C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 002334
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/18/2017
TAGS: PREL, MARR, ETRD, UNSC, OSCE, AM, AJ, EN, GG, RS
SUBJECT: A/S FRIED'S MEETING WITH DFM KARASIN: ESTONIA, GEORGIA
Classified By: DCM Daniel A. Russell, Reason: 1.4 (b, d)

Summary
-------

1. (C)
EUR A/S Fried and Russian DFM Karasin's May 15 discussion
focused on Estonia and Georgia. Fried assured Karasin that the
U.S. supports the independence and sovereignty of Russia's
neighbors and their freedom from a Russian sphere of influence
-- but also urges them to develop good relations with Russia.
Issues such as World War II monuments are emotional on both
sides; both Russia and its neighbors must take these emotions
into account. Karasin viewed the situation in South Ossetia
(Georgia) as alarming. He said the Sanakoyev "alternative
government" is creating nervousness in South Ossetia that has
led to ill-considered actions. Fried replied that political
steps cannot justify violence. Fried believed that recent
prisoner releases in Abkhazia have set the stage for further
progress. Karasin said one Abkhaz prisoner remains unaccounted
for. Karasin said talks with the Georgians will continue; if
Saakashvili attends the June 9-10 CIS Summit he will get a
meeting with Putin (unless he makes that a condition of his
attendance). Karasin briefly raised the possibility of a
statement by the two presidents on Nagorno-Karabakh at the G-8
Summit and the Russian candidate for OSCE Head of Mission in
Armenia. End Summary.

Russia and Its Neighbors
------------------------

2. (C)
EUR A/S Daniel Fried met with Russian DFM Grigoriy Karasin for
one and a half hours May 15. Fried led off by describing the
Secretary's constructive approach to Russian-U.S. relations.
Karasin complained of U.S. actions on missile defense and a
statement by a U.S. official in opposition to Putin's
recently-concluded deal for Central Asian oil. He complained
that U.S. and EU statements on Estonia would not lead to a
"positive atmosphere," though he admitted that Russia's
actions were not "elegant."

3. (C)
Fried replied that we view Russia as a partner on our most
vital issues, though the partnership is not living up to its
potential. We do have difficulties with Russia over its
relations with its neighbors and differences over certain
internal developments. We start off from the position that the
neighbors are truly independent and sovereign, and not part of
a Russian sphere of influence. At the same time, they need to
develop good relations with Russia and not provoke it.
Estonia's actions in removing the Soviet WWII memorial were
not wise, and we told the Estonians so. We made the statements
to which Karasin objected after Russian mobs over-reacted. On
gas pipelines, Fried reiterated that we favor a diversity of
routes to take Central Asian oil and gas to market -- both
through Russia and outside it.

4. (C)
Karasin stressed the depth of Russian feeling about World War
II, and said that monuments are symbols for these feelings,
just as flags are for national sentiment. Fried agreed, but
reiterated that Estonians, Poles and Ukrainians (Western,
especially) also have deep feelings about World War II, and
they are very different feelings, though equally based on real
events. The Russians need to understand this.

5. (C)
Karasin said the partnership of which Fried spoke must be
based on equality and mutual respect; these do not appear in
some American rhetoric. Fried replied that we see most of the
sharp language coming from the Russian side. The Secretary and
Defense Secretary Gates have both taken a SIPDIS positive
tone, and Fried had tried to do likewise in his recent speech
in Berlin.

South Ossetia
-------------

6. (C)
Fried asked for Karasin's views on South Ossetia, pressing the
Russians to ensure that monitors reach the village of Avnevi,
where recent incidents started. Karasin was unaware that
monitors had not been there and said he would look into it.
Fried noted a recent Russian statement critical of South
Ossetian misdeeds, and we appreciate that objectivity. He
reminded Karasin that the U.S. consistently warns Georgia
against military adventurism under any circumstances, and
noted that Georgia "says the right things" in reply and have
been doing the right things.

7. (C)
Karasin said the situation in South Ossetia is alarming. The
Ossetians are nervous about the Sanakoyev government and are
taking steps that are "not well thought out." Karasin
recounted the May 7 standoff between South Ossetians and
Russian and OSCE monitors, in which Ossetian

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forces fired in the air to prevent the monitors from
confiscating illegal anti-aircraft weapons. Subsequently,
Kokoity declared a blockade of Georgian enclaves and demanded
the liquidation of the Sanakoyev regime and an end to the
Georgian passport checks on the Trans-Caucasus Highway. Russia
urged restraint on both Kokoity and the Georgians.
Ambassador-at-Large Popov left for Georgia May 15 to calm the
situation.

8. (C)
Fried responded that Karasin may be right analytically that
nervousness over the Sanakoyev government led to the South
Ossetian reaction. However, whatever Georgia has done, and
there was also something that could be said in defense of
Georgia's support for Sanakoyev, resorting to violence is not
justified. It was wrong when Georgia did it; it is wrong when
South Ossetia does it. Georgia is acting more constructively
than it was one or two years ago. It is taking political
steps, not military. Russia may not like the political steps,
but it is better that they are political, not military. Fried
said that the recent incidents show that there must be a
permanent JPKF post at Didi Gupta to keep heavy weapons out of
the hands of the South Ossetians. Karasin praised the
leadership of the JPKF as serious, responsible and impartial.

9. (C)
Karasin raised the recent Russian assistance delegation to
South Ossetia led by DPM Bukayev. Russia wants to intensify
the social rehabilitation of the area. Experts in transport,
health and construction were on the delegation, as was
Ambassador Popov. Russia will not channel its aid through the
OSCE, because it wants to avoid spending money on unneeded
projects. But Russia wants to be transparent. The delegation
invited Georgian officials to join it, so they could see
exactly what projects Russia had in mind. Regrettably, the
Georgians refused. Fried was glad to hear the Russian desire
for transparency. He hoped the Russians will work with the
Georgians, not just provide direct support for Kokoity.
Economic development must be in ways acceptable to all sides.

Abkhazia
--------

10. (C)
Fried said we were encouraged by UNSCR 1752 and by the
reciprocal releases of hostages. 1752 should provide the basis
for moving forward, and this could be discussed at a
"Geneva-style" meeting in New York with the participation of
Abkhaz "FM" Shamba. The U.S. is finalizing a package of
proposals. They will include ways to reduce tensions in Gali,
secure agreement on a package providing for IDP return and
commitments not to use force, ways to combat criminality, and
ways to address the human rights situation, including in Gali.
Accomplishing these steps will require the U.S. and Russia to
cooperate.

11. (C)
With regard to the hostage releases, Karasin explained that
the Georgians had freed one hostage -- Chakaberia -- but not
the other, Sigua. Karasin met with Bagapsh after Chakaberia's
release and asked him to release at least one of the Georgian
students the Abkhaz were holding. Bagapsh had released all
three on the basis of what he understood to be Georgian
commitments -- commitments Georgia did not fulfill. Instead,
Saakashvili was publicizing his accomplishment in getting the
Georgian students freed. Sigua must be found. Measures must be
taken to restore confidence. Fried said he did not know what
promises Georgia may have made on Sigua, but they needed to be
fulfilled.

12. (C)
Karasin concluded the discussion of the frozen conflicts with
two points. First, the sides need to meet. The South Ossetians
and Georgians need to talk in the context of the Joint
Coordination Council. The Abkhaz and Georgians need to talk
directly. Second, the "puffing up" of Sanakoyev is not just
political; it goes hand in hand with preparations for action
by "Georgia's military machine." There is danger in the logic
of military actions. Georgia needs to end its preparations for
conflict. Fried agreed that the danger of conflict exists.
Instead of waiting passively for the next crisis, we should
put the peace processes on a good course. Direct talks between
the Georgians and Abkhaz and Georgians and South Ossetians are
important. Fried agreed that rhetoric must be toned down. The
Georgian Ministry of Internal Affairs needs to act responsibly.
The Georgians should adhere to the 1994 Moscow Agreement's
provisions on Kodori, and should be transparent to UNOMIG.

Russia-Georgia
--------------

13. (C)
Karasin said he had spoken at length with Georgian

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Parliament Speaker Nino Burjanadze, who led Georgia's
delegation to Yeltsin's funeral. He complained to her of
continued insulting rhetoric. Georgia's Minister of Internal
Affairs has become the most "disturbing" member of the
Georgian government. Georgians should not stubbornly stick to
an anti-Russian line; the two countries are neighbors, after
all.

14. (C)
Contacts continue, Karasin said. Georgian DFM Manjgaladze is
coming soon. Preparations are under way for a Putin-Saakashvili
meeting on the margins of the June 9-10 CIS Economic Summit in
St. Petersburg. Karasin explained to Burjanadze that
Saakashvili should not condition his willingness to attend the
summit on getting a meeting with Putin. Rather, Saakashvili
should just signal his attendance and, Karasin assured
Burjanadze, he would get his meeting.

15. (C)
Ultimately, Karasin said, everything depends on Georgia's
willingness to take visible steps to normalize relations.
Fried replied that normalization also means reopening the
border that Russia has closed; re-starting direct air links
that Russia has grounded; and ending the Russian bans on
imports of agricultural goods, wine and mineral water. Fried
was glad Saakashvili is coming; there is much to discuss.

Nagorno-Karabakh
----------------

16. (C)
Karasin noted that there are many meetings on NK, but they did
not appear likely to lead to a breakthrough this year. He
asked Fried whether the mediators should think of a joint
effort -- such as an appeal by the Presidents on the margins
of the G-8 meeting. This could have its downside if the sides
failed to move. Fried said he would discuss the issue with our
negotiator, EUR DAS Matt Bryza. The G-8 Foreign Ministers are
meeting before the summit; that might also provide a venue for
action on NK.

OSCE Mission in Armenia
-----------------------

17. (C)
Karasin asked for Fried's support for the Russian candidate to
be OSCE Head of Mission in Yerevan. The incumbent, whose term
is up, is a Russian and has done a good job. A Russian, Sergey
Kapinos, should replace him. Fried agreed to look at the
suggestion.

18. (U)
Assistant Secretary Fried has cleared this message.

BURNS