| ID: 09ANKARA374 Dokument dato: 2009-03-13 13:15:00 Release dato: 2011-01-30 05:32:00 Kilde: Embassy Ankara header: SECRET 07ANKARA2992 08ANKARA1306 VZCZCXYZ0000 OO RUEHWEB DE RUEHAK #0374/01 0721315 ZNY SSSSS ZZH O 131315Z MAR 09 FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9035 INFO RUCNMEU/EU INTEREST COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHIT/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL PRIORITY 5502 RUEATRS/TREASURY DEPT WASHDC PRIORITY RUEAHLC/HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHDC PRIORITY RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC PRIORITY RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY RUEUITH/ODC ANKARA TU//TCH// PRIORITY RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J-3/J-5// PRIORITY RUEUITH/TLO ANKARA TU PRIORITY RUEHAK/USDAO ANKARA TU PRIORITY S E C R E T ANKARA 000374 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/13/2029 TAGS: PTER, PREL, DA, TU SUBJECT Hovedtekst: 1. (C) Summary. Turkey's March 9 response to a long-standing Danish request for concrete, "actionable" information on the link between PKK and ROJ-TV was inadequate, Danish Ambassador Vahr complained to us March 11. Turkey has not yet responded to Denmark's December proposal of formal bilateral counterterrorism (CT) "action plan." Vahr wonders whether Ankara's slowness in responding to Danish requests could be intentional, to keep Denmark as a convenient whipping boy, and fears closure of the current window of opportunity to engage high-level Danish law enforcement officials. We agree that another roundtable bringing Turkish and Danish legal experts together to examine actual cases could help bridge the communication gap. End summary. ROJ-TV: The Thorn in the Side ----------------------------- 2. (C) Danish Ambassador Jesper Vahr described to us March 11 recent Danish counterterrorism (CT) cooperation with Turkey, including Danish efforts to address the ROJ-TV issue. Turkey asserts ROJ-TV is affiliated with and supports the PKK (KGK), but it has not been able to provide Danish authorities with concrete evidence of the tie between the two that would hold up in a court of law, Vahr stated. Denmark's inability to find legal mechanisms to shut-down Kurdish-language broadcasts from Denmark by ROJ-TV remains the major issue in the bilateral relationship and the one which occupies more of his time than any other, Vahr stated. 3. (C) Six months after Denmark's formal request for more concrete information to support Turkey's allegations that ROJ-TV is linked to the PKK (and over 10 months after its initial informal request), Turkey's Ministry of Justice on March 9 finally provided an 11-page document purporting to document the connection. Clearly frustrated, Vahr complained the Turks response was still inadequate the information provided would not hold up in a court of law. Despite several sessions between Turkish and Danish experts, Turkey still does not seem to "get it." Turkey continues to focus primarily on ROJ-TV messages, whereas Denmark had explained it needs to be able to demonstrate that ROJ-TV is either laundering money that ends up at foundations clearly affiliated with the PKK or that it has an institutional link with the terrorist group. Vahr hoped for an opportunity for Turkish and European legal experts to go over actual cases, as suggested at the June 2008 roundtable for Turkish and European prosecutors (Ref a). 4. (S) Vahr reviewed Danish efforts to demonstrate its good-faith to strengthen bilateral CT cooperation. These included Danish assistance in investigating a 2006 bombing on Turkey's southern coast with links to Denmark provision of passenger name lists for Copenhagen-Erbil flights involving Kurdish cash couriers September 2007 VIP security detail training of Turkish National Police an April 2008 visit to Turkey by Danish State Prosecutors Office and Copenhagen police officials directly involved with the ROJ-TV case January 2009 assistance to Turkey's new witness protection system and ongoing cooperation on al Qaeda plots in Denmark with links to Turkey. Noting that Turkey is in the midst of restructuring its CT mechanisms, Vahr said he had recently offered Interior Minister Atalay to share Denmark's experience establishing a counterterrorism analysis center two years ago. The Minister was very interested, Vahr reported. 5. (C) Denmark had also become more forthcoming on formal CT cooperation, Amb. Vahr stated. When Turkey first proposed a bilateral CT agreement in December 2007, during inaugural CT consultations, Denmark was reluctant to sign a "stand alone" agreement, proposing an MOU instead (Ref b). In December 2008, however, Denmark presented a draft bilateral CT "Action Plan." MFA Undersecretary Tezcan would be the likely negotiator on the Turkish side, Vahr opined. To Vahr's frustration, however, Ankara has not yet responded to the Danish proposal. Political Games? ---------------- 6. (C) Vahr speculated aloud whether Turkey's slowness in responding to Denmark's requests, and the thinness of the material provided, might be part of a deliberate effort to drag out the ROJ-TV matter, thus retaining Denmark as a "whipping boy" to be produced and criticized when politically expedient. As an example, he pointed to a critical letter sent by PM Erdogan to Danish PM Rasmussen following the October 2008 PKK attack on a Turkish military outpost in which 15 soldiers were reported killed. He also wondered how the ROJ-TV issue would affect Turkey's attitude toward the NATO Secretary General candidacy of Danish PM Rasmussen. Vahr was anxious to persuade the Turks to move more quickly and to maintain the momentum in CT relations begun with the December 2007 CT consultations and bolstered by the April 2008 Chief Prosecutor's visit. MFA U/S Apakan had visited Copenhagen February 24 and of course raised ROJ-TV. Now, Vahr stressed, the two sides had a window of opportunity, with high-level Danish interest among law enforcement authorities. He feared Danish interest would wane if Turkey is not more forthcoming with concrete information. Denmark has pressing competing priorities, including a growing domestic gang war. He understood that Turkey had been able to provide the UK with the information needed to close PKK-affiliated MED-TV in London in 1999 and did not understand why they could not do the same for ROJ-TV. Comment ------- 7. (C) ROJ-TV continues to dominate Denmark-Turkey relations. While we understand Danish frustration, Turkey's "thin" responses may be a matter of inadequate understanding of Danish legal requirements rather than of deliberately dragging the issue out. We agree that providing Turkish and European prosecutors and other legal experts the opportunity to go over actual cases could prove to be a valuable mechanism for bridging the gaps in understanding. S/CT PDAS Schlicher's upcoming visit to Ankara, Copenhagen and other European capitals could also help facilitate closer cooperation against the PKK and other terrorist groups. Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turk ey Jeffrey 2009-03-13 13:15 |