Wikileaks - 06ANKARA1821

SECRET
05ANKARA5825
06ADANA60
06ADANA62
06ADANA67
06ANKARA1251
06ANKARA1464
06ANKARA1723
06ANKARA671
VZCZCXRO3893
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK RUEHMOS
DE RUEHAK #1821/01 0960434
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 060434Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4553
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHAK/USDAO ANKARA TU PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J-3/J-5// PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC//USDP:PDUSDP/ISA:EUR/ISA:NESA/DSCA// PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RUEUITH/ODC ANKARA TU PRIORITY
RHMFISS/425ABS IZMIR TU//CC// PRIORITY
RHMFISS/39ABG INCIRLIK AB TU PRIORITY
S E C

1. (S) SUMMARY: PKK terrorism in Turkey is on the upswing. 
Violent protests in the southeast and bomb attacks in 
Istanbul have resulted in over 15 deaths in under a week. On 
April 3, the Kurdish Freedom Falcons issued a warning to 
foreign tourists to avoid Turkey and called on Kurdish youth 
to join in attacks across the country. Turkish security 
forces have shown restraint but the government's patience 
will be tested as clashes with police continue. Protracted 
civil unrest and an escalated bombing campaign will, at a 
minimum, distract the government from progress on EU reforms 
and assistance to Iraq and GWOT. Large-scale violence could 
trigger a negative response that might derail Turkey's EU 
candidacy, and it could also trigger a crisis in US-Turkish 
relations over the PKK presence in northern Iraq. SACEUR, 
former CENTCOM Deputy Commander Smith, Advisor to the 
President for National Security Affairs Hadley and CJCS Gen 
Pace have pledged during recent visits that the US would 
assist Turkey against the PKK. We have taken steps, but not 
visible ones with public impact, and not serious action in 
northern Iraq. Handling this issue in ways consistent with 
our overall policy on international terrorism will facilitate 
improvement in a still-rocky US/Turkish relationship. We 
urge a prompt review of what further steps the USG could take 
regarding the PKK in Europe, Turkey and Iraq. END SUMMARY. 

VIOLENCE SPREADS THROUGHOUT TURKEY 
---------------------------------- 

2. (SBU) While the March 21-23 celebrations of Newruz were 
generally peaceful (ref d), the March 28 funerals for 14 
suspected PKK terrorists killed in a Turkish military 
operation in the Mus province provided the pretext for the 
PKK to launch a campaign of civil disobedience unseen in 
Turkey for almost a decade. Tens of thousands turned out for 
street protests in the southeastern provinces of Diyarbakir, 
Batman, Siirt, Sanliurfa, Mardin and Sirnak. In Diyarbakir, 
the destruction of businesses by protesters resulted in over 
$15M in damage. Clashes with police and Jandarma forces 
resulted in over 10 civilian deaths. Turkish authorities 
generally showed restraint, but several protesters, including 
two children in Diyarbakir, were killed by stray bullets 
presumed to have been fired into the air by security forces. 
Their funerals sparked further protests. Security forces 
lost control of parts of Diyarbakir city for several days but 
have regained control and the situation has calmed. 

3. (U) In Istanbul, a bomb placed in a trash can near a bus 
stop on March 31 resulted in one death. On April 2, a bus 
was attacked by molotov cocktails, resulting in the death of 
a bus passenger as well as two by-standers who were run over 
by the inflamed bus. That same day, protests in Istanbul's 
Taksim Square turned violent. Capitalizing on the civil 
unrest, the Kurdish Freedom Falcons (TAK) on April 3 issued a 
statement that said it would attack tourist areas throughout 
the country and warned foreign tourists to stay away. A 
second TAK statement called on Kurdish youth to volunteer for 
attacks against state institutions and personnel. 

4. (S) Our sense from talking to Turkish officials is that 
their anxiety is rising dramatically. There are indications 
that the military is looking for greater authority to act 
both inside and outside of Turkey. To calm matters, PM 
Erdogan and FM Gul made public statements on April 4 calling 
for a new wave of democratic reforms, rejecting a 
heavy-handed response to PKK provocation, and announcing a 
proposal to strengthen anti-terrorism legislation to ensure 
the government has the appropriate powers to manage the 
terrorism threat. The issue is complicated, however. Among 
the other problems it faces, the Erdogan government is loathe 
to extend powers to the military that could derail Turkey's 

ANKARA 00001821 002 OF 004 

EU accession process or stain its recently-improved human 
rights image. 

TURKEY MUST DO ITS PART 
----------------------- 

5. (C) Of course, the Turks need to do more to resolve the 
root economic, social and political problems that have caused 
unrest within its Kurdish population and provided fertile 
ground for the PKK. With the submission of a new 
anti-terrorism bill to Parliament, it is working to 
strengthen Turkey's security powers. The government pledged 
to also strengthen its international outreach efforts to 
sever the PKK's financial network and to close PKK-related 
media outlets. On the democracy front, the government must 
put action behind PM Erdogan's statement that Turkey would 
fight terrorism "with more democracy, investment and 
reforms." This includes GOT efforts to further expand the 
rights of its Kurdish citizens and to consider reconciliation 
measures for suspected PKK supporters/members in the Makhmour 
camp and elsewhere in northern Iraq. 

6. (S) What is lacking in Turkey's handling of the PKK, and 
to some extent in our own assistance to Turkey on the PKK, is 
a comprehensive approach to the problem. Such an approach 
would deal more effectively with the PKK in Turkey, its front 
groups and funding mechanisms in Europe, and its presence in 
northern Iraq. The goal of our strategy should be to 
maximize the synergy between US, Turkish and European 
efforts, and should include efforts that will publicly 
demonstrate US and European commitment to helping Turkey deal 
with its number one security problem. It would complement US 
and European efforts to persuade Turkey to deal more 
constructively with the separate issues related to its 
Kurdish minority's status. Turkish officials repeatedly urge 
us to take actions the GOT can hold up to the public as a 
sign of the US commitment to combat the PKK. As we develop 
our strategy, we should give weight to those actions that we 
can publicize. 

US EFFORTS UNDERWAY 
------------------- 

7. (C) Our efforts with European governments to shut down the 
organization's financial and support network are beginning to 
bear fruit, and we are continuing discussions with the Danes, 
urging Denmark to shut down Roj TV. In response to a request 
by the Turkish military, EUCOM is developing a plan to assist 
Turkey to devise and implement an effective information 
operations campaign against the PKK. We increased our 
intelligence-sharing with the Turks on PKK activities in 
Turkey and northern Iraq, and CENTCOM conducts regular 
overflights of PKK camps near the Turkish-Iraqi border. The 
success of these efforts has ameliorated the PKK issue as a 
problem in US-Turkish relations and helped to engineer a more 
constructive Turkish approach on Iraq that now strongly 
supports US efforts there. However, Turkey's concerns about 
the PKK have not gone away, and the past week's violence in 
the southeast threatens to create a new crisis in the 
relationship. 

WE CAN DO MORE - VISIBLE AND INVISIBLE 
-------------------------------------- 

8. (C) In Iraq: Recognizing that the PKK is not (and should 
not be) our highest priority in Iraq, there are things we are 
nonetheless able to do: 
- Shut down the Makhmour Refugee Camp
 
- Close down PKK front offices
 
- Remove PKK-related flags from buildings in Mosul and other 
northern Iraqi cities
 
- Seize high-value individuals. 
Efforts on some of these have begun, but progress is 
sporadic, and the timetable for action extends into future 
years when we will presumably have fewer US resources on the 
ground. 

ANKARA 00001821 003 OF 004 

9. (C) In Europe: MFA Director General for Security Affairs 
Hayati Guven presented the Department on March 16 with a list 
of additional requested USG actions, some of which are being 
worked. These include: 
- Press European governments to arrest and extradite 
suspected PKK terrorists (and working with the Turks to 
demonstrate the required breadth and depth of evidence)
 
- Urge European governments to monitor and prevent the 
activities of front organizations supporting the PKK
 
- Discourage Norway from government, political party and NGO 
contact with the PKK and consideration of granting the PKK 
status as a legitimate organization
 
- Help the Turks examine whether evidence can be gathered to 
prove a financial link between Roj TV and the PKK
 
- Move the effort to block financial flows and arrest "PKK in 
Europe" figures to the next level by creating trilateral law 
enforcement and intelligence working groups
 expand the 
effort beyond France and Germany
 and intensify legal 
cooperation and assistance to Turkey in the preparation of 
extradition requests. 
We need to make the PKK a significantly higher priority in 
our dialogue with Europe and ensure it is raised when senior 
USG officials meet their European counterparts. Fire bomb 
attacks on April 5 against Turkish banks in London and Paris 
and the Turkish Consulate in Paris, which have been initially 
attributed to PKK-affiliated groups, may now give this issue 
greater resonance in Europe. 

10. (S) In Turkey, we should consider opportunities to share 
additional intelligence with Turkey, including on the TAK, 
which has stepped up its activity and raised its public 
profile. 

11. (SBU) In Washington and elsewhere, the US should continue 
strong public statements by high-level US officials that 
squarely condemn the PKK as a terrorist organization and 
recognize positive statements and actions by the Turkish 
government. 

A PARTNER IN GWOT 
----------------- 

12. (S) While Turkey must do more to deal with its Kurdish 
problem, we should recognize those steps that Turkey has 
taken at home and abroad to fight terrorism. A trial of the 
notorious Al Qa'ida operative Lu'ay Sakka is underway in 
Turkey. The military just hosted a counter-terrorism 
conference that drew CJCS Gen Pace, Afghan President Karzai 
and dozens of regional military and government leaders. 
Turkey has completed investigations into two Turkish 
companies connected to AQ Khan and is moving forward with 
prosecutions. It will host the Proliferation Security 
Initiative's (PSI) first-ever combined air, land and sea 
exercise in May. Turkey is training Iraqi security forces 
and diplomats in Turkey and, in Afghanistan, has taken a 
leadership position in ISAF. In addition to leading ISAF II 
and VII, Turkey will share command of ISAF's Kabul Central 
Command with France and Italy beginning summer 2006 for a 
two-year period, while simultaneously opening its first PRT 
in neighboring Wardak province. Turkey also provides crucial 
logistical support to Operation Iraqi Freedom through a 
logistics hub and re-fueling operation at Incirlik Air Base 
and the Habur Gate Ground Line of Communication (GLOC). 

13. (S) A stream of high-level USG officials have come to 
Turkey during the past year to reaffirm the strategic nature 
of the bilateral relationship and to pledge USG efforts to do 
everything it can to assist Turkey to combat the PKK. In 
September 2005 SACEUR Gen Jones and then CENTCOM Deputy 
Commander Smith discussed with Chief of the Turkish General 
Staff the specific measures noted in para. 4. That same 
month, APNSA Hadley pledged to PM Erdogan that he would tell 
President Bush that the one thing we can do to improve 
relations with Turkey would be to do more against the PKK 

ANKARA 00001821 004 OF 004 

(ref h). 

14. (S) While the US has made efforts to assist Turkey to 
combat the PKK, we need to seriously consider tangible 
action, such as high profile extraditions from Europe
 the closure of Makhmour Camp in northern Iraq
 and expanded 
information-sharing in Turkey, to put reality behind our 
partnership message and show Turkey that we do not 
distinguish between their terrorists and ours. This will be 
an essential element in addressing anti-US sentiment here 
and therefore also in our ongoing efforts to rebuild 
US-Turkish relations after a rocky period from 2003 to 2005. 

Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/ 

WILSON 

2006-04-06 04:34