ID:189342
    Date:2009-01-29 09:00:00
    Origin:09TRIPOLI68
    Source:Embassy Tripoli
    Classification:CONFIDENTIAL
    Dunno:08TRIPOLI227 08TRIPOLI36 08TRIPOLI478 08TRIPOLI481 08TRIPOLI515 08TRIPOLI530 08TRIPOLI896 08TRIPOLI936 08TRIPOLI994 09TRIPOLI17 09TRIPOLI37
    Destination:VZCZCXRO7810 
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHFL RUEHKUK RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSR 
DE RUEHTRO #0068/01 0290900 
ZNY CCCCC ZZH 
O P 290900Z JAN 09 ZDK 
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4381 
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE 
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE 
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC 
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC 
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC 
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC 
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4905 
    
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 TRIPOLI 000068 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR NEA/MAG (JOHNSON), INR/NESA (HOFSTATTER) AND S/P 
(BEHRMAN) 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 1/27/2019 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, ECON, EFIN, KCOR, PINR, LY 
SUBJECT: AL-QADHAFI: THE PHILOSOPHER-KING KEEPS HIS HAND IN 
 
REF: A) TRIPOLI 37, B) 08 TRIPOLI 994, C) 08 TRIPOLI 0036, 
D) 08 TRIPOLI 481, E) 08 TRIPOLI 530, E) 08 TRIPOLI 478 (NOTAL), 
F) 08 TRIPOLI 515, G) 08 TRIPOLI 227, H) 08 TRIPOLI 896, 
I) 08 TRIPOLI 936, J) TRIPOLI 0017 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy - 
Tripoli, U.S. Dept of State. 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
 
1. (C) Summary: Despite a carefully cultivated image as a 
philosopher-king with no formal title and persistent rumors that 
he is relinquishing day-to-day decisionmaking as part of an 
orchestrated succession by one of his sons, Muammar al-Qadhafi 
remains intimately involved in the regime's most sensitive and 
critical portfolios. He has used an influential but obscure 
administrative entity to politically vet commercial contracts 
involving GOL funds and ensure that opportunities to extract 
rents from those contracts are distributed to key regime allies. 
In addition to his activist role in commercial affairs, 
al-Qadhafi's recent interventions in other high-profile issues 
undermine the claim that he is an oracle above the fray. He 
personally briefed GOL officials before their discussion with 
U.S. counterparts on the disposition of eight C-130H aircraft 
Libya purchased in the 1970's, but never took delivery of 
because of deteriorating bilateral ties. He has taken a close 
interest in sensitive human rights cases, and appears to be the 
author of the regime's position on detained human rights 
activist Fathi el-Jahmi and the GOL's heated response to 
Emboffs' request to visit a predominantly Berber town. Although 
he has done so quietly, al-Qadhafi has also played an active 
role in the process of political-economic reform currently under 
discussion in Libya, to include personally selecting members of 
a committee reviewing a draft constitution and urging 
conservative regime elements not to oppose possible upcoming 
elections. Part of his involvement stems from the fact that the 
Jamahiriya system has few formal decisionmaking structures and 
opaque lines of authority. Another aspect is that Libya remains 
a kleptocracy in which the regime has a direct stake in anything 
worth buying, selling or owning. Al-Qadhafi's mastery of 
tactical maneuvering has kept him in power for nearly 40 years; 
however, the unholy alliance of corruption and 
cult-of-personality politics on which the system has been based 
is ultimately limiting. Squaring the circle between an old 
guard whose livelihood depends on the status quo and a new, more 
predictable and transparent system in which a greater number of 
ordinary Libyans can productively participate is the key 
challenge facing al-Qadhafi in the autumn of his reign. The 
reality is that no potential successor currently enjoys 
sufficient credibility in his own right to maintain that 
delicate equilibrium and keep the project going of transforming 
(at least superficially) the Jamahiriya. In that regard, 
al-Qadhafi is the architect of his own gilded cage and cannot 
yet relinquish day-to-day decisionmaking, even if he wants to. 
End summary. 
 
 
BACKGROUND: REVOLUTIONARY TURNED SAGE 
 
2. (C) Libyan leader Muammar al-Qadhafi has since the early 
1990's sought to propagate his image as "Guide of the 
Revolution". While the de facto head of state, he holds no 
formal title or position, and has periodically made public 
remarks to the effect that while he is a sort of uber-political 
counselor to the revolution and its offshoot, the Jamahariya, he 
is not involved in day-to-day decisionmaking. Al-Qadhafi was 
part of a group of self-described Free Officers who staged a 
bloodless military coup on September 1, 1969, wresting power 
from King Idriss al-Sanussi, who was then on holiday in Ankara. 
Al-Qadhafi was appointed President of the Revolutionary Command 
Council on September 13, 1969. In March 1977, he announced that 
a new "Jamahiriya", described as "a state of the masses" would 
replace the Libyan Arab Republic. The new entity, officially 
titled the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 
theoretically allowed the people to govern directly through the 
General People's Congress, of which al-Qadhafi became Secretary 
General (Prime Minister-equivalent). In 1979, he resigned his 
positions and authored the Green Book, in which he articulated 
the "Third Universal Theory", which purports to be the logical 
corollary of (and improvement on) socialism and capitalism. In 
1989, al-Qadhafi declared himself Guide of the Revolution and 
adopted the de facto role of head of state, but without formal 
portfolio or responsibilities. With the imposition of 
international sanctions in the early 1990's, al-Qadhafi largely 
withdrew from the media limelight, and only re-emerged in 
earnest after sanctions were lifted in 2003-2004. He has since 
advocated various trans-national agendas, most recently for a 
proposed unified African government, and has cultivated the 
image of an international philosopher-king, a la Nelson Mandela 
or Vaclav Havel. On the margins of last year's Revolution Day 
festivities in Benghazi, a visiting group of African tribal 
leaders bestowed upon him the title "King of Kings", together 
with the requisite golden crown and scepter. 
 
 
AL-QADHAFI: SHOW ME THE MONEY 
 
3. (C) Notwithstanding his carefully cultivated image as a man 
of history above pettifogging details, XXXXXXXXXXXX, recently told us that 
Muammar al-Qadhafi personally reviewed all contracts involving 
GOL funds that were worth more than USD 200 million and 
exercised a great deal of influence over which foreign companies 
were awarded contracts through the Committee for Oversight and 
Audit. The Committee for Oversight and Audit, known as the 
'riqaba' committee, is a powerful GOL entity that reviews all 
contracts involving public funds, ostensibly to ensure that they 
are fairly awarded and consistent with Libyan law. In reality, 
after the contracts are approved at the level of the General 
People's Committees (ministry-equivalents) and, in the case of 
particularly large contracts, at the level of the General 
People's Congress (typically by the office of the Prime 
Minister-equivalent), the contracts are sent to the 'riqaba' 
committee for what amounts to political vetting. 
 
4. (C) Al-Qadhafi has used the 'riqaba' committee to ensure that 
political patronage is properly distributed, i.e., that GOL 
entities headed by regime loyalists administer particularly plum 
contracts, ensuring that they are well-positioned to extract 
rents from foreign companies. He also uses it to direct 
contracts to companies from countries with which he has good 
relations as a tangible symbol of goodwill, and to prevent large 
contracts from being awarded to companies from countries with 
which he has political issues. Several well-informed contacts 
have told us that when cartoons depicting the Prophet Muhammad 
were re-published in a Danish magazine in 2007, al-Qadhafi 
reached out through the 'riqaba' committee to direct that 
contracts for management of infrastructure projects worth tens 
of millions of dollars that had initially been awarded to two 
Danish firms be given to other companies. In addition, the 
'riqaba' committe and Prime Minister's office acted swiftly to 
prevent imports of Danish goods (Danish butter only recently 
reappeared on the shelves after an absence of more than a year). 
More recently, al-Qadhafi has used the 'riqaba' committee, 
together with the office of the Prime Minister, to harass Swiss 
companies after the arrest in Geneva last July of his son, 
Hannibal al-Qadhafi, and the ensuing Swiss-Libyan contretemps. 
As reported ref B, Swiss companies were informed last December 
that they had to liquidate all their assets within a month. 
U.S. companies experienced a surge in harassment by the GOL, 
some of it reportedly directed personally by al-Qadhafi, in the 
wake of a decision by a U.S. judge in January 2008 to award 
roughly $6 billion in damages to families of seven Americans 
killed in Libya's 1989 bombing of a French-operated UTA 
passenger plane (ref C). (Note: The situation improved after a 
comprehensive U.S.-Libya claims agreement was signed in August 
2008 and implemented in October 2008. End note. ) Prime 
Minister al-Baghdadi al-Mahmoudi, reportedly with the knowledge 
and at least tacit blessing of al-Qadhafi, has mounted a 
campaign through his office and the 'riqaba' committee against 
the Tripoli branch of U.K. department store Marks and Spencer as 
a means to harass longtime rival Husni Bey, a partner in the 
Tripoli branch. 
 
5. (C) A well-connected Libyan national XXXXXXXXXXXX
confirmed that al-Qadhafi is deeply 
involved in the work of the 'riqaba' committee. Although the 
nominal threshold for a contract to be reviewed by al-Qadhafi is 
USD 200 million, the reality is that he reviews a large number 
of contracts of lesser value. Typically, al-Qadhafi focuses on 
contracts with foreign companies of particular concern, 
including the U.S., Britain, Russia, China, Italy, Egypt and 
Tunis. Our contact told us al-Qadhafi personally directed 
Abuzeid Dorda to reduce the number of infrastructure and 
development contracts awarded to Turkish companies for a raft of 
projects in December 2007 to avoid giving the impression that 
Libya favored "the Ottomans". Al-Qadhafi ignored Dorda's 
protest that the Turkish companies had submitted the most 
competitive bids and were best-qualifed, suggesting that 
political credentials count for at least as much as technical 
ability. 
 
6. (C) In addition, our contact said the 'riqaba' committee's 
writ extends far beyond auditing and review and into actual 
project management and contract execution, which has ironically 
better allowed 'riqaba' members to extract rents and bribes. 
Its officials, most of whom are appointed for political loyalty 
rather than technical expertise (many are members of the 
Revolutionary Committees and/or relatives of senior regime 
figures), are not well-qualified to play such a role. Noting 
senior regime officials' "paranoia" about being "cheated" by 
foreign companies and the extreme sensitivity to pervasive 
rumors that senior regime elements are corrupt, our contact said 
an inordinate amount of time and energy is spent by foreign 
contractors justifying their expenses and operational decisions. 
 
 
AL-QADHAFI AS POLITICAL BOSS 
 
7. (C) In addition to his activist role in commercial affairs, 
al-Qadhafi's recent interventions in other high-profile issues 
undermine the claim that he is a remote seer. As reported ref 
D, XXXXXXXXXXXX told us on the margins of a meeting 
last May to discuss the disposition of eight C-130H aircraft 
Libya purchased in the 1970's (but never took delivery of 
because of deteriorating bilateral ties), al-Qadhafi personally 
met with Libya's team to stress that any movement on resolving 
the issue must be contingent on securing USG guarantees that 
export licenses would be granted for those items. Al-Qadhafi 
was fully conversant with details of the case and was concerned 
that U.S.-Libya engagement on C-130's was a deliberate ruse or 
an issue on which the USG would ultimately be unable to deliver 
because of opposition from Congress, either of which would 
greatly embarrass the regime and strengthen the hand of 
conservative regime elements skeptical of re-engagement with the 
U.S. In December, a key contact told us that while other senior 
regime officials supported broader military-to-military 
cooperation with the U.S., al-Qadhafi was concerned about having 
large numbers of U.S. advisers and trainers present in uniform 
in Libya given that "evacuation" of U.S. forces from Libya in 
1970 was seen as a key accomplishment of the regime. 
 
8 (C) Al-Qadhafi also actively follows sensitive human rights 
issues. In March, a request for GOL assistance in facilitating 
a visit by an Emboff to the predominantly int town of Zuwara 
prompted an angry demarche in which our interlocutor hotly 
denied that there was a Berber minority in Libya, decried the 
Embassy's "unacceptable interference" in Libya's domestic 
affairs and threatened Emboffs with physical harm if they 
visited the town (ref E). A XXXXXXXXXXXX interlocutor told us that 
only al-Qadhafi himself could have authored such a sharply 
worded message in official correspondence. As reported ref E, a 
senior regime official cautioned the Embassy in June against 
pushing too hard on the case of detained human rights activist 
Fathi el-Jahmi. Claiming that al-Qadhafi had personally 
authored the regime's policy on el-Jahmi, he made it clear that 
al-Qadhafi had closely tracked (and taken issue with) the 
Embassy's engagement with el-Jahmi's family and visits to him by 
P/E Chief. Later, a XXXXXXXXXXXX interlocutor, citing a 
conversation with National Security Adviser Muatassim al-Qadhafi 
(Muammar al-Qadhafi's son), said Muammar al-Qadhafi was 
personally following el-Jahmi's case and was "upset" that the 
U.S. kept raising it (ref F). (Note: El-Jahmi's public 
criticism of al-Qadhafi and his stewardship of Libya prompted 
el-Jahmi's arrest. End note.) 
 
9. (C) Although he has done so quietly, al-Qadhafi has also 
played an active role in the process of political-economic 
reform currently under discussion in Libya. In March 2008, he 
called for a program of radical privatization and government 
restructuring (ref G), and has since been actively involved in 
the debate about whether and how to implement his vision (ref 
H). Describing al-Qadhafi's decision to scale back 
privatization and government restructuring, the XXXXXXXXXXXX told 
us that " ... al-Qadhafi is a philosopher, but he is also 
responsible". More recently, well-informed contacts told us 
that al-Qadhafi quietly supported efforts by a special committee 
to develop a draft Libyan constitution, and had personally 
selected about half of the members of the committee (ref I). 
Al-Qadhafi has reportedly kept his role quiet to allow his son, 
Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi, to play a leading role in what could 
be a popular reform initiative and to afford himself maximum 
latitude to cajole reluctant old guard members into accepting 
it. At the end of a televised meeting on December 28 to discuss 
Libya's reaction to the commencement of Israeli military strikes 
against Gaza, al-Qadhafi instructed that television and 
recording equipment be switched off and announced to the 
assembled group of political, military and security officials 
that Libya was entering "a new political period" and would hold 
elections for "some key offices (NFI) soon" (ref J). Most 
recently, al-Qadhafi conducted a DVC with students at Georgetown 
University on January 21, in which he addressed a variety of 
domestic and international issues, and published an editorial in 
the New York Times on January 22. The editorial focused on 
al-Qadhafi's proposed single state "Isratine" solution to the 
Arab-Israeli conflict. 
 
10. (C) Comment: Despite persistent rumors that he is in ill 
health and/or delegating day-to-day decisionmaking as part of an 
orchestrated succession by one of his sons (most bet it will be 
Saif al-Islam), al-Qadhafi remains actively involved in the 
regime's most sensitive and critical portfolios, and in many 
that are not obviously so important. Part of that is because 
the Jamahiriya system of which he is the original author 
features few formal decisionmaking structures and opaque lines 
of authority, placing a premium on personal fiefdoms and 
delicate relationships between regime figures who have been in 
power for decades. A further complication is the fact that 
Libya is a kleptocracy in which the regime - either the 
al-Qadhafi family itself or its close political allies - has a 
direct stake in anything worth buying, selling or owning. 
Referred to in Libyan parlance as "the politics of the black 
hand", it is the tried and true method of indulging - and even 
encouraging - corruption by favored regime officials, in part so 
that al-Qadhafi has a cudgel with which to beat them to help 
ensure their political loyalty. Al-Qadhafi's mastery of 
tactical maneuvering in what remains an essentially tribal 
society (with the attendant complication of family/clan ties) 
has allowed him to remain in power despite a notoriously 
fractious and inchoate body politic for nearly 40 years; 
however, the unholy alliance of corruption and 
cult-of-personality politics on which the system has been based 
is ultimately limiting. Senior members of the regime have made 
a handsome living by dint of political loyalty and a skill set - 
smuggling, bribes, extortion, and the more prosaic winning of 
contracts by virtue of connections alone - that are not as 
saleable or lucrative in a transparent economy in which the rule 
of law obtains. Squaring the circle between an old guard whose 
livelihood and political standing will be seriously impacted by 
proposed political-economic reforms and a new, more predictable 
and transparent system in which a greater number of ordinary 
Libyans can productively participate is the key challenge facing 
al-Qadhafi in the autumn of his reign. The reality is that 
neither Saif al-Islam nor any other potential successor 
currently enjoys sufficient credibility and power in his own 
right to maintain that delicate balance and keep going the 
project of transforming (at least superficially) the Jamahiriya. 
In that regard, al-Qadhafi is the architect of his own gilded 
cage and cannot yet relinquish day-to-day decisionmaking, even 
if he wants to - and it is far from clear that he does. End 
comment. 
 
 
CRETZ