU unable to agree on
finances, leadership opportunities for the Dutch are growing.
This trend is enhanced by the gravitation of EU decision
making to smaller groups, as Dutch participation can make or
break internal groupings. The Dutch and Italian refusal to
attend a "group of six" meeting recently proposed by
Schroeder, for example, effectively squelched his initiative.
The British Ambassador here recently confided that Blair sees
the Dutch as essential to pursuing his European objectives and
ensuring that transatlantic relations remain high on the
European agenda. The leaders of the Netherlands, UK, Norway,
Denmark, and Sweden already meet quietly several times a year
to coordinate positions prior to EU Council and other
high-level EU meetings.

6. (S)
Dutch leadership within the EU does not weaken their
commitment to NATO, where they are "go-to guys" for resolving
potential EU-NATO conflicts. Their active, if often behind the
scenes, support for NATO SYG (and former Dutch Foreign
Minister) Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, as well as their commitment
to the NRF (and SRF, ISAF, and NTM-I), have helped push back
efforts, such as Tervuren, which might otherwise create
tensions between the NRF and EU battlegroups or other emerging
ESDP capabilities. Foreign Minister Bot recently proposed
restructuring NATO's decision-making and funding mechanisms to
make them more effective. The appointment of Herman Schaper,
the former deputy director general of political affairs at the
Dutch MFA and a good friend of the U.S., as the new Dutch
permrep to NATO should create more opportunities for
productive cooperation.

POLITICAL-MILITARY COOPERATION BEYOND THE EU
--------------------------------------------

7. (S)
The Dutch are increasingly aware that strategic interests
 outside Europe warrant their attention and leadership,
 especially in the political-military sphere. For example:

- Venezuela: The Dutch have strategic interests in the
Caribbean (i.e., the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba) and are
deeply concerned about Chavez' meddling in the region. As a
Caribbean power, the Dutch have good reasons to lead an effort
to balance traditional Spanish dominance on Latin American
issues in the EU, but the U.S. and others will need to push
them to take this role. The Dutch are active partners in
regional drug enforcement efforts, and recently demonstrated
their ability to deploy military forces (F-16's) on short
notice. Persuading the Dutch to counter Chavez's
destabilization efforts more actively would give us a reliable
European partner in the region.

- Afghanistan: According to CENTCOM, the Dutch took a strong
lead in organizing and soliciting forces to staff ISAF Phase
III, and are now preparing to deploy up to 1,400 personnel in
conjunction with British, Canadian, and possibly Australian
forces. Separately, the Dutch deployment of Special Forces in
a combat role represents a major shift in Dutch priorities
away from peace-keeping to combat missions for the first time
since the 1960's. The Dutch remain a strong supporter in the
war on terrorism in Afghanistan. We should encourage them both
to continue to make significant contributions, and to push
others to do more.

- Africa: Senior Dutch military officials say they are
considering expanding their military presence in Africa to
include Burundi, Rwanda, Eastern Congo, Botswana, Zambia, and
Ivory Coast, adding new "eyes and ears" on the ground. The
Dutch have requested embedding a cell at EUCOM (similar to
that already operating in CENTCOM) to coordinate their actions
with the U.S. and other allies. One objective of the Dutch
military deployments is to provide a secure environment for
what is already one of the most ambitious assistance programs
in the world. The Dutch are the fourth largest provider of
assistance to Africa world-wide. In 2005 they established a
110 million Euro Stability Fund for security sector reform in
the African Great Lakes Region and Sudan (as well as
Afghanistan and Iraq.) Dutch deployments in Africa have solid
support in Parliament, while the focus on security as an
aspect of development provides an attractive justification for
potential European partners. We should not only encourage the
Dutch to increase their direct involvement in Africa, but also
explore whether the Dutch could act as a "clearinghouse" for
other interested parties. - Iraq: The Dutch were instrumental
in providing early logistic support to U.S. forces in Iraq
(including permitting transshipments through Rotterdam when
other ports in Europe would not.) The Dutch deployed 1,200
troops directly to the southern province of al-Muthanna for 20
months, including two controversial extensions. Although the
Dutch have since withdrawn from al-Muthanna, their presence
provided the political and military cover necessary for Japan
to commit forces. The Dutch provided 25 trainers for the NATO
Training Mission in Iraq, and have offered to provide up to
100 if other countries would make comparable contributions. We
should urge the Dutch to continue to push their EU and NATO
partners to do more in Iraq.

- Middle East: The Dutch enjoy a reputation for "balance"
almost unique in Europe, as they are strong supporters of
Israel, yet trusted by Arabs. Given Foreign Minister Bot's
expressed willingness to take a more active regional role. We
should look for opportunities to harness Dutch interest
through participation in the Forum for the Future and other
initiatives. The Dutch have already promised to make a
financial contribution to an expanded Multinational Observer
Force (MFO) if asked, and, under the right circumstances,
might be prepared to send peace-keepers to the region as well.

8. (S)
These commitments demonstrate how the Dutch "take their
responsibilities seriously" in practice by committing real
resources -- money, troops, hardware, and political capital --
to tackle real problems, as well as their "multiplier" effect
in the political-military realm. The fact that the Dutch are
providing the head (Peter Feith) and observers to the EU's new
monitoring mission in Aceh is the latest example of their
assuming leadership of an important international mission in a
region where they feel special ties (as witnessed by FM Bot's
historic decision this year to attend the commemoration of
Indonesian independence, the first such visit by a senior
Dutch official since Indonesian independence).

9. (S)
The Dutch have one of the largest, most geographically diverse
deployments of military forces in the world, with more troops
deployed as a percentage of their total forces than any other
ally. Defense Minister Kamp and CHOD Berlijn recently
restructured the Dutch military to eliminate layers of
bureaucracy, including independent service chiefs, thereby
creating a leaner, more deployable force. Kamp and Berlijn
believe firmly in the "use or lose" principle, and have
accordingly sought increasingly challenging operations -- such
as the Special Forces deployment to Afghanistan and potential
operations in sub-Saharan Africa. Their desire to maximize the
military's capabilities and their preference for U.S.
equipment, even when alternative European suppliers exist,
make the Dutch strong supporters of the Joint Strike Fighter
(JSF) program. The Dutch are one of only two countries (Italy
is the other) whose financial contributions merit Tier II
status in JSF development. Berlijn is pushing to lock in an
early commitment for 50 planes (out of a total of 85) to
prevent JSF from becoming an issue in the 2007 elections. The
Dutch are also seeking Tactical Tomahawks for Dutch frigates,
additional lift capacity (CH-47, C-130, KDC-10), and are
continuing to update their remaining hardware (AH-64D, F-16's,
Patriot Missile System, etc.) all of which are focused on
meeting their Prague Capability Commitment objectives as well
as their ability to sustain extended expeditionary operations
outside the European theater.

COUNTERTERRORISM COOPERATION
----------------------------

10. (S)
Faced with growing threats in their own country, as witnessed
by the murder of Theo van Gogh in November 2004, the Dutch
believe they are in the forefront of Europe with regard to
counterterrorism, arguing that legislation and other steps
earlier adopted by the Dutch are only now being considered in
countries like the UK and Italy. Led by Justice Minister
Donner and Finance Minister Zalm, the Dutch were the first in
Europe to implement the Container Security Initiative (CSI),
Radiological Gates, DOE's Megaports program, U.S. Customs'
Green Lane Program, and, soon, Trusted Flyers. China has
engaged the Dutch on next generation protocols and standards
for transport security, includng RFID technology. It will be
important to monitor and work with the Dutch as they work with
China. The Dutch have also expressed an interest to
participate in DHS's "Centers of Excellence." While the EU was
arguing with us and itself over releasing personal records to
airlines, the Dutch allowed U.S. immigration teams (IAP) to
operate at Schipol airport. The Dutch were instrumental in
pushing the EU in 2003 to designate Hamas in its entirety as a
terrorist entity; an EU-wide designation of the Dutch branch
of the Al-Aqsa followed. During their EU Presidency the Dutch
hosted an EU-wide seminar to raise awareness of terrorist
financing issues and have offered to host a major
international conference on the same subject in 2006. The
Dutch continue to push for EU designation of Hizballah in its
entirety and to strengthen the EU's "Clearinghouse"
designation process. Given their record, we should continue to
look to the Dutch to launch joint pilot programs in Europe,
and, more generally, to push counterterrorism issues to the
top of the European agenda more generally.

DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE
----------------------

11. (S)
The Netherlands is among the world's leading aid donors,
having budgeted USD 4.2 billion (0.74 percent of GDP, with a
target of raising it to 0.8 percent) in assistance in 2004. It
is a top donor of unearmarked assistance to UN humanitarian
programs. In 2003, the Netherlands introduced a more focused
aid strategy, which phased out smaller aid programs in
wealthier countries. Dutch bilateral aid is now directed to 36
partner countries, including 18 in Africa. In 2003, President
Bush and Prime Minister Balkenende signed an MOU to coordinate
HIV/AIDS programs in Ghana, Zambia, Rwanda and Ethiopia that
emphasizes public-private partnerships. Balkenende recently
expressed interest in using the Millennium Challenge
Corporation as a model for promoting public-private
partnerships world-wide. USAID's involvement with a Heineken
AIDS treatment and education program in Rwanda has been
particularly successful, and the World Bank has adopted it as
a model. Dutch creativity and credibility in development makes
them good potential partners for future joint initiatives with
the U.S. We should also take advantage of their experience and
insights to help shift global aid efforts in the direction of
sustainable long-term development.

CENTER OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS
--------------------------------------------

12. (S)
With the International Court of Justice (ICJ), International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the
Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), the Iran-U.S. Claims
Tribunal, the International Criminal Court (ICC) and other
international legal institutions all located in The Hague, our
ability to have an impact in the Netherlands on international
issues ranging from Iraq to the Balkans is unique. With a
historical interest in international law dating back to
Grotius, the Dutch view themselves as natural defenders of
international legal norms and practices. This tradition made
them the perfect hosts for a conference of Iraqi judges in The
Hague in 2004, and has pushed them to the forefront of
international efforts to train a new generation of Iraqi
jurists. While their legalistic approach can be frustrating,
they are flexible. Their concerns about U.S. interpretations
of the Geneva Protocols have not prevented their Special
Forces from deploying in Afghanistan. The Dutch also helped
sway the EU to vote against the Cuban-sponsored resolution on
Guantanamo at the Human Rights Commission last year despite
concerns about the treatment of detainees. But, as Foreign
Minister Bot told Deputy Secretary Zoellick recently, over the
long run Dutch human rights concerns must be addressed to
ensure that public and parliamentary support does not erode;
we and the Dutch need to work together to resolve this
concern. Finally, the Dutch combination of seeking pragmatic
solutions while remaining true to their legal principles could
make the Dutch an important asset in resolving our differences
with the EU over the ICC and article 98 agreements under the
right circumstances.

ECONOMICS AND TRADE
-------------------

13. (S)
Balkenende shares our interest in promoting an open
international trading system and has been an ally in U.S.-EU
trade disputes such as Boeing-Airbus and the Foreign Sales
Corporation Tax. The Dutch share with the British a vision of
a market-friendly Europe driven by free trade. They are the
third largest investor in the U.S. and the fourth largest
recipient of U.S. investment world-wide. Their efforts to
shift the Lisbon agenda in a more cooperative direction and to
promote innovation and competition are creating additional
opportunities for U.S. investors in Europe. Because the
Netherlands has one of the highest broadband penetrations in
Europe, emerging research efforts in the areas of
nanotechnology, life sciences, and other IT-related areas, and
a new tax treaty, the country offers U.S. companies an
important gateway into Europe. If consulted early and
regularly, the Netherlands can also be an important ally in
navigating the EU's regulatory environment and removing
obstacles.

DRUGS AND TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS
--------------------------------

14. (S)
Narcotics and trafficking in persons remain areas of
difficulty. Despite fundamental differences regarding "soft
drugs" and legalized prostitution, the Balkenende government
has worked to prevent these differences from defining our
relationship. There are also signs that Dutch attitudes may be
shifting. The Dutch remain a major producer of synthetic
drugs. On the other hand, Dutch Health Minister Hoogevorst
recently signed a precedent-setting MOU with the U.S. to share
information on the health risks of new strains of marijuana
with higher concentrations of THC, which may convince the
Dutch to rethink their approach to "soft drugs" in general.
The Dutch are addressing drug tourism -- a recent proposal to
restrict the sale of marijuana to Dutch passport holders in
Maastricht, for example, could cut down on cross-border
smuggling and other drug-related crime. We should support such
initiatives actively.

BALKENENDE SOLID INTERNATIONALLY...
-----------------------------------

15. (S)
We are fortunate to have in the Balkenende government an
outward-looking partner for whom working with the U.S. and the
U.K. comes naturally. Balkenende and FM Bot take pride in
building bridges between the U.S. and Europe. Nowhere was this
more evident than during the Dutch presidency of the EU. On
two issues of great importance to the U.S. -- the China Arms
Embargo and accession talks for Turkey -- the Dutch moved,
with our active urging, from following an EU "consensus" set
by others to redefining the issue on their, and our, terms. In
both cases, Bot and Balkenende overcame initial skepticism and
concluded that Dutch and U.S. interests coincided -- a pattern
we have seen repeated on other less important issues. FM Bot
began the EU presidency telling us that lifting the Arms
Embargo was a "done deal." Later, however, he actively
intervened to prevent a lift on "his" watch, saying that he
did not want the blame for causing a rift between the U.S. and
EU. Despite Balkenende's personal skepticism about bringing
Turkey into the EU, he and Bot (a former Ambassador to Turkey)
worked hard to ensure that Turkey got its date to start
accession talks with the EU during the Dutch presidency, and
want to see the agreement they helped negotiate successfully
implemented. We will want the Dutch to continue to draw on the
relationships they developed during the presidency to coax
both sides to move in the right direction as October 3
approaches.

16. (S)
Specific U.S. policies provoke squalls of anger and
frustration here, but President Bush's visit to the
Netherlands in 2005 to commemorate V-E day at the WWII Dutch
American Cemetery at Margraten was met with universal acclaim
and provoked remarkably little protest. Even Dutch opposed to
U.S. policies warmly welcomed the visit as a reminder of
enduring, shared values forged in the crucibles of World War
II and the Cold War. This mission has pursued an ambitious
program of outreach to future Dutch leaders to ensure that
these emotions are passed to the next generation. In this
effort, the President's youth roundtable in Maastricht and
former Secretary of State Powell's town hall meeting with
young leaders in The Hague were notable successes, which can
serve as models for future efforts. Given the disproportionate
influence wielded by the Dutch in international fora, we
should expand our active exchange programs (including the
Fulbright and International Visitor Leadership Programs) to
help shape the successor generation.

...BUT FACES DOMESTIC CHALLENGES
--------------------------------

17. (S)
Unfortunately, the outward-looking, transatlantic orientation
of the Balkenende cabinet is offset domestically by strong
strains of Euro-centralism and Dutch-provincialism. This
division will become more pronounced as the parties prepare
for local elections in March 2006, and national elections in
May 2007. Current polls show that Balkenende's center-right
coalition (his second government) is falling in the polls,
while the main, center-left opposition Labor party (PvdA) and
fringes on the right and left are gaining. Balkenende is
gambling that his economic reform agenda will pay dividends in
time for the 2007 elections, but that is uncertain. There is a
strong chance that a center-left government dominated by the
PvdA will come to power in 2007 -- or earlier if the 2006
local election results prompt national elections.

18. (S)
Although U.S.-Dutch relations should remain fundamentally
sound despite a shift to the center-left, a PvdA-led
government would present new challenges. PvdA leader Wouter
Bos has made clear his tendency to look to Brussels first in
setting Dutch international priorities. He sees the
Netherlands less as a transatlantic "bridge builder" than as a
follower of EU consensus. As with Schroeder in Germany, Bos
might also find it tempting to adopt a critical attitude
toward the U.S. during elections to lock in his left flank.
The PvdA is already raising allegations of U.S. abuses to
challenge the rationale for Dutch deployments in Afghanistan,
and does not support the JSF program. It is in our interest
both to support the current government's transatlantic
orientation and to engage actively with the opposition to
shift them in a favorable direction.

THE ISLAMIC FACTOR
------------------

19. (S)
A new, but potentially serious factor in Dutch domestic
politics is its large, poorly integrated Muslim population,
currently numbering just under 1 million, or 5.8 percent of
the population. USG-sponsored polls show that 83 percent of
Dutch Muslims identify much more strongly with their religion
than with their host country, while 51 percent have little or
no faith in the Dutch government as an institution. While the
problems of Dutch integration captured international headlines
following the van Gogh murder, the Dutch believe they have an
early start on the rest of Europe in seeking creative ways to
address these concerns. Their strong interest in sharing and
soliciting ideas has opened up opportunities for Embassy and
USG outreach and consultations throughout Dutch society,
providing insights into a growing problem throughout Europe.
We expect our experiences here will provide good indications
of broader European trends as well as opportunities to
influence their direction.

CONCLUSIONS
-----------

20. (S)
The Netherlands is a complicated, multi-layered society.
Prevailing myths about the Dutch -- e.g., they are homogenous,
universally tolerant, pacifist, etc.-- do not accurately gauge
differences within society or reflect Dutch potential to
influence international events. While the Dutch prefer to see
themselves as "balancing" between Europe and the U.S., this
balance can shift due to domestic and international factors.

21. (S)
The key to maximizing Dutch effectiveness is to involve them
early through high-level consultations and exchanges. Dutch
pragmatism and our similar world-views make the Netherlands
fertile ground for initiatives others in Europe might be
reluctant, at least initially, to embrace.

22. (S)
As multipliers, the Dutch should be encouraged to play an
increasingly prominent role on the global stage. Coaxing the
Dutch into the spotlight can take effort, but pays off
royally. Dutch credentials, credibility, and capabilities make
them effective leaders across a wide range of geographic
regions and substantive issues.

23. (S)
The Dutch are actively and favorably involved in Afghanistan,
Africa, Iraq, the Middle East, the Balkans, the Caribbean,
Indonesia, and elsewhere. They are our best partner in
developing pilot projects in the counterterrorism area, and
are world leaders in development, free trade, international
law and human rights. In pursuit of U.S. interests in all
these areas of interest and leadership, we should build upon
our successes to date to take the Dutch to the "next level."

SOBEL
</pre>