S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 TALLINN 000114
SIPDIS FOR EUR/NB MIGUEL RODRIGUEZ
E.O. 12958 DECL: 04/27/2019
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, RS, GG, EN
SUBJECT: ESTONIA'S PESSIMISTIC APPROACH TO RUSSIA
Classified by: CDA Karen Decker for reasons 1.4 (b) & (d)
REF: A) MOSCOW 562 B) 07 TALLINN 366 C) IIR 6954003409

1. (S//NF)
SUMMARY: The Government of Estonia (GOE) generally prefers to
handle bilateral issues with Russia quietly, focusing on
working-level issues of mutual interest and deferring policy
discussions to the EU and NATO. The recent spate of
high-level, Estonia-Russia consultations is, therefore, a
positive development, but GOE leaders have little confidence
these talks will result in significant achievements and are
unlikely to press for more substantive bilateral engagement in
the near term. Russia's August 2008 invasion of Georgia
solidified Estonian defense planners' assessment that Russia
remains Estonia's biggest threat and that homeland defense
capabilities must remain an essential part of long-term
defense planning. Strong but narrowly-focused USG support has
been and will continue to be vital to encourage GOE efforts to
build a constructive bilateral relationship with Russia that
remains focused on shared US/EU/NATO goals. END SUMMARY.

POLITICS STRAINED; OUTLOOK PESSIMISTIC

2. (C)
Estonia's political ties with Russia, best characterized as
"strained" since Estonian re-independence in 1991, reached a
new low in April 2007 when the GOE removed a Soviet-era statue
from downtown Tallinn, sparking two days of riots (the "Bronze
Soldier riots") by primarily Russian speakers in Estonia.
Subsequent cyber attacks, widely believed to have been
orchestrated by Russia (REF B), led to harsh rhetoric between
Moscow and Tallinn in which each side claimed the moral high
ground. In the aftermath of these events, the bilateral
relationship entered a "deep freeze" that has lasted until
this year.

3. (C)
The Russian invasion of Georgia in August 2008 and Estonia's
vocal support for Georgian territorial integrity deepened the
divide, but also created some momentum on the Estonian side to
tend more actively to the relationship. In December 2008, for
the first time in more than two years, Estonian Foreign
Minister Paet and Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov met (on the
margins of Northern Dimension and OSCE ministerials). In
January 2009, Estonian MFA Secretary General Kook and Russian
DFM Titov met in Tallinn and agreed to the resumption of
regular exchanges (REF A).

4. (C)
These consultations have been characterized as "business-like
but friendly." Our MFA colleagues will say they reflect
progress on Estonian-Russian relations, but privately, GOE
officials are doubtful that bilateral talks will lead to any
substantive progress in the relationship. Mart Volmer, the
Estonian MFA's Director for Russia told us he believes good
relations with Russia are not a "realistic goal." He also
emphasized that Estonia cannot commit to "business as usual"
as long as Russia is in violation of the six-point peace plan
with Georgia. Substantively, the Paet-Lavrov and Kook-Titov
discussions focused on practical issues including border-
crossing delays, bridge repairs, search and rescue
cooperation, pensions and visas. (Note: Working-level contacts
on most of these issues are and have been ongoing, such as
regular contacts between Russian and Estonian border guards.
End Note.) These consultations did not include
politically-charged issues like ratification of the
Estonia-Russia border treaty (which has languished since 2005-
see para 5) and Georgia.

5. (C)
Kyllike Sillaste Elling, Foreign Policy Advisor to the Prime
Minister, told PolChief that "there is little political will
on either side to change the current relationship." Before the
2007 riots, Estonia had tried what she called a "positive
engagement policy" at the working level to keep lines of
communication open. The GOE also made it a policy to ignore
"incendiary" Russian propaganda aimed at Estonia. This policy
was not particularly effective, Sillaste-Elling acknowledged,
in moving the relationship forward (Note: After the 2007 cyber
attacks and attacks on the resident Estonian Ambassador in
Moscow, the GOE appealed publicly for international support in
pressuring Russia to stop interfering in Estonian internal
affairs and ensure Geneva Convention protection for Estonian
diplomats. End Note.) Relations wouldn't improve,
Sillste-Elling continued, until Russia and Estonia agreed on
how to address their different perspectives on WWII history

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(including the nature of Soviet annexation of the Baltics in
1940 and Russian accusations that Estonia supports fascism).
GOE officials also remain wary of Russian attempts to
embarrass Estonian officials in public. Estonian President
Ilves walked out of a 2008 Finno-Ugric conference in Russia
after Russian MP Konstantin Kosachev alleged that Ilves'
speech contained a thinly veiled call for the break-up of
Russia.

6. (C)
Sillaste-Elling also said that taking a more proactive stance
with Russia is politically risky for Estonia, both
domestically and within the EU. At home, any effort by PM
Ansip to engage directly with either Putin or Medvedev would
open him up to significant criticism from political rivals,
regardless of the outcome. Normally pragmatic Estonian
politicians become particularly uncompromising on the topic of
Estonia's border treaty with Russia. Although a treaty was, in
fact, signed in 2005, it stalled during ratification when the
Estonian Parliament inserted a reference to the Tartu Peace
Treaty of 1920 (which established Russian recognition of an
independent Estonia and renounced "in perpetuity" all Russian
rights to Estonian territory). Russia's Duma subsequently
withdrew its signature from the document, and the treaty is in
limbo. In July 2008, President Ilves suggested the Estonian
parliament consider removing the reference and moving forward.
The idea fueled a short-lived public debate, but Estonian
politicians could not reach consensus to even re-open formal
discussions and the idea was abandoned.

7. (C)
GOE officials believe making overtures to Moscow is also risky
for Estonia within the EU. The GOE is very concerned that if
it reaches out to Moscow, other EU members will use the
opportunity to pressure Estonia to make further concessions
the country is not willing to make. Sillaste-Elling admitted
that the GOE has not "done a good enough job explaining
Estonia's position" to its partners ("like the French," she
said). Estonia is not Russophobic, she asserted, but is
genuinely afraid of the "constant pressure the Russians exert"
to undermine Estonia. This fear makes the GOE hesitant to
change the status quo. (Note: As Estonia prepares for local
elections in October, this concern will intensify. Non-
citizen Russian-speakers resident in Estonia (Russian citizens
and stateless) are eligible to vote in local elections. GOE
politicians and security forces often allege the Kremlin
intends to manipulate Estonian domestic politics through these
groups. End note.)

8. (C)
For now, GOE officials place a premium on consensus within the
EU and NATO on Russia. Estonia's balancing act was evident in
the positive position it took on re-engagement with Russia in
the context of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC). Despite their
misgivings, Estonian officials know there are benefits to
cooperation with Russia on issues of joint concern like non-
proliferation, Afghanistan and terrorism. At the same time,
however, our GOE interlocutors have little faith these
discussions will yield any result. Paul Teesalu, MFA Director
of Security Policy, recently commented that it does not appear
that Russia is as eager to come to the table as NATO, and
emphasized the importance Estonia places on keeping Georgia on
the NRC agenda. In his view, the NRC needs to remind Russia
that Georgia will "cast a shadow" on future cooperation and
that Allies will not "simply forget" what happened.

9. (C)
While Estonia is willing to defer to consensus decisions in
the EU and NATO, the GOE is also clearly frustrated by the
inability of either organization to reach a consensus on
critical Qsues related to Russia, including energy security.
One influential MP, Marko Mikelson, lamented the EU's lack of
consistency in its approach to Russia, noting that NOT
isolating Russia appeared to be more important to some
countries than supporting new democracies on the Russian belt.
Estonian President Ilves has been exceptionally vocal on the
need for NATO and the EU to take a stronger, more unified
approach to Russia. He has publicly urged NATO to develop a
coherent strategy to deal with a "belligerent, aggressive"
Russia, but privately he laments NATO's inability to do so.
President Ilves also routinely complains about Russia's use of
energy to wield political influence in Europe, noting the
close relationship between Gazprom executives and certain EU
leaders.

HOMELAND DEFENSE: JUST A LITTLE BIT PARANOID

10. (C)
While Estonia works to temper its political

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stance on Russia, its defensive posture emphasizes internal
defensive capabilities, based on an almost- paranoid
perception of an imminent Russian attack. The GOE's new
ten-year Defense Development Plan (DDP) for 2009-2018,
published in January, was finalized after Russia's 2008
invasion of Georgia (ref C). While the DDP is consistent with
NATO collective defense priorities, it also clearly reflects
defense planners' intent to expand development of territorial
and initial defense capabilities. The DDP calls for Estonia to
invest in improvements to early warning assets, air defense,
anti- tank, and armored maneuver capabilities to discourage
aggression and to improve capabilities to support Article V
contingency operations. The DDP retains conscription, expands
the size of both the active duty and reserve forces and
significantly increases the quantity and quality of reserve
training.

11. (C)
In public comments, Minister of Defense Aaviksoo has noted
that Estonia needs a solid infrastructure capable of serving
as a deterrent so Estonia would not have to defend itself, but
also that Estonia "should be able to put up resistance if the
need arose." These expenditures on internal defense will
compete for shrinking resources Estonia needs for the
development of a lighter, more agile and deployable force
capable of supporting NATO and other international operations.

12. (C)
COMMENT: Against this backdrop, the Embassy has limited, but
important, influence. Working on areas of mutual interest,
such as the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, is
one of only a handful of issues on which Estonia and Russia
(and the U.S. and the Dutch) regularly meet. USPTO-funded
training in customs and trademark enforcement at the border is
another source of engagement, as is the environment and
activities to combat digital piracy. Both State and DoD
offices reiterate the need for Estonia to develop a modern
military useful to NATO, and not focus on heavy armor to repel
a land attack from the east. We will continue to look for
opportunities to promote Estonian-Russian engagement and to
allay Estonia"s security concerns. END COMMENT.

DECKER