ID:204960
    Date:2009-04-30 14:13:00
    Origin:09MADRID432
    Source:Embassy Madrid
    Classification:CONFIDENTIAL
    Dunno:06MADRID2853
    Destination:VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMD #0432/01 1201413
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 301413Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY MADRID
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0581
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RHMCSUU/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC

    
C O N F I D E N T I A L MADRID 000432 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EUR/WE, EUR/RPM, EUR/PRA, ISN, OES/PCI, OES/S/IHB 
NSC FOR TOBIN BRADLEY 
DOE FOR PWORTHINGTON, GPETERSON, BFOUNTOS 
DOD FOR OSD, OGC, J-4, J-5/POL-MIL FOR TPAWLOWSKI, WMACKIE, 
OSD/IE FOR CBOWLING, WNICHOLLS, OSD/ISA FOR MSADOWSKA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/29/2019 
TAGS: KGCN, KRAD, PARM, PGOV, PREL, SENV, SP 
SUBJECT: INTERAGENCY DECISION NEEDED ON PALOMARES RESPONSE 
TO GOS 
 
REF: 06 MADRID 2853 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Arnold Chacon for Reasons 1(b) and (d) 
 
Summary and Action Request 
-------------------------- 
1.(C) The GOS has for several months been seeking USG 
interlocutors to discuss final cleanup of radiation 
contamination at the Palomares site.  In a March 16 
diplomatic note, it asked for names of USG officials who 
would participate in a working group to consider future 
collaboration on site cleanup.  Documents available to post 
give no indication that the USG has ever formally committed 
to fund a final cleanup.  However, the contamination is the 
result of a 1966 accident between two U.S. military aircraft. 
 For over four decades, DOE and its predecessor agency have 
helped fund GOS health and environmental monitoring, and DOE 
has helped fund a recently-completed GOS study of remaining 
contamination.  GOS officials have indicated for some years 
that they expect USG assistance in funding cleanup costs, and 
they plan to seek disposal of additional contaminated soil in 
the U.S. 
 
2.(C) Post believes that an interagency policy decision, 
likely involving the NSC, is needed on what the USG as a 
whole should do )- not just what any individual agency is 
legally obligated to do.  Should the USG decide not to help 
fund a cleanup, we anticipate GOS surprise, significant 
negative publicity, and some negative impact on other areas 
of our bilateral relationship.  Post recommends that the USG 
respond positively to the GOS diplomatic note and assure 
Spanish officials that the USG interagency has the matter 
under consideration and will respond appropriately.  End 
Summary and Action Request. 
 
Background 
---------- 
3.(U) On January 17, 1966, a USAF B-52 carrying four 
plutonium-uranium 235 hydrogen bombs from Johnson AFB 
collided with a USAF KC-135 tanker aircraft based at the 
Spanish base of Moron during refueling above Spain,s 
southeastern coast.  The collision killed seven of the two 
planes, 11 airmen and resulted in three bombs falling near 
the town of Palomares and one in the Mediterranean off the 
nearby coastal town of Villaricos.  The non-nuclear 
detonation of two of the bombs resulted in the dispersal of 
plutonium contamination across 558 acres of the Palomares 
area. 
 
4.(U) In the following months, DOD and the GOS conducted a 
cleanup of the affected areas.  An estimated 1,400 tons of 
radioactive soil and vegetation were excavated and sent to 
the United States for disposal at the Savannah River site in 
South Carolina.  After the cleanup, the GOS expropriated the 
affected areas and restricted their use.  In the February 
1966 Hall-Otero Agreement, the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission 
(AEC) agreed to provide technical assistance to the Spanish 
Junta de Energia Nuclear in investigating health and safety 
aspects of the accident. 
 
5.(U) Since then, the USG has assisted GOS monitoring 
efforts, with DOE (the successor agency to the AEC) and its 
predecessor agency paying a portion of the costs of annual 
medical testing of all residents.  A 1997 Implementing 
Agreement between DOE and the GOS scientific research agency 
CIEMAT outlined health and environmental monitoring 
cooperation.  In Project Annex I to the Implementing 
Agreement, signed at the same time, DOE committed to pay 25% 
of CIEMAT,s annual costs for environmental and medical 
monitoring, up to $300,000, as well as $50,000 for a program 
review. 
 
Seeking to Finish the Program 
----------------------------- 
6.(SBU) As we understand it, lead agencies in both 
governments would like to end the program.  DOE has spent 
over $3 million on Palomares in the last decade alone. 
CIEMAT would like a final cleanup, especially as measurements 
in 2001 led it to believe that remaining contamination might 
be more serious than previously believed.  Cost may also be a 
factor in CIEMAT,s eyes; it has said it has about 100 
employees working an average of half their time on Palomares 
issues.  In addition, growth in the Palomares area over the 
last decade has led to pressure from the local government and 
 
developers who would like to construct housing on the site, 
which is near the coast.  (Spain,s current housing slump and 
construction collapse may reduce this pressure in the short 
term, but CIEMAT remains very interested in a final cleanup.) 
 
 
7.(SBU) Reftel discusses in detail the events that led to DOE 
and CIEMAT agreeing on a project to map contamination in the 
area, the results of which were to be used to recommend a 
final cleanup plan if needed.  In a 2006 Project Annex II and 
a 2007 Project Annex III to the Implementing Agreement, DOE 
agreed to contribute $1.983 million to support this project 
(as well as continued environmental monitoring).  In Annex 
III, DOE committed to help CIEMAT contact the Department of 
Defense six months before completion of the mapping project. 
After a July 2008 DOE visit in which preliminary project 
findings were discussed, DOE and CIEMAT agreed to begin 
discussions with their respective militaries.  As we 
understand it, September 2008 conversations between 
individuals at DOE and USAF were inconclusive.  In November, 
CIEMAT sought to contact DOD directly, but was discouraged 
from doing so.  CIEMAT also has discussed with DOE its intent 
to seek International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA) review 
of the eventual final version of its cleanup plan, which it 
envisions will include USG input; an IAEA visit is scheduled 
for June.  The cost of the final cleanup will depend upon 
what is determined to be necessary. 
 
Next Steps ) Interagency Decisions Needed 
----------------------------------------- 
8.(SBU) The study was completed in December, and the GOS 
would like to begin talks on a final cleanup plan.  In a 
March 16 diplomatic note, it asked for names of USG officials 
who would participate in a working group to define 
responsibilities for cleanup.  We understand that Washington 
agencies are considering how to respond to that note.  We 
expect that the GOS will ask the USG to fund at least part of 
the cleanup costs and dispose of additional contaminated soil 
in the U.S.  We see at least two issues to be addressed: 
 
1) Which agency within the USG has the lead on the issue? 
 
2) Is the USG willing to consider paying for at least some of 
the cleanup costs and disposing of additional contaminated 
soil in the U.S.? 
 
DOE officials have stated to GOS officials that any support 
for final cleanup is not a responsibility of DOE but of DOD. 
Post is not aware that DOD agrees that it has responsibility. 
 Post believes that interagency consideration of these 
questions, likely with NSC involvement, will be necessary. 
 
No Legal Obligation for Cleanup? 
-------------------------------- 
9.(SBU)  Post is not aware of any documents indicating that 
the USG has committed to help fund a final cleanup.  (We have 
seen one reference in a low-value 1969 USG-GOS contract to an 
assurance by General Wilson )- we assume Major General 
Delmar Wilson, who was in charge of initial accident response 
-- that the USG would defray &all expenses caused by the 
accident,8 but the contract contains no information on what 
this assurance covered.)  The Hall-Otero Agreement refers to 
&a previously contaminated rural area that has been 
decontaminated in accordance with mutually agreed upon 
decontamination limits and procedures,8 and contains no 
reference to additional cleanup efforts.  However, it is 
clear that, as a result of advances in scientific knowledge 
of what contamination levels are acceptable, further testing, 
and the preliminary results of the mapping project, 
additional cleanup is now considered necessary.  The 2006 
Project Annex II and 2007 Project Annex III state that 
nothing in them constitutes a commitment by either party to 
undertake or fund any cleanup activity. 
 
But an Expectation 
------------------ 
10.(SBU) CIEMAT has for several years expressed its 
expectation that the USG will support a final cleanup effort 
and, more recently, its desire to send additional 
contaminated soil to the U.S. for disposal.  Reftel describes 
how events in 2005 and 2006 contributed to this expectation 
of USG support, which we believe has been reinforced by 
continued contacts over the past two years.  Stories in the 
Spanish press also have contributed to this perception. 
 
 
What if We Say No? 
------------------ 
11.(C) If the USG decides not to engage in this effort, we 
anticipate a significant negative reaction, from the GOS and 
from the Spanish public and press.  (We expect that the U.S. 
press, which occasionally writes followup stories, also would 
be interested.)  We assume other areas of our bilateral 
relationship would be affected, but we do not have a sense 
for the extent of any reaction.  The political and public 
focus will not be on whether the USG ever explicitly or 
implicitly made any commitments.  Instead, it will be on USG 
unwillingness to help finish cleaning up contamination caused 
by U.S. weapons that fell from USAF airplanes.  Post 
recommends that the USG respond positively to the GOS 
diplomatic note and assure Spanish officials that the USG 
interagency has the matter under consideration and will 
respond appropriately. 
CHACON