ID:225476
    Date:2009-09-16 18:01:00
    Origin:09GUATEMALA884

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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8070
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO PRIORITY 5242
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITY
RHMCSUU/FBI WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0295
    
C O N F I D E N T I A L GUATEMALA 000884 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT PLS PASS TO AID FOR LAC/CAM -SEIFERT 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/16/2019 
TAGS: PGOV, SNAR, KCRM, GT 
SUBJECT: WITH ENCOURAGEMENT FROM THE AMBASSADOR AND CICIG, 
PRESIDENT COLOM APPROVES JUDICIAL REFORMS 
 
REF: A. GUAT 780 
     B. GUAT 454 
     C. GUAT 394 
 
Classified By:  PolOff Gina M. Werth, reasons 1.4 (b)&(d) 
 
1. (C)  SUMMARY:  On September 2, Guatemalan President Alvaro 
Colom signed into law two important pieces of criminal 
legislation that had been supported by the international 
community.  The two laws, one for plea-bargaining and one for 
`high-impact' courts with additional security measures, 
would create new tools to help prosecutors successfully try 
and convict criminals.  Colom had hesitated to approve the 
measures due to strong opposition from his General Counsel, 
Carlos Larios Ochaita.  However, a last minute meeting on 
September 2 with the  Ambassador and CICIG Commissioner 
Carlos Castresana convinced Colom to sign the reform bills 
into law.  The entire episode speaks poorly of 
Congressional-Executive coordination.  That said, the 
approval of the laws continues progress on judicial reform. 
END SUMMARY. 
 
2. (C)  On August 4, the Guatemalan Congress passed two laws 
designed to strengthen the rule of law.  The `Law on Penal 
Competence in High Risk Processes' provides for 
`high-impact' courts where additional security measures 
would mitigate the risks to judges, prosecutors, and 
witnesses in narcotrafficking and other dangerous cases.  The 
second law, a reform of the Organized Crime Law, empowers 
judges to reduce a witness,s sentence or suspend prosecution 
entirely in exchange for witness cooperation i.e. 
plea-bargaining.  This creates a previously non-existent 
incentive for witnesses to cooperate with the prosecution. 
Both laws were strongly supported by the Embassy and CICIG 
(Ref A). 
 
3. (C)  On September 1, the Embassy learned that President 
Colom had told Canadian Ambassador McKechnie and CICIG 
Commissioner Castresana that he would veto both laws due to 
alleged drafting mistakes that made them 
`unconstitutional'.  During a September 2 call with Colom, 
the Ambassador underscored the importance of the laws in 
improving the administration of justice in Guatemala.  (Note: 
September 2 marked the end of the 15-day decision timeline.) 
Colom initially hesitated, stating that the situation was 
`complicated', but later in the evening summoned the 
Ambassador and Castresana to the Presidential Palace, where 
they met together with Carlos Larios Ochaita, General Counsel 
to the President.  (Note: Larios, who was Supreme Court 
President in 2003, has previously opposed legal reforms which 
would improve transparency and threaten organized crime, Ref 
B.  End Note.)  The President, clearly uncomfortable, said 
that he was willing to sign the plea-bargaining law 
(`colaboracion eficaz'), given Castresana,s explanation of 
its legality.  However, he asserted that the `high-impact' 
courts bill had a drafting flaw that would permit the 
opposition to sue him, thereby putting his presidency at 
risk.  Colom was therefore inclined to veto the bill or 
return it, unsigned, to the Congress, for Congress to enact. 
 
4. (C)  Castresana pushed hard against the latter option, 
saying that it would undermine the legitimacy of the bill. 
The Ambassador told Colom that he did not believe any serious 
The Ambassador told Colom that he did not believe any serious 
politician would use the bill to bring a lawsuit against 
Colom given that an overwhelming majority of Congress, 
including all political parties, had voted for the bill; the 
press supported it; private sector groups did not oppose it; 
and civil society and the international community supported 
it.  The Ambassador and Castresana agreed that if the 
President signed the bill, both the Ambassador and Castresana 
would ask Congress President Roberto Alejos and party blocs 
in Congress to amend the bill before it was implemented. 
(Comment: While this is a workable solution, the timing is 
uncertain.)  Larios made clear he believed Colom was best 
served by not signing the bill.  Colom agreed with the 
Ambassador and Castresana and signed the two bills in front 
of them, which were published in the September 3 official 
gazette. 
 
5. (C)  Comment:  Colom,s strategy of summoning the 
Ambassador and Castresana to the Presidential Palace to 
discuss the legislation, rather than taking Larios, advice, 
suggests that he felt the need to have their agreement, if 
not their blessing, for his decision, and he may have wished 
to have someone else,s opinion to justify overruling Larios. 
It remains unclear what motivated Larios to wait until two 
days before the end of the decision period before counseling 
Colom that he should veto the laws, suggesting that Larios 
may have had an ulterior motive for trying to quash these 
important judicial reforms.  The First Lady,s views were not 
mentioned, although the Ambassador and Castresana believe 
that she and Larios are aligned politically.  The episode 
speaks poorly of Congressional-Executive coordination on 
bill-drafting; the Ambassador pressed Larios on this point, 
and will suggest that future legislation be coordinated, at 
least informally, with Larios to avoid any pretext for future 
vetoes.  (Note: CICIG has five laws in the pipeline.) 
 
6. (C)  The passage of the laws adds to the momentum 
generated by CICIG investigations; some initial favorable 
court decisions on impunity cases; the putting into operation 
of the Attorney Generals, wiretapping unit (with 
considerable USG assistance); and the renewal of CICIG,s 
mandate for two more years.  The next big challenge for 
judicial reform is the ongoing process to select the new 
judicial authorities. 
 
McFarland