From: <a href="http://www.kp.ru/daily/25623/790207/">www.kp.ru</a><br>
Date: perhaps 2006-09-27?
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 010861
SIPDIS SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/18/2016
TAGS: PGOV, PINR, RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIA'S "DEMOCRATS" IN DISARRAY
REF: MOSCOW 10620
Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns: 1.4 (b, d).

1. (C) Summary: Russia's "democrats" remain in near-terminal
disarray. Personality disputes, disagreements over
accommodating with the Kremlin, differences over the viability
of political activity, and difficulties in political party
registration undercut efforts aimed at uniting in advance of
the 2007 Duma elections. While some believe the Kremlin wants
a unified democratic (or "rightist") opposition, if only for
appearances sake, the democrats remain stymied by Yabloko
chairman Yavlinskiy's insistence on a paramount leadership
role. In meetings with the Central Election Commission and
other senior government officials, the Ambassador will
continue to underscore concern over the failure of the Russian
Republican Party under Vladimir Ryzhkov to be registered to
date; separately, the democrats will need to make tough
decisions about their political future. End Summary

2. (C) In recent introductory calls on Yabloko's Grigori
Yavlinskiy and Republican Party's Vladimir Ryzhkov, a picture
of disorganization, backbiting, and alleged pandering to the
Kremlin emerged, further complicating the prospects of a
unified democratic opposition capable of crossing the seven
percent threshold to the Duma.

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"Democrats" divided
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3. (C) The real issue, according to Ryzhkov, is that there are
three camps within the democratic opposition: those who
despise Putin and "argue for war crimes tribunals" (Committee
2008's Kasparov, former Prime Minister Kasyanov), who have
scant public traction; those who are prepared to seek some
degree of accommodation with the Kremlin (SPS' Belykh and
Yabloko's Yavlinskiy) and in return allegedly receive party
registration, under the table support, some access to the
media, and occasional meetings with Presidential
Administration Deputy Head Vladislav Surkov; and those, like
Ryzhkov, who oppose Putin, but continue to play within a
"managed" system and are denied party registration, as well as
access to the media and Kremlin leadership. While Belykh
doubted whether a union of rightist parties would cross the
seven percent Duma threshold, Ryzhkov optimistically argued
that they could garner between 10-15 percent of a general
vote. However, Ryzhkov stressed that personality and attitude
towards the Kremlin are significant hurdles to the otherwise
rational calculus to unite.

4. (C) First and foremost, Ryzhkov, Belykh and SPS Chubays all
agreed, Yavlinskiy is a pill, and his leadership of a combined
democratic opposition would be a bitter one for many to
swallow, given his insistence that all other parties
subordinate themselves to Yabloko and admit to the policy
errors of their past. Yavlinskiy himself told us that the
other democratic opposition "will all come to me, they have no
other option," given the amendments to the electoral law that
encourage the consolidation of political parties. In his
meeting with us, Ryzhkov accused Yavlinskiy of promising to
"deliver" a united rightist opposition to Surkov, thereby
rounding out the political spectrum. Yavlinskiy dismissed
Ryzhkov as "a nothing," while insisting that if he had access
to the media, Yabloko alone would draw 15 percent. Political
consultant Dmitri Oreshkin told us that it's "psychological"
-- Yavlinskiy does not want to come into the Duma as part of a
rightist union, but as the undisputed leader of the
"democratic" forces. When Duma member and Party of
Entrepreneurs representative Oksana Alekseyeva was asked what
was the main obstacle to a coalition of Russia's traditionally
democratic parties, she said without hesitation: "Yavlinskiy."

5. (C) Second, tactics among democratic parties diverge. The
Other Russia conference organized in advance of the G8 summit
clarified the divisions: Yabloko and SPS rejected the
conference outright -- Yavlinskiy declined to be one of a
crowd, and Belykh said that he didn't like the company that
the conference organizers were prepared to keep in order to
show that opposition to Putin's Russia was alive and well.
Outside observers, including Oreshkin, Indem President Georgiy
Satarov and Ekho Moskvy chief editor Aleksey Vennediktov,
endorsed the line that both parties chose to continue their
tacit understanding with the authorities, according to which
the Kremlin tolerates their fundraising and views them as
politicians with whom they are prepared to do business. As
evidence of this tacit accord some point to Surkov's
invitation of both Belykh and Yavlinskiy to a public
roundtable debate on his conception of "sovereign democracy."
(In the case of SPS, Oreshkin argued that an additional

MOSCOW 00010861 002 OF 002

factor dictating compromise with the Kremlin was Chubays'
focus on securing Administration support for the reform of RAO
UES.) While Ryzhkov endorsed the Other Russia conference, he
subsequently repudiated Kasyanov's efforts to transform the
conference into a party that would further Kasyanov's
presidential bid. The Republican Party will no longer attend
Other Russia functions.

6. (C) Finally, there are disagreements over the political
landscape and room for maneuver in the presidential elections.
Yavlinskiy was dismissive of electoral politics -- predicting
that Putin's inner circle would prevail upon him to remain in
power for a third term; indifferent to the unification of
leftist parties -- characterizing it a Kremlin project doomed
to fail; and fatalistic about his role -- arguing that he was
waiting "for the fall" of Russia and devoting his time to
preparing the next generation of intellectual elite. In
contrast, Ryzhkov reiterated that he was prepared to play in
the system and was actively working to establish credible
party chapters, despite continuing difficulties with the
election commission authorities, including the party's removal
from the electoral list in Chechnya. Ryzhkov believed that
there was still political room for maneuver, and heralded the
unification of leftist parties as a "positive development"
since it weakened the hold of United Russia.

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Ryzhkov's Moral Dilemma
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7. (C) Ryzhkov acknowledged that unless he compromised with
the Kremlin along the lines of Yabloko and SPS, there was
little prospect of success for his party, which remains
unregistered, and his political future. While he accepted this
intellectually, he noted that morally it continued to cause
him pause. Ryzhkov reiterated his rejection of the political
stance of Kasyanov and Kasparov, stating that it was important
to recognize Russia's political realities, and gave us the
impression that he was leaning toward compromise with Yabloko
and SPS. Ryzhkov requested US assistance in underscoring
concern over the difficulties faced by the Russian Republican
Party in securing its registration. While the CEC has until
the end of the year to complete its review of the Republican
Party, Ryzhkov predicted that the party's application would be
rejected, following a series of "technicalities" that have
plagued his party's efforts to organize over the last year.

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Comment
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8. (C) As the rightist parties continue negotiations, many
observers believe that the Kremlin also seeks a union of
democratic parties, if only to round out the political
spectrum and provide legitimacy to the electoral process.
Efforts by Republican Party and Yabloko regional leaders in
Astrakhan (septel) to unite are indicative of pressures within
both party structures to create viable political alliances,
and last year's agreement between SPS and Yabloko to join
forces secured the democrats a presence in the Moscow Duma.
The Ambassador will continue to raise the status of the
Russian Republican Party in meetings with the Central Election
Commission and senior government officials.

BURNS
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