ID:	241557
Date:	2009-12-24 03:12:00
Origin:	09SEOUL2002
Source:	Embassy Seoul
Classification:	CONFIDENTIAL
Dunno:
Destination:	VZCZCXYZ0000 OO RUEHWEB DE RUEHUL #2002/01 3580312 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 240312Z DEC 09 FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6560 INFO RUCNKOR/KOREA COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 7080 RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 0642 RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 7141 RUEHSH/AMCONSUL SHENYANG PRIORITY 5456 RUEKJCS/OSD WASHDC PRIORITY RUACAAA/COMUSKOREA INTEL SEOUL KOR PRIORITY RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J5 SEOUL KOR PRIORITY RHMFISS/COMUSFK SEOUL KOR PRIORITY RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 002002 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/24/2034 TAGS: PREL, PINR, PGOV, ECON, SOCI, KN, CH, KS SUBJECT: CHINESE AMBASSADOR TO ROK ON SIX-PARTY TALKS, DPRK ECONOMICS, AND KOREAN POLITICAL CULTURE Classified By: AMB D. Kathleen Stephens. Reasons 1.4 (b/d). Summary ------- 1. (C) Chinese Ambassador to the ROK Cheng Yonghua told Ambassador Stephens over dinner on December 21 that he was optimistic the DPRK would eventually return to the Six-Party Talks. The North's currency revaluation was a mistake and ran the risk of further alienating the populace, Cheng said. PRC Political Counselor Chen Hai observed that the Chinese MFA's "Korea cadre" was experiencing a generational shift away from those with long experience in the DPRK to a younger generation whose Korea experience was primarily in the ROK. Counselor Chen said rumors that Ambassador Cheng has been tapped to serve as the PRC Ambassador to Tokyo are "premature." End Summary. Strategic Patience "Necessary but Not Sufficient" --------------------------------------------- ---- 2. (C) During a wide-ranging discussion of North Korea issues during a dinner he hosted for the Ambassador on December 21, Chinese Ambassador to the ROK Cheng Yonghua expressed cautious optimism that U.S. patience with North Korea would succeed in getting Pyongyang back to the Six-Party Talks. He applauded U.S. efforts to maintain strategic patience with North Korea, noting that China had to exercise its share of patience with the regime over the past year. He indicated that Beijing had sustained a dialogue with Pyongyang over the nuclear issue through 2009 and routinely warned that some of its actions were clearly not in the interest of China. 3. (C) While Cheng firmly believed patience to be a virtue for all parties involved, he expressed concern that Washington and Pyongyang not take too long to contemplate next steps. Cheng recalled how U.S.-DPRK negotiations during the Clinton Administration proceeded at a relatively slow pace until the waning days of the Administration when there was a rush to reach agreements that ultimately failed. Neither taking too long to engage, nor trying to rush negotiations was desirable, Cheng suggested. Although he did not elaborate, Cheng opined that North Korea could not afford to take too long before resuming engagement because of Kim Jong-il's health situation and its implication for regime succession. 4. (C) China supported the international community's interest in enforcing sanctions, Cheng claimed, but hoped that the cargo plane carrying DPRK weaponry that was recently interdicted in Bangkok would not damage prospects for resuming Six-Party Talks. Cheng believed the DPRK understood that there were consequences to its actions, which was why it was so sensitive about wearing the "sanctions cap." Cheng suggested the U.S. and the other parties think about ways to give the DPRK &face8 to return to the talks. DPRK Tactics Stem From Insecurity --------------------------------- 5. (C) Cheng empathized with U.S. frustrations over the North's negotiating style, which he characterized as a result of the regime's chronic insecurity. He said he fully understood the U.S. stated desire to not "buy the same horse twice," and acknowledged Pyongyang's attempts to repackage overtures it had already agreed to in an attempt to wrest further concessions. He suggested that Pyongyang's lack of confidence and recognition of its limited leverage prompted its attempts to "split poker chips to play them twice." Currency Reform Ill-Advised --------------------------- 6. (C) Cheng characterized the DPRK's recent currency revaluation as an ill-advised attempt to reassert the regime's control over the economy. In his personal experience, Cheng said, when common people start to earn money it is very difficult to put the genie back in the bottle. Now that people in China owned homes and cars, it would be inconceivable to think the government could turn back the clock to a time when property ownership was not allowed. Political Counselor Chen Hai observed that the DPRK still had only a primitive understanding of contemporary economics and trade principles. He cited a conversation about trade deficits between Vice Foreign Minister Wu Dawei and DPRK First Vice Foreign Minister Kang Sok-ju in which Kang, with arguably as much exposure to western economics as any DPRK Official, appeared to have no grasp of the concept of a trade deficit. 7. (C) Ambassador Cheng suggested the DPRK would be much better off today if it had followed China's path to reform. He noted that before the Cultural Revolution, North Korea had followed China's lead, but since then had chosen to take its own path. Commenting on reform and opening, Chairman Deng Xiaoping had famously observed that opening a window let in flies and mosquitoes. China chose not to shut the window on reform just because of a few flies and mosquitoes, Cheng said, noting that sadly North Korea lacked a Deng Xiaoping. DPRK's Time Warp has Historical Roots ------------------------------------- 8. (C) Korea had a long history of adopting the culture of powerful neighboring states and hanging on to that culture until well after the neighbor's cultural had evolved. Modern-day North Korea was like China during the Cultural Revolution, Ambassador Cheng observed, noting that the first time he engaged with DPRK officials in an official capacity he had difficulty connecting with them. Once he determined to mentally reset his personal clock by 30 years, Cheng said, everything was fine. 9. (C) Counselor Chen commented that being behind the times had historical roots for Korea. He noted wryly that one hundred years after the Qing Dynasty had supplanted the Ming, Korea insisted on sending its tributes to the Ming Court and clinging to Ming customs and traditions. Chen opined that as a small nation, the Korean response when confronted with a rapidly changing environment was to hunker down out of fear that it would cease to exist if it succumbed to change. Counselor Chen believed that for this reason, the U.S. message to the North that a better future was possible was very effective. Historically speaking, emphasizing only negative consequences for the North would only result in further retrenchment. Conversely, he was optimistic that the North would respond positively to the U.S. offer to seek a better relationship. China's "Korea Cadre" Increasingly ROK-focused --------------------------------------------- - 10. (C) The MFA's "Korea cadre" had three distinctive cohorts, broken down by where they obtained their education, according to Counselor Chen. Beijing's senior Korea experts almost all attended university in the DPRK and in most cases had a minimum of 8-10 years studying and or working there. Mid-level and junior officers on the "Korea track" were divided into those who earned their degrees in Korean language/Korean studies in China, and a third and growing group who earned the bulk of their Korea expertise in the ROK. While many of the senior Korea cadre had some fond memories of their student days in the DPRK, they were not allowed to befriend North Koreans, and had limited ties there. Even this older generation viewed modern China as more like the ROK than the DPRK and strongly preferred the more substantive and dynamic work in Seoul, not to mention the quality of life. Rumors of MFA Personnel Shuffle "Premature" ------------------------------------------- 11. (C) After dinner, poloff asked Counselor Chen about ROK press reports that Ambassador Cheng had been tapped as the PRC's new ambassador. Chen described such reports as premature, but acknowledged that it was possible Cheng would eventually replace Ambassador Cui Tiankai in Tokyo, and that Cui would become Vice Foreign Minister responsible for Six-Party Talks. The 20 December report had suggested the change could take place as early as January, a timetable Chen dismissed as not credible. (MOFAT's China Desk told us that Ambassador Cheng on December 22 told Deputy Minister Lee Yong-joon that Beijing had not contacted him about the possibility of moving to Tokyo. Cheng is a Japan expert, having served at the PRC Embassy in Tokyo four times and as Deputy DG for Asian Affairs in Beijing. STEPHENS