S E C R E T SEOUL 000272

SIPDIS

EO 12958 DECL: 02/22/2034
TAGS PREL, PGOV, KNNP, ECON, SOCI, KS, KN, JA, CH
SUBJECT: VFM CHUN YOUNG-WOO ON SINO-NORTH KOREAN RELATIONS

Classified By: AMB D. Kathleen Stephens. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).

Summary
-------

¶1. (S) Vice Foreign Minister Chun Yung-woo told the
Ambassador February 17th that China would not be able to stop
North Korea's collapse following the death of Kim Jong-il
(KJI). The DPRK, Chun said, had already collapsed
economically and would collapse politically two to three
years after the death of Kim Jong-il. Chun dismissed ROK
media reports that Chinese companies had agreed to pump 10
billion USD into the North's economy. Beijing had "no will"
to use its modest economic leverage to force a change in
Pyongyang's policies -- and the DPRK leadership "knows it."
It was "a very bad thing" that Wu Dawei -- whom Chun
characterized as "the most incompetent official in China" --
had retained his position as chief of the PRC's 6PT
delegation. Describing a generational difference in Chinese
attitudes toward North Korea, Chun claimed Vice Foreign
Minister Cui Tiankai and another senior PRC official from
the younger generation both believed Korea should be unified
under ROK control. Chun acknowledged the Ambassador's point
that a strong ROK-Japan relationship would help Tokyo accept
a reunified Korean Peninsula. End summary.

VFM Chun on Sino-North Korean Relations...
------------------------------------------

¶2. (S) During a February 17 lunch hosted by Ambassador
Stephens that covered other topics (septel), ROK Vice Foreign
Minister and former ROK Six-Party Talks (6PT) Head of
Delegation Chun Yung-woo predicted that China would not be
able to stop North Korea's collapse following the death of
Kim Jong-il (KJI). The DPRK, Chun said, had already collapsed
economically; following the death of KJI, North Korea would
collapse politically in "two to three years." Chun dismissed
ROK media reports that Chinese companies had agreed to pump
10 billion USD into the North's economy; there was "no
substance" to the reports, he said. The VFM also ridiculed
the Chinese foreign ministry's "briefing" to the ROK embassy
in Beijing on Wang Jiarui's visit to North Korea; the
unidentified briefer had "basically read a Xinhua press
release," Chun groused, adding that the PRC interlocutor had
been unwilling to answer simple questions like whether Wang
had flown to Hamhung or taken a train there to meet KJI.

¶3. (S) The VFM commented that China had far less influence
on North Korea "than most people believe." Beijing had "no
will" to use its economic leverage to force a change in
Pyongyang's policies and the DPRK leadership "knows it." Chun
acknowledged that the Chinese genuinely wanted a
denuclearized North Korea, but the PRC was also content with
the status quo. Unless China pushed North Korea to the "brink
of collapse," the DPRK would likely continue to refuse to
take meaningful steps on denuclearization.

...Chinas "Most Incompetent" Official...
-----------------------------------------

¶4. (S) Turning to the Six Party Talks, Chun said it was "a
very bad thing" that Wu Dawei had retained his position as
chief of the PRC's delegation. It had been the ROKs
expectation that Vice Foreign Minister Cui Tiankai, who was
hastily transferred from Tokyo back to Beijing, would be
taking over from Wu. Chun said it appeared that the DPRK
"must have lobbied extremely hard" for the now-retired Wu
to stay on as China's 6PT chief. The VFM complained
that Wu is the PRC's "most incompetent official,"
an arrogant, Marx-spouting former Red Guard who "knows nothing
about North Korea, nothing about nonproliferation and is hard
to communicate with because he doesn't speak English." Wu was
also a hardline nationalist, loudly proclaiming -- to anyone
willing to listen -- that the PRC's economic rise represented
a "return to normalcy" with China as a great world power.

...China's "New Generation" of Korea-Hands...
---------------------------------------------

¶5. (S) Sophisticated Chinese officials like Cui Tiankai and
Chinese Communist Party Central Committee International
Department Vice Director Liu Jieyi stood in sharp contrast
to Wu, according to VFM Chun. Citing private conversations
during previous sessions of the Six Party Talks, Chun
claimed Cui and Liu both believed Korea should be unified
under ROK control. The two officials, Chun said, were ready
to "face the new reality" that the DPRK now had little value
to China as a buffer state -- a view that since North Korea's
2006 nuclear test had reportedly gained traction among senior
PRC leaders.

...PRC Actions In A DPRK Collapse Scenario...
---------------------------------------------

¶6. (S) Chun argued that, in the event of a North Korean
collapse, China would clearly "not welcome" any U.S. military
presence north of the DMZ. Again citing his conversations
with Cui Tiankai and Liu Jieyi, Chun XXXXX said the PRC
would be comfortable with a reunified Korea controlled by
Seoul and anchored to the United States in a "benign
alliance" -- as long as Korea was not hostile towards China.
Tremendous trade and labor-export opportunities for Chinese
companies, Chun said, would also help salve PRC concerns
about living with a reunified Korea. Chun dismissed the
prospect of a possible PRC military intervention in the event
of a DPRK collapse, noting that China's strategic economic
interests now lie with the United States, Japan, and South
Korea -- not North Korea. Moreover, Chun argued, bare-knuckle
PRC military intervention in a DPRK internal crisis could
"strengthen the centrifugal forces in China's minority areas."

...and Japan
------------

¶7. (S) Chun acknowledged the Ambassador's point that a
strong ROK-Japan relationship would help Tokyo accept a
reunified Korean Peninsula under Seoul's control. Chun
asserted that, even though "Japan's preference" was to keep
Korea divided, Tokyo lacked the leverage to stop
reunification in the event the DPRK collapses.

STEPHENS