In the 2011-01-13 07:37 Wiokileaks release of this cable, the part about the 'unimpressive results' of Swiss prosecutors against suspected Al-Qaeda operatives in Switzerland was redacted. This part was unredacted in the 2011-05-02 23:01 release (but that release was broken in various other ways: a double header, and a backslash added to each line). Below this cable as from the first release, but with the unredacted part from the second release added in red.
Date: 2006-01-20 16:53
VZCZCXRO7442 PP RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR DE RUEHSW #0141/01 0201653 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 201653Z JAN 06 FM AMEMBASSY BERN TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1431 INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUCNFB/FBI WASHDC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 2436 RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BERN 000141
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR S/CT, EB, EUR/AGS
FBI FOR OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS
TREASURY FOR OFAC
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/20/2016
TAGS: PTER PARM ETTC SZ
SUBJECT: SWISS COUNTERTERRORISM OVERVIEW - SCENESETTER FOR
FBI DIRECTOR MUELLER REF: A. BERN 100 B. BERN 10 C. 2005 BERN 1865
Classified By: Pol/Econ Counselor Eric Sandberg, Reasons 1.4 b/d
1.(C) Summary: Switzerland and Liechtenstein are considered
low-threat target for terrorist attacks, but Bern
acknowledges that Islamist groups could use the country as a
transit point, logistics center, or haven for terrorist
finances. While violent crime in both countries is relatively
low, officials remain concerned about international organized
criminal groups and extreme right-wing and left-wing
political elements who occasionally mobilize for
demonstrations surrounding major events, such as the annual
World Economic Forum in Davos. Swiss officials maintain that
there are few Islamic extremists in the country, but a small
number of arrests in the past two years suggests there may be
more under the surface. Bilateral law enforcement and
intelligence cooperation is improving, but at a gradual pace;
Swiss leaders insist that they can address the threat with
little outside assistance. The Swiss media and individual
members of Parliament have placed a greater focus on alleged
USG wrongdoings in the War on Terror than on the terrorist
threat itself. As for Liechtenstein, officials work very
cooperatively with USG counterparts, as they seek to
ameliorate their reputation as a money-laundering center. End
Summary.
Anti-Terror Measures
--------------------
2.(U) Switzerland implemented UN sanctions even prior to
becoming a full member in 2002. Along with UN lists, the
Swiss Economic and Finance ministries have drawn up their own
list of around 44 individuals and entities connected with
international terrorism (Al-Qaeda) or its financing. Swiss
authorities have thus far blocked about 82 accounts totaling
$28 million (SFr 34 million) from individuals or companies
linked to Osama bin Laden and Al-Qaeda under UN resolutions.
The Swiss Federal Prosecutor also froze separately 41
accounts representing about $28 million (SFr 34 millions) on
the ground they were related to terrorist financing. Swiss
officials estimate significant overlap between the US and UN
lists. Switzerland signed and ratified all of the 12 UN
anti-terrorism conventions as of September 2003.
3.(U) For its part, Liechtenstein has frozen about $145
thousand in Taliban/Al-Qaeda assets under UNSC Resolution
1267. The principality has taken notable strides to combat
money laundering and other illegal activity since 1999; it
joined the Egmont Group in 2001, signed a mutual legal
assistance treaty with the United States in 2003, and was
FATF certified that same year. Liechtenstein has also
ratified all of the relevant UN conventions.
Bilateral Cooperation
---------------------
4.(C) Following 9/11, the Swiss agreed to sign an operative
working agreement (OWA) with the USG permitting intensified
information sharing on Al-Qaeda and allowing an FBI agent to
sit in the Federal Criminal Police Counterterrorism Unit. We
are in the final stages of negotiating a broadened OWA to
allow joint investigations on counterterrorism matters. As
forthcoming as some contacts are, the Swiss law enforcement
community in general remain reluctant to open up to the
United States. The sentiment was expressed best by Justice
Minister Blocher to the Ambassador. Blocher said that
Switzerland shared America's counterterrorism goals;
Switzerland will worry about Switzerland, and the U.S. can
worry about the rest of the world. The least cooperative
Swiss agency (with us and with other Swiss agencies) is the
Federal Service for Analysis and Prevention (DAP) -- the
internal intelligence service. The external service, under
the Swiss Department of Defense, is more cooperative.
5.(C) In many ways, Liechtenstein officials are a model of
what we wish the Swiss would become. Shocked by the
international notoriety it earned in the 1990s, officials in
the tiny principality decided to join FATF and cooperate with
partners. The MLAT it signed with the United States in 2003
BERN 00000141 002 OF 004
was the first of its kind for Liechtenstein. They make as much
use of it as do our law enforcement agencies.
Significant counterterrorism investigations
-------------------------------------------
6.(C) Swiss prosecutors have launched several investigations
of suspected Al-Qaeda operatives in Switzerland. As yet,
prosecutors have had unimpressive results.
-- September 11: The 9/11 attacks resulted in greater external
intelligence and police cooperation between the United States
and Switzerland, as well as with Liechtenstein. After a
significant delay, the Swiss agreed to share phone records
from Al-Qaeda operatives using anonymous Swisscom phones. The
use of these phones by terrorists prompted the Parliament two
years later to require identification documents for Swisscom
subscribers.
-- Al-Taqwa: In December 2001, Switzerland froze the assets of
Al-Taqwa Management, a financial services firm accused by the
United States of helping to fund Al-Qaeda. Swiss police raided
Al-Taqwa's offices and froze the assets of its board members.
In March 2005, managing director Youssef Nada lodged an appeal
with the Federal Criminal Court to have charges dropped for
lack of evidence of criminal wrongdoing. Nada acknowledged
that he was an Islamic activist and member of the Muslim
Brotherhood, but denied he was connected to terrorist
financing. The Swiss Federal Prosecutor, frustrated by the
lack of cooperation from Bahamian authorities regarding
aspects of Al-Taqwa's activities there and otherwise
pessimistic about attaining sufficient evidence to convict,
dropped the case in June 2005. The Swiss government was
required to pay legal compensation to Nada.
-- Yassin Qadi: After the United States named Saudi Arabian
businessman Yassin Qadi a global terrorist and the UN placed
him under sanctions, Switzerland froze $21 million in Qadi's
assets held in a Geneva bank.
-- Jerba Bombing: Since the Jerba Bombings in April 2002, Swiss
officials have been investigating the whereabouts of a Swiss
citizen, Mohamed Ben Hedi, who had been secretary of the Salah
Islamic Center in Biel.
-- Riyadh Bombings: As a result of investigations following
the May 2003 bombings in Riyadh, Swiss police in January 2004
arrested ten Muslims who were suspected of providing
logistical support for the attacks. The remaining three
suspects were released on their own recognizance in late 2005.
-- Madrid Bombings: In the fall of 2004, Spanish police
identified Mohamed Achraf -- a rejected asylum seeker in
Switzerland awaiting deportation -- as the suspected
ringleader of a Salafist group "Martyrs of Morocco" that was
plotting to bomb the Spanish High Court. News of the Spanish
investigation surprised Zurich cantonal police, who had not
been informed by the Swiss internal service, DAP. Achraf was
deported to Spain in January 2005.
-- Internet Incitement: In March, 2005, Swiss authorities
arrested Malika Al-Aroed, charging her and her husband, Moez
Garsallaoui, a "Tunisian fundamentalist," with "posting
manuals for the manufacture of bombs," as well as "images of
murder" on the website www.islamic-minibar.com. According to
press reports, Al-Aroed had been acquitted in Brussels in 2003
of charges that she was involved in the attack on Afghan
opposition leader Ahmad Shah Mas'ud. The presiding judge there
had called her a "dangerous extremist." Another Islamist of
Egyptian origin, Muhammed Al-Ghanam, was apprehended using the
Geneva University server to spread extremist messages, but was
not arrested.
-- Yeslam Bin Ladin: In August 2005, the Swiss Federal Court
halted Swiss legal assistance to a French investigation of
two companies owned by Yeslam Bin Ladin (Osama's half
brother) after an appeal by the companies.
Muslims in Switzerland
----------------------
7.(U) The Muslim population in Switzerland has grown rapidly
BERN 00000141 003.2 OF 004
in the last two decades, now reaching around 310,000, or 4.3
percenQ the Swiss population. The majority of these, roughly
200,000, come from former Yugoslavia and tend to be moderate
or secular in their views. Another 70,000 are of Turkish
background, have long been in Switzerland, and are also
moderate. Only the North African population, largely from
Morocco, are seen as a possible source of Islamic extremism.
There are no Islamic political parties in Switzerland; the
Muslim population is divided along ethnic lines. There are
only two mosque buildings in SwitzerlandQn Zurich aQeneva),
but over a hundred makeshift Islamic centers operate.
8.(SBU) While Swiss authorities recognize that the Muslim
population could contain extremists, they rate the threat
from right-wing Neo-nazis and left-wing Swiss political
extremists as being much higher. Swiss authorities believe
that those Islamists present consider the country a "refuge"
rather than a "place to carry out operations." A Special
Report on Extremism issued late last year maintains that
almost all radical groups represented in Switzerland are
Sunni organizations whose primary goals are the establishment
of Islamic governments in their homelands. The principal
groups in this category are En Nahdha, the Tunisian Islamic
Front, the Muslim Brotherhood, the Islamic Salvation Front
(FIS), the Armed Islamic Group (GIA), the Salafist Group for
Preaching and Combat (GSPC), Hamas, Hizbollah and Al-Takfir
wal-Hijra.
9.(C) The best known Islamists in Switzerland are the
Ramadans, Tariq and Hani, of the Islamic Center in Geneva.
Tariq Ramadan, formerly a professor of philosophy and
grandson of Muslim Brotherhood found Hassan al-Bana, is
well-known throughout Europe. He is sometimes hailed as a
moderate, at other times attacked as a wolf in sheep's
clothing, putting a palatable front to fundamentalist
activities. Offered a teaching position at Notre Dame
University in 2004, his visa was revoked by DHS, and he
withdrew a subsequent application. The UK Government has
included Ramadan in an advisory body to assist in their
outreach efforts with its Muslim minority.
10.(U) Hani Ramadan was suspended from his duties as a public
school teacher in the fall of 2002, following the publication
of an article in the French newspaper "Le Monde," in which he
spoke out in favor of the stoning of adulterers. He was
dismissed in 2003, following an administrative investigation,
but he successfully appealed the decision. However, following
a second investigation, the Geneva Cantonal Government
confirmed Ramadan's dismissal and removed him from the
cantonal payroll in December 2004. In October 2005, the Swiss
Justice Ministry denied a work permit to a Turkish Imam
invited to work at the Islamic Center in Geneva, due to the
Imam's extremist views.
Swiss Media Push-back on the War on Terrorism
--------------------------------------------- -
11.(C) Since the Washington Post claimed in early November
2005 that the United States was operating hidden prisons in
Europe, the Swiss media has gone full bore in identifying USG
sins, real and imagined. Any news on Guantanamo or Abu Ghraib
is guaranteed front-page treatment, whereas Al-Qaeda attacks
are relegated to the back pages. Of particular concern is the
issue of overflights by alleged CIA charter planes. Italian
prosecutors allege that a U.S. military jet traversed Swiss
airspace on the day Milan cleric Abu Omar was kidnapped. The
Swiss government has repeatedly asked the USG to explain the
flight and four charter plane landings at Geneva Airport.
Washington has yet to respond.
12.(C) Recently, a Swiss tabloid published a leaked Swiss
intelligence report of an intercept of an Egyptian government
fax. The Swiss Federal Council has condemned the leak and its
subsequent publication, and the government has launched
administrative and criminal investigations into the matter.
The intercepted Egyptian fax claimed that the Egyptian
government knew of 23 Iraqi and Afghani prisoners transferred
by the USG to prisons in Romania and other Eastern European
countries. Swiss officials apologized to Ambassador Willeford
for the leak and for the press's overreaction to it. The
Ambassador cautioned officials that Switzerland's
BERN 00000141 004 OF 004
obsession with the prisons/overflight matter -- driven in
significant measure by Swiss Senator Dick Marty -- risked
overwhelming Washington's perceptions of Switzerland. Marty,
acting in his capacity as head of the Council of Europe
Parliamentary Assembly's Justice Commission and not in any
official Swiss government capacity, greeted the information
cautiously, but criticized the Swiss and other European
governments for not disclosing information on the prisoner
issue.
Comment
-------
13.(C) Comment: Despite being somewhat shaken by attacks in
London and Madrid, the Swiss internal security service
continues to assess that Switzerland is relatively safe and
that there is no evidence yet of any activity beyond
logistical support for Islamic extremists. Swiss opinion
leaders among the Parliament and media exhibit little evident
concern about the terrorist threat to Switzerland, perhaps
contributing to their tendency to focus their criticism on
the USG reaction, rather than the initial threat itself.
Embassy engagement with Swiss counterparts, reinforced by
senior-level visits by USG officials, are helping to move the
Swiss to be more forthcoming on information sharing and joint
investigations. Absent a direct attack on Swiss interests,
however, the process is liable to move very gradually. End
comment.
Willeford