Wikileaks - 05ANKARA5223

CONFIDENTIAL
05ANKARA4965
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
081016Z Sep 05

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 ANKARA 005223 
SIPDIS 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/01/2025 
TAGS: TU, PGOV, PINS, PREL 
SUBJECT: DAS BRYZA'S AUGUST 25-26 VISIT TO TURKEY 
REF: A. ANKARA 4965 
 B. STATE 121751 
Classified By: CDA Nancy McEldowney, E.O. 12958, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 

1. (C) Summary: DAS Bryza attended a series of positive 
meetings with Turkish officials to promote a renewed 
strategic partnership between the US and Turkey. While 
noting that the U.S.-Turkish relationship is broad and 
multidimensional, Turkish interlocutors repeatedly stressed 
the importance of the Iraq and PKK issues and warned that the 
perception of continued USG inaction against the PKK is 
undermining popular support for the U.S. in Turkey. End 
Summary. 

--------------------------------- 
MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER GUL 
--------------------------------- 

2. (C) In his meeting with Turkish Foreign Minister and 
Deputy Prime Minister Abdullah Gul, DAS Bryza outlined his 
vision for a shared U.S.-Turkish strategic partnership. Gul, 
in turn, emphasized the importance of the U.S.-Turkish 
relationship and asserted that good USG-GOT relations would 
benefit the entire world. 

3. (C) Gul expressed his concerns regarding the PKK and the 
situation in Iraq. He is worried that the new constitution 
has opened the door to the Kurds seizing Kirkuk and fears 
that this will unbalance a delicate situation and fuel 
extremism. Gul also encouraged the USG to strengthen the 
hands of the Sunni minority in Iraq he claimed that the 
Sunnis are naturally closer to U.S. and Turkish values and 
the Iraqi Shiites, in contrast, are "narrow-minded and 
extremist". Gul warned Bryza that PKK terrorist operations 
are fueling anti-Americanism in Turkey because the Turkish 
public is increasingly associating the U.S. with the PKK,s 
resurgence. Bryza underscored that the United States was 
working against the PKK terrorists in Europe and Iraq through 
the trilateral process. Efforts in Iraq should proceed from 
our shared interests in a unified Iraq with a sovereign 
government, which meant Ankara and Baghdad should work on the 
PKK directly with each other, with the United States playing 
a supporting role. 

4. (C) Gul said Turkey is grateful for the USG,s help on 
Turkey,s EU-membership bid. Gul claimed that Turkey,s 
strategy is to do everything asked in the run up to October 
3. Bryza encouraged the GOT to show restraint in responding 
to the EU,s expected counter-declaration to Turkey,s July 
28 statement of non-recognition of Cyprus. (Comment: Gul is 
exaggerating. The GOT has redlines it is unwilling to cross 
at this stage, e.g. recognition of Cyprus. End Comment.) 

------------------------------------------ 
MFA ON US-TURKISH RELATIONS, PKK, AND IRAQ 
------------------------------------------ 

5. (C) Deputy U/S Apakan said Turkey wants to develop and 
broaden its bilateral agenda with the U.S. The MFA is in the 
process of drafting a list which will provide the U.S. side 
with suggested bilateral working groups. DAS Bryza welcomed 
the expanded dialogue and said the U.S aim is to produce 
tangible results. 

6. (C) Apakan called the U.S. paper on addressing the PKK 
problem in Europe "useful" and said the MFA is evaluating it. 
He noted that the paper "addresses one aspect" of the PKK 
problem the other aspect is the PKK in Northern Iraq. There 
is "no substitute for action" against the PKK in Iraq. 
Apakan suggested the U.S. provide a paper with a timetable 
for steps to cope with the PKK on the ground in Iraq. Apakan 
said there has been no change on that score since the August 
6 trilateral meeting:
 PKK infiltration from Iraq to Turkey is unchanged
 PKK flags still fly in Iraq
 PKK leaders still move about freely. 

7. (C) DDG for Security Affairs Bicakli said Turkey has given 
Iraqi authorities 137 Interpol "red notices" for PKK members. 
 International agreements and law require the Iraqis to 
arrest on this basis, but they have refused. DAS Bryza 
pointed out that Iraqi authorities said they need court files 
before they can arrest. He urged the Turkish side to provide 
the documentation the Iraqis want and which the Turkish side 
agreed to provide during trilateral talks, thereby removing 
an obstacle to the extradition process. Bryza also promised 
that the U.S. would urge Iraqi authorities to arrest PKK 
members. 

8. (C) Middle East DDG Celikkol reiterated Turkish concerns 
that the draft Iraqi Constitution will allow Kirkuk to become 
part of the KRA (ref A) and asked that the U.S. use its 
influence to prevent this. DAS Bryza replied that the U.S. 
shared concerns about Kirkuk. At the same time, we support 
Iraqi sovereignty and want to avoid dictating details in the 
constitution drafting process. However, Bryza said we would 
communicate with the Iraqis on this point and urged Turkey to 
do so as well. 

9. (C) Celikkol said the MFA has been in contact with all 
Iraqi groups for example, it recently hosted a mixed Sunni 
and Shia delegation from Talafar. Celikkol claimed the MFA 
consistently tells Iraqi groups to participate in the 
political process and not support armed resistance. 

----------------------------------------------------- 
MFA ON ISRAEL/PALESTINE, CAUCUSUS, AND GREECE, CYPRUS 
----------------------------------------------------- 

10. (C) Celikkol called recent developments between Israel 
and Palestine "encouraging" and said PMs Erdogan and Sharon 
had spoken by telephone twice recently. The two FMs will 
meet in New York. Celikkol said Turkey had offered a 
security expert to assist in training PA security services 
but the U.S. told the GOT to speak directly to the PA about 
this. Celiikol said Turkey will supply what it can to the PA 
security sector (ref B). 

11. (C) Caucasus DDG Karslioglu told Bryza Turkey is 
monitoring the run up to Azeri elections, including being in 
touch with the opposition, whom they are encouraging to "play 
by democratic rules." Turkey is also urging the Azeris to 
accept reasonable Armenian offers to settle Nagorno-Karabakh
 
he urged similar U.S. pressure on Armenia. The GOT is taking 
the Kars/Tbilisi railroad idea "seriously," Karslioglu added. 
 Bryza suggested considering the merits of the Kars/Guymri 
proposal as well, as a possible sweetener for a 
Nagorno-Karabakh framework agreement. 

12. (C) Northeastern Mediterranean Affairs DG Uman said 
Turkish/Greek relations are progressing. He highlighted 
trade, tourism and energy cooperation, and noted Aegean and 
Cyprus issues have been "compartmentalized, with exploratory 
talks on the Aegean continuing at the U/S level. Uman noted 
that Greece has made a "strategic decision" to support 
Turkey's EU candidacy. The Turks expect PM Karamanlis to 
reschedule his postponed visit to Turkey. (Note: Greek First 
Secretary Touloupas confirmed August 29 the postponement was 

SIPDIS 

for scheduling reasons, not politics. End Note.) 

13. (C) Apakan requested that the U.S. urge Greece not to 
insert stronger Aegean text into the EU Negotiating 
Framework
 he claimed the current text had been proposed by 
the Greeks in December. Bryza outlined U.S. efforts to work 
with Greece and other EU members states on this and other 
issues related to the October 3 start of EU accession talks 
with Turkey. 

14. (C) Northeastern Mediterranean DDG Bilman said he 
anticipates short and medium term problems with Cyprus in the 
context of Turkey's EU accession process. Cyprus-related 
text in the Negotiating Framework is "already unbearable" for 
Turkey, Bilman added. He predicted any further changes will 
jeopardize Turkish parliamentary ratification of the Ankara 
Agreement extension protocol, not just with the opposition, 
but also among ruling AKP MPs. Apakan added that an EU 
counter-declaration abut Cyprus recognition would, in effect, 
become part of the acquis. Bryza encouraged the GOT to 
demonstrate restraint in responding to the EU 
counter-declaration. 

15. (C) Apakan and Bilman expressed appreciation for U.S. 
measures for Turkish Cypriots and asked that those efforts 
continue. 

------------------------------------------ 
DIRECTORATE OF RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS (DIYANET) 
------------------------------------------ 

16. (C) Bryza told Mehmet Gormez, Diyanet vice president, 
that he recognizes that Turkey, with its unique history, 
cannot serve as a "model" for other Muslim countries, but 
could nonetheless provide "inspiration." Bryza said Turkey 
permits religious diversity while at the same time 
controlling Islamic extremism. The Diyanet, with its program 
of carefully training state-employed imams, deserves much of 
the credit. Bryza said he would like to learn how the 
Diyanet accomplishes this, especially with regard to helping 
Turkish emigrants remain connected to their Turkish culture, 
thereby avoiding the alienation that plagues many other 
Muslim immigrant communities (especially Moroccan and 
Algerian) in Europe. 

17. (C) Gormez said the Diyanet is a unique institution, and 
he has had a difficult time explaining its role to 
representatives of foreign governments. He said the Diyanet 
is an integral part of Turkey,s secular democratic system. 
The institution began as the agency responsible for 
overseeing Islamic worship in Turkey. In the 1960s, when 
Turks began immigrating to Europe and elsewhere, the Diyanet 
branched out and began providing services to Turks abroad. 
Gormez said that despite the rise of radical Islam in Europe, 
no Diyanet mosque in Europe has been connected to any 
terrorist organizations. Nevertheless, he said, the 
Europeans have never expressed appreciation for the positive 
role the Diyanet has played. 

18. (C) Bryza noted that he would be traveling to Athens, and 
asked whether he could ask the Greek Government to take any 
steps that would enable the GOT to re-open the Ecumenical 
Patriarchate,s Halki Seminary, closed by the Turkish state 
in 1971. Gormez claimed that the Muslim minority in Thrace 
faces greater restrictions on religious freedom than 
Turkey,s Greek Orthodox. He said the 1923 Lausanne Treaty 
establishes reciprocal rights for the two communities. As a 
religious scholar, he said, he does not agree with the idea 
that the rights of Greek Orthodox Turkish citizens should be 
tied to the rights of a minority living in another country. 
However, he said, Lausanne places certain legal restrictions 
on Turkey. (Note: Gormez,s comments about Lausanne are 
standard GOT arguments, although a number of scholars 
disagree with this interpretation of the treaty. End Note.) 

--------------------- 
TURKISH GENERAL STAFF 
--------------------- 

19. (C) DAS Bryza called on the new TGS J5, MG Hilmi Akin 
Zorlu, on Aug. 26. (Note: Zorlu was officially promoted to 
LTG Aug 30. End Note.) Zorlu noted Iraq,s status as the 
center of the GWOT, and urged the U.S. to work for a 
democratic and secular state in Iraq, though he acknowledged 
the latter "may take some time." He emphasized the need for 
Iraqis to identify themselves as Iraqis first and a member of 
an ethnic group (Kurd, Arab) or sect second. Zorlu asserted 
that the PKK moves freely in northern Iraq, including raising 
its front party,s flag in major cities, and asked "how can 
Barzani and Talabani permit this?" He asked the U.S. to use 
its influence with the Iraqi Kurds to limit the PKK,s 
freedom of movement and ability to infiltrate Turkey to carry 
out attacks. Bryza responded that we do discuss the PKK 
frequently with the Iraqi Kurds, some of whom seem to 
understand that the PKK issue may come back to hurt them if 
they do not act to counter this terrorist threat. 
Additionally, we are using the trilateral process to increase 
the Iraqis, capacity to deal with this problem. 

20. (C) Bryza outlined planned increased USG efforts to use 
diplomatic, law enforcement, and intelligence assets to work 
with Turkey on building cases against PKK terrorists and 
operatives in Europe. Zorlu said he appreciated these 
efforts. He contrasted long-standing U.S.-Turkey cooperation 
on terrorism with Turkey,s more troubled relationship with 
many European countries. 

------------------------------------- 
NSC SECGEN ALPOGAN ON CYPRUS AND IRAQ 
------------------------------------- 

21. (C) NSC SecGen Yigit Alpogan noted his appreciation for 
US efforts to maintain EU member state support for the Oct. 3 
start of Turkey,s EU accession negotiations. He stated that 
if the EU imposes new conditions, Turkey will not be able to 
continue discussions, adding that popular support for the EU 
in Turkey has dropped from 76 percent to 69 percent in recent 
months. He claimed the EU would not respond negatively to 
Turkey,s declaration of non-recognition of southern Cyprus, 
saying that there has been "EU silence. No problems. No 
issues." Turkey is working to ensure there will be "smooth 
sailing" at the COREPER and subsequent Gymnich. 

22. (C) Alpogan said he advised the Greek Patriarch in 
Istanbul that there would be no movement on Patriarchate 
issues until after Oct. 3. He opined that there is "no hope 
for Papadopolous" and said Turkey would do nothing to 
recognize southern Cyprus before the start of talks. He 
dismissed the idea that Papadopolous was looking for a quiet 
way to re-engage in discussions on the Annan Plan. Bryza -- 
recognizing that the two issues were unrelated -- queried 
whether Turkey might respond positively to a Greek action to 
permit the opening of several mosques on western Thrace. 
Alpogan agreed that the two issues were unrelated but 
grudgingly affirmed the possibility of a positive response. 
He also acknowledged the possibility of implementing parts of 
FM Gul,s Cyprus proposal in the absence of agreement on the 
entire plan, assuming buy-in from the non-governmental 
community. 

23. (C) On Iraq, Alpogan asked whether the US proposal for 
action against the PKK in Europe signaled a shift of US 
attention away from northern Iraq. Bryza explained the 
two-track US approach, saying the US would need to work with 
Turkey to make the case to European countries on the need to 
close Kurdish stations like Roj TV in Denmark
 to arrest PKK 
leaders
 and close down financial networks. At the same 
time, the planned Sept. 8-9 meeting between US Generals Jones 
and Abizaid and Chief of the Turkish General Staff Ozkok 
provides an opportunity to discuss northern Iraq. Bryza 
emphasized the integral role of the Iraqi government in any 
action, the goal of which would be to eliminate an element 
that threatens the stability of the country. He understood 
the importance to the US and Turkeyof a sovereign, democratic 
Iraq. Alpogan reiterated Turkey,s desire for "one, small, 
tangible act," such as the capture of a few important and 
well-known PKK leaders, to demonstrate US solidarity with 
Turkey. 

--------------- 
PRESS BRIEFINGS 
--------------- 

24. (SBU) Bryza held two on-the-record sessions with senior 
representatives of the Turkish media. His comments on the 
PKK issue, Cyprus/EU, and discussions at the Diyanet 
generated broad, and mostly positive, coverage. Key 
newspapers such as Sabah and Milliyet focused on Bryza,s 
"new initiative" to go after PKK terrorists, PKK-affiliated 
media outlets, and PKK fund-raising in Europe. Although 
Milliyet argued that Bryza,s remarks showed that there is 
"nothing really new" in US policy on the PKK, most reports 
were more positive. In a front-page story on August 26, 
Sabah praised the U.S. commitment to "move into action" 
against the PKK in Europe. Bryza,s comments on his 
discussions at the Diyanet were misinterpreted by the Turkish 
daily Aksam, which claimed that Bryza was advocating that the 
U.S. and Europe become involved in training imams. Most 
press accounts correctly reported Bryza,s statements that he 
was seeking information from the Diyanet on how imams are 
trained in Turkey and how the Diyanet interacts with Turkish 
migrants in European countries. Bryza,s stand-up appearance 
with diplomatic correspondents following his series of 
meetings at the MFA was carried live by several Turkish media 
outlets, including the news channels NTV and CNN-Turk. He 
stressed the breadth of the U.S.-Turkish bilateral 
relationship, and argued that the relationship had rebounded 
from a difficult period earlier this year. His comments at 
the MFA were carried widely and accurately in most Turkish 
papers the following day. Bryza's visit was a significant 
net plus in our efforts to achieve more positive media 
coverage of U.S. policy and U.S.-Turkish relations in recent 
months. 

MCELDOWNEY 

2005-09-08 10:16