Wikileaks - 09COPENHAGEN241

ID: 09COPENHAGEN241
Dokument dato: 2009-05-26 12:13:00
Release dato: 2011-01-30 05:43:00
Kilde: Embassy Copenhagen
header:
SECRET
09COPENHAGEN206
VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB 
DE RUEHCP #0241/01 1461213
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 261213Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4972
INFO RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 0228
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE

Hovedtekst:
S E C R E T COPENHAGEN 000241 
SIPDIS 
STATE FOR S/CT, EUR 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/29/2019 
TAGS: PREL, PTER, NATO, TU, DA 
SUBJECT: DENMARK LOOKING TO STRENGTHEN CASE AGAINST PRO-PKK 
ROJ-TV 
REF: COPENHAGEN 206 
Classified By: Charge dīAffaires a.i. Terence McCulley, reasons 1.4 (b) 
and (d)
 
1. (S) In recent discussions, Danish government officials and 
the chief prosecutor in the case against PKK-affiliated 
Roj-TV underscored their determination to address that case 
according to Danish law, expressing frustration with the 
evidence produced so far and unwilling to predict when the 
station may be taken to court. Danish pledges to intensify 
efforts against Roj-TV -- among the measures offered Turkey 
for not blocking former PM Rasmussenīs appointment as NATO 
secretary general -- have given additional impetus to the 
investigation while also prompting senior officials to tread 
carefully, to avoid the appearance of a quid pro quo (i.e., 
sacrificing freedom of speech in exchange for a high-level 
post). The Danes report, however, that they are pursuing 
"new angles" to the case and would welcome the opportunity to 
discuss them in greater detail with the anticipated U.S. 
counterterrorism delegation (among these "new angles" may be 
information developed through an informant and alternative 
approaches on broadcasting content and tax evasion). 

Denmark: No Interference with Judicial Process 
---------------------------------------------- 

2. (S) Shortly after the NATO Strasbourg Summit at which 
Rasmussen secured his new post over Turkish objections, PM 
National Security Advisor Thomas Ahrenkiel emphasized to us 
the importance of resolving the Roj-TV issue through legal 
and intelligence channels. Ahrenkiel, who has stayed on as 
NSA to the new prime minister, signaled that his office 
wanted to avoid any suggestion of undue political pressure in 
the matter, and encouraged us to work directly with the chief 
prosecutor, Lise-Lotte Nilas. When pressed a few weeks later 
by visiting U.S. Ambassador to NATO Kurt Volker (reftel), 
Ahrenkiel acknowledged that he had not been keeping his 
Turkish counterpart informed about the case, but 
(reluctantly, it seemed) agreed to do so in light of growing 
Turkish concerns. The PMīs office and the MFA remain wary of 
raising their profile on Roj-TV, concerned about the domestic 
political fallout and potential damage to the case itself. 

Stymied on Content, Still Looking for PKK Links 
----------------------------------------------- 

3. (C) Prosecutor Nilas and Danish Security and Intelligence 
Service (PET) Legal Advisor Lykke Sorensen reviewed for us 
the status of the Roj-TV investigation May 20, highlighting 
the caseīs long history and ongoing challenges. The initial 
focus, they recalled, had been to investigate Turkish 
complaints based on Roj-TVīs broadcasting content. Twice the 
Danish Radio and Television Board has ruled on the matter, 
concluding -- after reviewing television footage provided by 
Turkish authorities -- that Roj-TVīs programming did not 
incite hatred, violence or otherwise corrupt minors, as 
alleged by Turkey. Rather, the Danish board ruled, most 
recently in May 2007, that Roj-TVīs broadcasts resemble those 
of other news organizations covering violence and terrorist 
acts. Sorensen noted that, otherwise, sanctions could be 
similarly applied to any news outlet that covered, for 
example, terrorist bombings in Iraq or news of the latest 
al-Qaeda statement. Nilas noted that the recent German court 
decision suspending the ban on Roj-TV there made it that much 
more difficult to argue against the station on content. 

4. (S) Denmarkīs criminal investigation of Roj-TV has 
focused, meanwhile, on establishing institutional links 
between the station and the PKK, especially on the financial 
side. Despite the Danish policeīs and tax authoritiesī own 
efforts, intelligence provided by the Turks and us, 
interdictions of suspected couriers and stepped-up 
cooperation with EU partners (Nilas mentioned the Belgians, 
Germans and French through EUROJUST), no clear evidence has 
been found to connect the broadcaster with the PKK. Roj-TV 
has learned to be very careful over the years, evincing an 
open and cooperative attitude toward occasional -- and 
fruitless -- reviews of their books. Sorensen noted that 
Danish authorities arenīt even certain which way the money 
flows are supposed to be going -- is Roj-TV financing the 
PKK, or is it the other way around? 

Communication with Turks Improving, but Expectations Differ 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 

5. (C) The Danes suggest that progress in the Roj-TV case has 
been hampered by conceptual differences with the Turks (e.g., 
misunderstandings about what constitutes protected speech, 
legal restraints on government action) and by what the Danes 
perceive as lack of communication among Turkish officials. 
Nilas reported that her discussions in April had been 
positive, and she felt that she had made progress in 
explaining to the Turks what specific evidence is needed to 
advance the case in Denmark. For successful prosecution in 
Denmark, the state needs to show actual incitement to acts of 
terror, and not simply news or editorializing, she explained. 
Sorensen reported that the Danes continue to work directly 
and through their liaison officer in Ankara to break through 
the stovepiping in Turkish law enforcement, but communication 
remains a challenge. 

6. (C) We see that the Danes and the Turks are sometimes 
talking past each other, or at least speaking based on 
greatly differing expectations. Senior Danish officials 
seemed caught by surprise last month when we told them that 
the Turks felt let down by Denmarkīs post-Strasbourg actions; 
former PM Rasmussen even suggested that he and Turkish PM 
Erdogan had put the issue entirely behind them. Similarly, 
Prosecutor Nilas could not be optimistic about taking Roj-TV 
to court, refusing to speculate on a time frame, while the 
Turkish embassy here told us they were "certain" that 
prosecution would begin within months -- supposedly based on 
their discussions with Nilas and the police. 

"New Angles," Warm Welcome for U.S. Team 
---------------------------------------- 

7. (S) Nilas and Sorensen told us that the Danish authorities 
are looking at "new angles" in the investigation and would be 
ready to discuss these in more detail if and when another 
U.S. interagency team visits Copenhagen, ideally sooner 
rather than later. Sorensen suggested that she preferred to 
limit these "new angles" to intelligence channels for the 
time being, but she may have been referring to an informant 
the police are supposedly working with, about which we have 
heard some vague reports. Sorensen suggested that the Danish 
government may make another run at Roj-TV on tax issues, both 
in terms of possible evasion of payments and terror finance. 

8. (S) Sorensen brought up another avenue that has not yet 
been explored, and that is to demonstrate that the 
broadcaster is consistently one-sided in its presentation of 
information. Though not a criminal offense, such a finding 
by the Danish Radio and TV Board could result in revocation 
of the stationīs license. Sorensen did not elaborate on how 
this might be established or whether it has ever been done 
before. 

9. (S) Nilas and Sorensen were enthusiastic about a possible 
visit by U.S. counterterrorism officials, indicating that 
they are eager to discuss strategy and review efforts to 
improve coordination with Turkey. Both recognized that new, 
"smoking-gun" information on Roj-TVīs PKK connections was 
unlikely, but they said they would be grateful -- as always 
-- for any U.S. intelligence that could help the prosecution. 

Comment 
------- 

10. (S) We are convinced that the Danes would welcome an 
opportunity to take action against Roj-TV and rid themselves 
of this issue once and for all. We are equally certain, 
however, that they will not move without some new evidence or 
approach that can shield them against charges of trading 
principle for the former prime ministerīs career. Danish 
officials are committed to reinvigorated efforts to close the 
station, to renewed trilateral cooperation with us and the 
Turks, but in strict accordance with Danish law. Rasmussen 
and his former government maintain that President Obama 
personally indicated understanding for this position at 
Strasbourg, acknowledging the high political costs of an 
abrupt, unjustified reversal. We recommend that we -- 
beginning with the upcoming visit of the S/CT-led delegation 
to Copenhagen -- engage the Danes early to review possible 
new lines of approach and encourage them to think creatively 
about ways to disrupt or close the station, should criminal 
prosecution prove unachievable in the short term. 

MCCULLEY