ID:156121
    Date:2008-05-30 13:03:00
    Origin:08BAMAKO485
    Source:Embassy Bamako
    Classification:SECRET
    Dunno:08ALGIERS548
    Destination:VZCZCXRO7155
RR RUEHPA
DE RUEHBP #0485/01 1511303
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 301303Z MAY 08
FM AMEMBASSY BAMAKO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9183
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 0436
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0433
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 0304
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 0163
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/COMSOCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
    
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 07 BAMAKO 000485 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/30/2018 
TAGS: PTER, PREL, ML, AG 
SUBJECT: WORKING WITH THE MALIANS ON SAHEL SECURITY 
 
REF: ALGIERS 00548 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Terence P. McCulley for 
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
1.(S)  Summary:  This cable analyzes Mali's approach to 
security in the Sahel in advance of the interagency mission 
to Algiers.  Mali is a committed ally in the war on terror, 
but its position as one of the poorest nations in the world 
limits its capacity to counter the presence of AQIM in the 
country's far north.  Moreover, the mantra of Mali's 
leadership is that AQIM is an Algerian problem, and that the 
incipient Tuareg rebellion in the north presents a greater 
threat to Mali's stability and sovereignty than the terrorist 
presence. Since the GSPC re-branded itself as al Qaeda, we 
have made headway in sensitizing President Amadou Toumani 
Toure (ATT) to the danger posed by AQIM to both Mali and 
western interests in the region, but work remains in this 
regard.  Trans-Sahara Counter Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP) 
programming in Mali reflects these generally congruent, but 
at times conflicting, realities by balancing targeted 
military assistance with a broad range of development, 
humanitarian and public diplomacy initiatives designed to 
reinforce the link between security and development.  Since 
TSCTP's inception, Mali has regarded U.S. military assistance 
as a vehicle for addressing a variety of security concerns 
ranging from AQIM to bandits and narco-traffickers to Tuareg 
rebels.   At the same time, ATT recognizes that his country's 
poverty and geographic position force him to consider the 
equities of powerful regional players.  We do not believe 
that Libya is Mali's preferred dance partner on regional 
security issues, particularly on Tuareg questions, but 
Qaddafi's deep pockets mean that ATT cannot resist if the 
"frere guide" decides to engage (or meddle, depending on 
one's point of view).  Algeria, however, remains for Mali its 
preferred diplomatic partner on trans-Saharan issues, and 
while ATT can be by turns bitter and frustrated with the 
Algerians, he recognizes Algiers holds the key to a peaceful 
resolution of Mali's Tuareg insurgency.  We believe that 
President Toure is committed to a negotiated solution with 
the Tuaregs, but there are many internal political 
constraints that play into his handling of the crisis.  For 
ATT, the Algiers Accords remain the central basis for 
negotiation with the insurgency, but application of aspects 
of the agreement -- particularly the so-called "special 
units" -- are politically delicate, but not impossible, to 
achieve. 
 
2. (S) Summary continued:  Mali remains a good partner on 
security issues, and it is not impossible to reconcile Mali's 
need for tranquillity in the north with what we understand to 
be Algeria's goals, in order to advance U.S. peace, security 
and counter-terrorism objectives in northern Mali. It is, 
however, important to act quickly, as the situation in the 
north is unraveling as we write.  We hope the inter-agency 
mission to Algeria will reassure the Algerians that our 
military engagement with Mali is one part of a larger, 
holistic program, and that our mil-mil training programs are 
intended to build capacity to address the range of security 
threats in the north, and not to launch the Malian military 
in some quixotic anti-Tuareg campaign.  It is important that 
the Algerians understand that the Tuareg insurgency here 
represents a threat to the security and stability of a 
democratic and moderate regional ally, and that the 
development we all seek for northern Mali is endangered by 
ongoing acts of rebellion and banditry.  Moreover, the Malian 
military has a responsibility and an obligation to safeguard 
Mali's territorial integrity and protect civilian populations 
in the north (most of whom recognize that acts of rebellion 
impede development).  As for Mali, we need to continue to 
engage with ATT in support of a peaceful resolution to the 
northern crisis, to encourage him to more effectively 
articulate his northern strategy (both to his northern 
compatriots and to his majority and increasingly resentful 
southern electorate), and to take the politically risky (but 
necessary) steps toward involving northerners in the security 
forces active in the northern zone.  Key to this effort will 
be our continued support for decentralization in Mali which 
will answer the demand made by Northern populations for more 
autonomy and control of their resources and future. In the 
end, ATT needs to find a Malian solution to this internal 
(and interminable) problem, but he needs an assist from 
"Bouteflika the Malian", and the U.S. can play a helpful 
 
BAMAKO 00000485  002 OF 007 
 
 
supporting role.  Restoring the Algiers Accords process by 
bringing the rebellion in from its mountain redoubt in the 
Sahara will advance U.S. counter-terrorism goals by returning 
the focus to the threat of AQIM in the Trans-Sahara region 
and fostering conditions that help deny space to terrorists 
active in northern Mali.   End Summary. 
 
 
------------------------------------------ 
TSCTP in Mali: No Security, No Development 
------------------------------------------ 
 
3.(S)  As one of the poorest nations in the world, Mali lacks 
the ability to effectively combat terrorism or counter 
terrorist influences.  TSCTP programming in Mali takes this 
reality into account by dividing TSCTP actives into two 
categories: counter-terrorism and counter-extremism. 
Counter-terrorism programs cover the "hard" side of TSCTP, 
meaning direct military to military assistance.  This 
assistance is designed to bolster Mali's ability to provide 
the level of security and stability, particularly in northern 
Mali, upon which development depends.  The primary vehicles 
for this assistance are Joint Combined Exchange Training 
events (JCETs).  JCETs are not designed to help the Malian 
military counter Tuareg insurgents.  They are intended, 
rather, to boost selected Malian military units' capacity to 
control borders and respond to a broad range of security 
threats ranging from terrorist activity to drug smuggling and 
arms trafficking.  Over the past year we have held successful 
JCETs in Bamako, Tessalit and Kidal, and Malian units that 
have participated in JCETs have shown a marked increase in 
professionalism and operational capacity. 
 
4.(S)  The "soft" side of TSCTP in Mali includes Department 
of Defense sponsored humanitarian assistance, USAID 
development programs and public diplomacy outreach.  Our 
counter-extremism component of TSCTP is designed not only to 
encourage the traditional tolerant nature of Malian Islam but 
to also effectively address the critical interplay between 
development and security.  This effort is particularly key in 
northern Mali where we are able to reach out to important 
northern communities in ways that demonstrate USG friendship 
and support. The DOD's humanitarian assistance and Civil 
Military Support Element (CMSE) play a crucial role in 
helping us meet this goal by building and rehabilitating 
wells, schools and health clinics throughout Mali.  Medical 
and Veterinary Civic Action Programs (MEDCAP and VETCAP) that 
normally accompany JCETs are also extremely well received and 
enable local communities to derive benefits from military 
training that would otherwise not extend beyond the perimeter 
of military installations. 
 
5.(U) USAID/Mali considers the northern region of Mali an 
important area and has undertaken activities there in a 
concerted effort since 1999.  USAID/Mali implemented 
approximately $3.7 million worth of activities in the north 
during FY07, including support to 35 rural health centers, 
the construction and reinforcement of 17 community radio 
stations, the establishment of six community telecenters 
offering Internet access, the conduct of conflict-mitigation 
activities, support to rice and horticultural commodities, 
the expansion of access to financial services, the provision 
of scholarships and mentoring to 6,500 girls under the 
Ambassador's Girls Scholarship Fund, and the creation of 
teacher training and radio-based instruction for children of 
nomadic populations.  USAID/Mali received an additional $9.5 
million in TSCTP funds and the majority of these resources 
have been earmarked for activities in the North that aim to 
expand economic opportunities for youth, construct additional 
community radio stations, build capacity for local 
government, and support madersas throughout the country. On 
the Public Affairs side, we have used cultural preservation 
grants to help Mali honor its Islamic heritage by protecting 
thousands of ancient Islamic manuscripts in Djenne and 
Timbuktu and helping to preserve an ancient mosque in Gao. 
Additionally we recently celebrated the year anniversary of 
the only American Corner in Mali.  Located in Gao, it has 
allowed us to quadruple our outreach to key contacts in the 
region and to further promote mutual understanding between 
Malians and Americans. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
Malian View of the Situation in the North 
 
BAMAKO 00000485  003 OF 007 
 
 
----------------------------------------- 
 
6.(S) Malians generally regarded the GSPC as an Algerian 
extremist group composed of Algerian Salafists dedicated to 
overthrowing the Algerian government.  The GSPC was therefore 
seen as an Algerian problem that posed a risk not to Malians 
but to Algerians and the occasional western tourist naive 
enough to venture deep into the Sahara.  The GSPC-AQ merger 
to form AQIM altered this perspective only slightly until the 
December 2007 murders of the French tourists in Mauritania 
and, to a lesser extent, the kidnapping of the Austrian 
hostages in Tunisia, brought the dangers of terrorism in the 
Sahel home to the Malian government. 
 
7.(S) The brewing rebellion in northern Mali, however, has 
displaced all other security concerns.  President Toure has 
made a concerted effort to handle the recent attacks by 
Tuareg rebels (and the resultant deaths and capture of Malian 
soldiers) through dialogue and restraint, but he is under 
increasing pressure from the military, which is composed 
predominantly of southern Malians, to respond with force and 
severity. President Toure faces the very difficult challenge 
of finding a way to sit down at a negotiating table with 
rebels who have killed Malian soldiers, stolen government 
arms, laid mines, disrupted badly-needed economic development 
and still hold perhaps as many as 90 Malian soldiers as 
"prisoners of war."  President Toure's decision not to 
respond militarily to such aggressions are increasingly 
interpreted as signs of weakness by the media and the wider 
Malian public.  His recent decision to circumvent the regular 
army by supporting ethnic Imghad Tuareg paramilitary groups 
against Ibrahim Bahanga and the Alliance for Democracy and 
Change (ADC) suggest President Toure's resolve for dialogue 
has begun to wear thin. 
 
8.(S) Mali recognizes that Algeria is the only credible 
mediator for the Tuareg crisis.  Yet President Toure is 
clearly frustrated with President Bouteflika and Algeria's 
off-again on-again mediation efforts.  Algerian allegations, 
whether leveled by the Algerian press or through the 
diplomatic rumor mill, that Mali is somehow intransigent in 
the war on terror or willingly harboring terrorists have not 
passed unnoticed in Bamako.  President Toure is also 
convinced that members of the Algerian security services in 
southern Algeria are actively facilitating Tuareg rebels and 
has told us on several occasions that he does not believe 
President Bouteflika controls, or is even aware, of what his 
security services are doing along the Mali-Algeria border. 
Malians also posit that, if Algeria is serious about 
combating AQIM, they should do so by controlling their own 
borders instead of relying on unreliable and self-interested 
Tuareg proxies. 
 
9.(S)  President Toure still respects President Bouteflika 
(who bore the sobriquet of "the Malian" during his sojourn in 
Gao at the time of the Algerian war for independence) and 
seems to give him the benefit of the doubt by assuming that 
his Algerian counterpart is unaware of what his own security 
services are up to.  President Toure would prefer to see 
greater Algerian control of its borders and more Algerian 
resources aimed at AQIM operatives coming from North Africa 
than the arming of Malian Tuaregs who can easily turn such 
training and equipment against the central Malian government. 
 
 
---------------------- 
What this Means to Us 
---------------------- 
 
10.(S)  Deepening levels of impunity in northern Mali are 
rapidly reducing our ability to advance key peace and 
security goals.  The only groups likely to benefit from a 
northern Mali free-for-all akin to the one that occurred 
during Mali's 1991-1996 rebellion are well-armed bandits and 
AQIM.  The humanitarian and political impacts of a third 
rebellion in northern Mali will be enormous.  Those who will 
suffer most are not the minority of Tuareg rebels who have 
taken up arms against the central government but the vast 
majority of ethnic Tuareg and Arab northern Malians who 
simply want to send their children to school and support 
teir families.  We have already begun to curtail cetain 
USAID and DOD activities in the north due t a lack of 
security and our sensitivity to beingperceived as taking 
 
BAMAKO 00000485  004 OF 007 
 
 
sides in the conflict underway between Tuareg bandits and the 
Malian military. 
 
11.(S)  The similarities between the start of the last 
northern rebellion in 1991 and today are sobering.  In 
January 1991 Algeria brokered a peace agreement, the 
Tamanrasset Accords, between Mali and northern rebel groups 
led by Iyad ag Ghali that was never implemented.  As security 
in the north deteriorated, an alphabet soup of armed rebel 
militias (the MFA, MFUA, FIAA, ARLA and FPLA among others) 
representing disparate ethnic groups and Tuareg fractions 
filled the void.  A similar dynamic appears to be unfolding 
now with the appearance of competing Tuareg rebel and 
government sponsored militias and the 2006 Algiers Accords - 
also negotiated by Algeria and Iyad ag Ghali - teetering on 
the brink of collapse. 
 
12.(S)  In regards to our CT efforts in the region, we have 
made some progress in convincing President Toure of the need 
to zero in on AQIM by focusing on the changing nature of AQIM 
and the fact that Mali, like neighboring Mauritania, is not 
immune to AQIM attacks on its soil.  We have also been more 
aggressive on the intel side in terms of information sharing. 
 The Malians are significantly more open interlocutors now 
than a few years ago, even though President Toure still sees 
action against AQIM as counter to fundamental national 
interests due to the inherent risks of further stirring up 
trouble in the north.  A third Tuareg rebellion will greatly 
diminish our ability to discuss counter-terrorism with the 
Malians and their willingness to listen. 
 
-------------------------- 
Saving the Algiers Accords 
-------------------------- 
 
13.(S)  The Algiers Accords remain the only, and best, way to 
prevent further unrest and provide an environment conducive 
to stopping AQIM activity in the Sahel.  President Toure's 
commitment to a peaceful settlement to the ongoing rebellion 
and Algeria's recent agreement to resume its mediation 
represent two positive steps in getting the negotiations back 
on track.  That said, domestic political constraints and 
opposition within the Malian military will pose significant 
roadblocks and further deepen President Toure's frustration 
of having to dedicate so much time, money and material 
resources to Mali's most sparsely populated region. 
Implementation will require more concessions and more 
diplomatic pressure, but we remain confident that progress 
can be mad if the potential road blocks can be overcome: 
 
-- The absence of a point person on either the Malian or 
Tuareg side.  In July 2006 Minister of Territorial 
Administration, General Kafougouna Kone, negotiated the 
Algiers Accords on Mali's behalf.  Alliance for Democracy and 
Change (ADC) leader Iyad ag Ghali and his deputy Ahmada ag 
Bibi represented the Tuareg rebels.  Two years later, General 
Kone has faded from view and Iyad ag Ghali has moved to Saudi 
Arabia.  President Toure could re-energize the peace process 
and significantly alter the dynamics of the current crisis by 
appointing a lead interlocutor.  General Kone is the most 
obvious choice.  Fifteen years of democratic success in Mali 
has, however, produced two other leaders - former President 
Alpha Oumar Konare and former Prime Minister and opposition 
leader Ibrahim Boubacar Keita - who were central figures 
during the second northern rebellion of the 1990s and could 
lend a needed sense of gravitas to peace negotiations. 
Nominating either Konare or Keita as his special envoy to the 
north would require a significant amount of political courage 
on President Toure's part given that his relations with both 
men are not the best.  On the Tuareg side there is no one 
capable of replacing ag Ghali.  While there are a number of 
well-respected Tuareg politicians, none of these have the 
ability to control, or even influence, current rebel leaders. 
 
-- Juxtaposed with the absence of Malian and Tuareg 
interlocutors is a multiplicity of mediators.  President 
Toure apparently turned to Libya not to send a signal to 
Algiers but in hopes of securing the release of the military 
hostages still held by Bahanga.  Re-introducing Libyan cash 
and influence to northern Mali was clearly ill-advised. 
Mali's request for Algeria to return as the key facilitator 
on this issue indicates President Toure's recognition that 
Algiers holds the key to a peaceful resolution of Mali's 
 
BAMAKO 00000485  005 OF 007 
 
 
Tuareg insurgency. 
 
-- The reduction of Malian military's footprint in northern 
Mali during an ongoing period of hostilities.  The 
signatories of the Algiers Accords pledged to facilitate a 
return to pre-2006 troop levels in northern Mali.  This has 
subsequently been interpreted by some Tuareg rebels as a 
complete withdrawal of the Malian military from northern 
Mali.  The Malians would like to reduce their troop numbers 
in northern Mali, both to respect the Accords and reduce 
costs, but this is ultimately a question of national 
sovereignty and one cannot reasonably expect the Malians to 
withdraw from a zone of instability.  Rather than reducing 
troop levels in the north, Mali is in the process of 
augmenting its security presence, and will continue to do so 
as long as Tuaregs rebels continue to attack military bases 
and convoys and hold Malian soldiers hostage. 
 
-- The relocation of military bases.  Both the 1991 
Tamanrasset Accords and 1992 National Pact called for 
military bases located within urban areas to be relocated to 
less inhabited areas.  Fifteen years later, Mali still lacks 
the financial resources to construct new military posts in 
order to fulfill this requirement. 
 
-- Economic development for the north.  The Algiers Accords 
outline an extensive, yet vague, plan for the development of 
northern Mali.  The only portion of this agenda so far 
implemented was the March 2007 Kidal Forum.  The Forum was 
intended as a pledge-a-thon for northern Mali but served as 
an accounting of all the projects and initiatives for the 
north already undertaken by the Malian government and 
international donor community.  Many of the specific 
development projects identified in the Algiers Accords - such 
as paving the road to Kidal, repairing the airports in Kidal 
and Tessalit, extending electrical grids and providing Kidal 
with access to national television and radio -  are feasible 
yet well beyond the financial means of the Malian government 
or any single international donor.  Banditry and Tuareg 
unrest further complicate any development efforts in the 
north as most foreign development partners are unable to work 
in such a hostile and unstable environment. 
 
-- The creation of special military units.  This is the most 
important aspect of the Accords for Tuareg rebels and the one 
where Mali may have to make the most concessions.  We have 
spent the last 18 months pushing for Mali to make these units 
operational and integrate them into security operations in 
the north.   Were Mali to agree, we could likely incorporate 
the special units into our JCET program.  President Toure and 
other Malian leaders maintain that Mali already created these 
units and that they were subsequently sabotaged by Tuareg 
desertions.  There is some truth to this as the Malian 
government did make a substantial concession by agreeing to 
appoint Hassan Fagaga as the commander of the special unit in 
Kidal.  On the other hand, there is some substance to the 
Tuareg argument that the units existed on paper only and 
never received equipment, vehicles, fuel or other required 
supplies.  Explanations for continued Malian foot-dragging on 
this issue include: fierce opposition within the Malian 
military to the reintegration of Tuareg deserters responsible 
for attacking and killing fellow Malian soldiers; concern 
that Tuareg special unit members would simply turn the 
training and equipment provided to them against the regular 
army; suspicion that Algeria intends to use the special units 
to advance Algerian rather than Malian interests.  There is 
also the unresolved question of the fate of chronic deserters 
like Bahanga and Fagaga.  Minister of Internal Security, 
General Sadio Gassama, is vehemently opposed to the concept 
of special units. Since the units would fall under the 
Security Ministry's purview, this is a problem.  In short, 
President Toure could stand up these units, but has hesitated 
due to internal political constraints. 
 
-- Outstanding questions on the April 10 execution of two 
Tuareg members of the ADC.  In addition to demands for a 
military withdrawal from northern Mali and the creation of 
special units, Tuareg rebels are also demanding a credible 
murder inquiry into this event.  We will probably never know 
who committed these killings or why.  In October 2007 a 
Malian army unit arrested and executed a Tuareg gendarme 
within the confines of the military base in Gao.  The 
soldiers responsible for the Gao murder are known to the 
 
BAMAKO 00000485  006 OF 007 
 
 
Malian military, yet no legal proceedings are underway. 
Given this precedent, chances for a credible and transparent 
inquiry into the April 10 executions are grim. 
 
---------------------------- 
Overcoming Mutual Suspicions 
---------------------------- 
 
14.(S)  Encouraging Mali and Algeria to overcome the evident 
distrust that divides them will pose a serious challenge.  On 
the Algerian side, we need to impress on Algeria the dangers 
of using Tuareg rebel groups as surrogates against AQIM as 
they did in 2006 by providing funds and fuel.  By bankrolling 
the ADC, Algeria provided support to a group that had 
attacked a democratically elected government, circumvented 
the sovereignty of the Malian state by attempting to create a 
local militia, and further destabilized the north.  Reftel's 
description of Algeria's understanding of the special units - 
Tuareg militias charged with eradicating AQIM - is 
significantly different from the Malian reading of the 
Algiers accords, which outlines a clear command structure 
with defined missions assigned by Malian military leadership. 
 
 
15.(S)  Algerian concern that the United States is arming the 
GOM to take on the Tuaregs is yet another indication of a 
misunderstanding between neighbors - although this tracks 
with statements made by Tuareg contacts.  The nature of U.S. 
military assistance to Mali has been constant for several 
years and focuses on peace and security writ large.  It is 
also worth noting that the Malians have, up to this point, 
launched only one operation against the Tuaregs and this 
operation relied not on U.S. training but Bulgarian attack 
helicopters and Ukrainian pilots.  This offensive military 
operation was done in response to Bahanga's blockade of the 
vital, and only, road between Gao and Kidal. 
 
-------------------------- 
Conclusion: What We Can Do 
-------------------------- 
 
16.(S) USG counter-terrorism and development efforts in Mali 
require a secure and stable northern region. Northern Mali's 
slide into unrest and rebellion will seriously affect our 
ability to advance key peace and security goals.  We see the 
need to use our good offices in both countries to encourage 
deeper understanding and trust between the Algerians and the 
Malians at the same time that we encourage movement forward 
on the Algiers Accords. Because Malian, Algerian and American 
security interests are not incompatible, there are ways for 
the U.S. to work within the Algiers Accords framework without 
challenging Algeria's role as primary mediator.  It is 
important that the Algerians understand that the Tuareg 
insurgency here represents a threat to the security and 
stability of a democratic and moderate regional ally, and 
that the development we all seek for northern Mali is 
endangered by ongoing acts of rebellion and banditry. 
Moreover, the Malian military has a responsibility and an 
obligation to safeguard Mali's territorial integrity and 
protect civilian populations in the north (most of whom 
recognize that acts of rebellion impede development). 
Although Mali's confidence in Algeria's ability to control 
Tuareg rebels is likely exaggerated, Algeria does have some 
leverage with Tuareg rebel leaders and we need Algeria to use 
this influence to, at the very least, secure a general 
cease-fire.  Mali will only be able to consider its 
obligations regarding a return to pre-2006 troop levels in 
the north once the fighting has stopped and Bahanga and the 
ADC have released the prisoners they continue to hold. 
 
17.(S)  On the Malian side, we must convince President Toure 
of the need to stand up special units despite the inherent 
risks they pose to the Malian military.  There are enough 
loyalist Tuareg and Arab soldiers within the Malian army to 
fill out one or two of these units and counter-balance any 
less trustworthy former Tuareg rebel elements that also must 
be included in the plan.  If the Malians agree to stand up 
one or two of these units, we could incorporate them into 
JCET events.  We are also pressuring President Toure to 
formulate a public relations strategy for the north in order 
to recapture the rhetorical battlefield from Ibrahim Bahanga 
and the like and to assure the populations in the North that 
the Malian government is actively finding ways to answer 
 
BAMAKO 00000485  007 OF 007 
 
 
their developmental needs. We are also committed to 
continuing our active and wide-ranging USAID program in the 
North of Mali with a goal of helping Mali fulfill at least 
some of the development components of the Algiers Accords. 
Development in the North, including greater decentralization 
which would place more local autonomy and control over 
resources, is a critial component of responding to Bahanga's 
grievancs at the same time that we create a stable and mor 
secure environment that will be less hospitable o AQIM 
activity. 
MCCULLEY