ID:212870
    Date:2009-06-18 17:10:00
    Origin:09BAMAKO401
    Source:Embassy Bamako
    Classification:SECRET
    Dunno:09BAMAKO383 09BAMAKO387
    Destination:VZCZCXRO2422
OO RUEHPA
DE RUEHBP #0401/01 1691710
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 181710Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY BAMAKO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0477
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY 0659
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY
    
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAMAKO 000401 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/17/2024 
TAGS: PREL, PTER, ML 
SUBJECT: ATT: "WE'RE ACTING ON AQIM - NOW WE NEED YOUR HELP" 
 
REF: A. BAMAKO 387 
     B. BAMAKO 383 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Gillian A. Milovanovic, reasons. 1.4 (b) and 
(d) 
 
 1.  (S)  Summary:  Ambassador met with President Amadou 
Toumani Toure (ATT) on June 18 at his request, following two 
days of localized fighting between AQIM and Malian military 
that resulted in deaths on both sides. ATT wished to brief 
her on successes in Mali's offensive against AQIM in the 
north, and reiterate requests for U.S. material support.  He 
stressed the importance of the recent murders of the British 
hostage and a Malian army colonel in convincing Arab groups 
previously neutral or commercially/logistically willing to 
deal with AQIM to see the true dangerous nature of the 
terrorist group and be motivated to take action against them. 
 He also spoke of emerging fissures among AQIM factions. 
Mali's success has generated some interest from neighbors ATT 
had previously (and despairingly) described as unhelpful. 
ATT's central message was that Mali has made a resolute 
commitment to action against AQIM and begun to implement it. 
Mali must now rely on friends such as the United States for 
help.  His specific requests remain as previously stated 
reftels - transportation/logistics, communications, 
intelligence support, construction of small bases as rest 
points for Malian soldiers posted in the desert and 
rehabilitation of Tessalit air strip as a key point for 
re-asserting control in the North. He also spoke of financial 
help to sustain his troops during prolonged action.  The 
discussion touched on the possible value of information 
campaigns to reinforce the falling out between northern 
Malian Arabs and others and AQIM, and the importance of 
quickly instituting development programs in the north to give 
people alternatives and hope. End summary. 
 
2.   (C)  Lamana's Death the Last Straw: A business-like ATT 
cut greeting formalities short and launched directly into a 
review of Mali's actions against AQIM in recent days. 
Despite his preference for sub-regional coordinated action 
and concerns about Mali's ability to unilaterally sustain an 
offensive, absent support from his neighbors, Mali had been 
preparing for possible action for some time and stepped it up 
after the murder of the British hostage.  The June 10 murder 
of Lt. Colonel Lamana in Timbuktu last week had been a 
tipping point.  The act of AQIM killing one of their own -- 
and in his home-- had shocked Arab communities and the 
region.  The Army organized to support an action even as 
ex-rebels and Arab youth came forward to join in combat, 
initially intending to act alone until they were brought 
under the military's wing. ATT particularly welcomed the Arab 
participation, stating that they were more adept at desert 
operations than even Tuareg populations.    ATT also noted 
that he focussed on bringing a number of Arab members of the 
Malian armed forces to supplement those already in the North, 
again because of their superior understanding of the terrain 
and the environment in general. 
 
3. (C)  ATT said Mali does not plan to issue any public body 
counts, but they believed 20-25 AQIM members died in the move 
against an AQIM base near the Algerian border.  He said the 
army found several fresh graves with multiple bodies as well 
as other remains; the dead had not yet all been identified. 
Some Malian forces secured that base, and others continued to 
pursue fleeing AQIM elements, whom he described as cornered. 
The Malian side suffered five deaths and three injuries, one 
severe, when a vehicle struck a landmine.  Malian 
reinforcements were arriving from other northern bases; ATT 
believed AQIM was trying to reach elements in Kidal for 
additional support. 
 
4.  (C)   Neighbors Warming to the Cause?:  ATT was hopeful 
about several of Mali's neighbors, who had begun showing 
interest in the offensive.  ATT said Mali had approached 
Algeria to point out two possible near-term scenarios. 
Either fleeing AQIM elements would head for Algeria, or AQIM 
reinforcements would be sent from there. Referring to Mali's 
awareness of 5-7 AQIM vehicles camped on the Algerian border 
for the last week, he asked for and received a commitment for 
Algerian assistance in monitoring its border against these 
dangers.  Algeria also offered to help with medevac of 
serious Malian military casualties, but otherwise had 
committed no assistance to the ongoing engagements.  While 
disappointed, ATT also said on one level Mali had been happy 
to omit Algeria from the early strike planning, since he 
believed Algerian border forces were the sources of leaks to 
AQIM.  He was, however, pleased that at last the Algerians 
were at least willing to talk to the Malians. He described 
Niger as "practical and responsive" to Mali's border 
concerns; he said a similar demarche had been made to 
 
BAMAKO 00000401  002 OF 002 
 
 
Mauritania, but added "their mind is elsewhere." 
 
5.  (S)  The Wish List:  Having summarized the favorable 
direction the offensive was taking, ATT asked the Ambassador 
to so inform Washington, and to reiterate Mali's request for 
material support to their efforts. "Our northern bases have 
no protection," he said.  He added that reinforcement of 
several camps, particularly the base at Tessalit, was needed; 
he even contemplates establishing a desert maneuver training 
center there.  The needs he listed were largely as previously 
reported in past weeks and years: vehicles, some airlift 
capability, communications, strengthened intelligence 
capacity, and other resources to support the troops Mali had 
commited to the fight.   Referring to Mali's 
Ukrainian-maintained helicopters (Mi-24D "Hind"), he added 
that they were investigating acquiring two more, because it 
is not helpful to know where the enemy is if they cannot be 
reached.  He lamented the security difficulties that impinge 
on the delivery of the very development assistance needed to 
ensure longer-term stability, and asked for help to convince 
the UNDP to review the security ranking for northern Mali. 
Speaking with feeling he stressed that this window for action 
needs to be used.  The UN wants to wait for total peace but 
total peace and security demand that there be some evidence 
of development to go along with security efforts.  ATT 
intends to despatch Foreign Minister Ouane to see the UN 
Secretary General to make the case that now is precisely the 
time that development assistance needs to be delivered. 
 
6.  (C) The Ambassador said Mali could be proud of its 
achievements in the military effort to date, and expressed 
condolences for the GOM casualties.  Picking up on ATT's 
observation about the local population's newly negative 
reaction to AQIM following the Dyer and Lamana deaths, she 
suggested that an information campaign -- which perhaps the 
US could work on with appropriate Malian counterparts-- to 
further sensitize residents about negative impact on their 
lives and on natural resource and other development might be 
useful.  The goal would be to consolidate the anti-AQIM 
attitudes created by the convergence of recent events.  ATT 
agreed that consolidating helpful views among the citizens in 
the North was important, adding that an information campaign 
would work only if development activities were also being 
undertaken -- words and deeds together. He expanded on Arab 
community reactions, saying that while there had been no 
question of ideological affiliation between local populations 
and AQIM, certainly recent events had woken up those who had 
seen no harm in commercial trading with the terrorists to the 
real dangers the group poses. 
 
7.  (C)  ATT's final observation was about splintering of 
various AQIM elements over the decisions taken with the 
British hostage and Lamana.  "The group against us is 
fracturing, with different patrons and enemies."  Local 
communities are mobilized to act against the AQIM they used 
to tolerate in timidity and ignorance.  Mali has committed 
itself to this battle, and now needs material support. 
 
8.  (C)  Comment:  Mali's overt offensive against AQIM is to 
be welcomed, even as we recognize the logistic difficulties 
that ATT also acknowledges will hamper his militia-assisted 
army as the offensive continues.  As of today, Embassy 
sources place the Malian forces in the area of Tin-Adema, out 
of fuel and awaiting resupply; AQIM is hunkered down 
north-west of Tessalit.  There does not appear to have been 
any geographical movement by either side since Tuesday, June 
16.  The resource-inspired standdown on the Malian side 
reinforces the crucial need for the support ATT is 
requesting.  He has unleashed a credible offensive, and 
merits support from international partners and his neighbors. 
MILOVANOVIC