From:
Der Spiegel
<<225581>>
9/17/2009 10:49
09TRIPOLI748
Embassy Tripoli
CONFIDENTIAL
09TRIPOLI677
VZCZCXRO7857
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0748/01 2601049
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O P 171049Z SEP 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5271
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1158
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0830
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0598
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5816
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, LY
SUBJECT: HUMAN RIGHTS DIALOGUE REBOUNDS AFTER DIFFICULT START
REF: TRIPOLI 677
C o n f i d e n t i a l section 01 of 05 tripoli 000748
Sipdis
Dept for nea/mag, l (bob harris), drl (kari johnstone). Dept
please pass to nsc (scott busby) and ovp (herro mustafa).
E.o. 12958: decl: 9/17/2019
Tags: prel, pgov, phum, ly
Subject: human rights dialogue rebounds after difficult start
Ref: tripoli 677
Tripoli 00000748 001.2 of 005
CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Tripoli,
Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
1. (C) Summary: An interagency team led by Acting A/S for DRL
Karen Stewart, and comprised of State, NSC, and OVP
representatives, launched with Libyan counterparts a bilateral
Human Rights Dialogue August 18 in Tripoli. Although a bizarre,
last-minute Libyan delegation and agenda switch nearly scuttled
the talks, FM Musa Kusa intervened to restore the original
delegation and agenda, and personally launched the talks. In
his opening remarks, Kusa acknowledged the GOL's need for U.S.
technical assistance in a range of areas, including illegal
immigration and upgrading the capacity of Libya's detention
centers and prisons. Kusa and other GOL officials protested the
critical comments about Libya contained within the annual Human
Rights Report and noted their interest in setting the record
straight on Libya's human rights situation within the context of
the Human Rights Dialogue. Kusa stressed that the GOL viewed
the human rights dialogue as part of a larger group of bilateral
dialogues with the United States on a number of topics,
including security, civil-nuclear cooperation, and
political-military engagement; his emphasis on this point,
coupled with last-minute Libyan changes to the joint statement
(which resulted in agreement for no statement) hinted at a deal
struck with hardliners to put the talks back on track only if
they had a broader -- or no -- public focus. While we will not
know how serious the Libyans are about these talks until we
receive their feedback on the action plans in mid-October, we
are hopeful that they could lead to some positive engagement in
the areas of immigration, refugee issues, and prison conditions.
End Summary.
2. (SBU) The U.S. delegation included xxxxxxxxxxxx
Dialogue begins with a false start
3. (C) The U.S. interagency team led by Acting A/S for DRL Karen
Stewart met with Libyan officials at 1030 local time August 18
at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Tripoli to initiate a
bilateral Human Rights Dialogue. While the Libyan side
initially responded positively to the concept of the dialogue
and provided on August 17 a list of participants and an agenda
that paralleled our proposed agenda, the actual GOL team for the
morning session was led by a philosophy professor, a judge, and
the Foreign Minister's interpreter, none of whom was included
among the original delegation. [Note: The GOL told us
originally that their delegation would be led by the Justice
Minister but told us August 17 that the A/S-equivalent for
consular issues would be the lead. End Note.]
4. (C) After introducing himself as "a professor, not a
politician," noting that "politics is the art of tricks,"
philosophy professor Rajab Boudabbous attempted to open the
bilateral Human Rights Dialogue with a lecture on human rights
and the Libyan concept of democracy -- direct rule by the people
or "jamahiriya." The U.S. delegation interrupted Boudabbous'
lecture, halted the talks, and sought information about the
Tripoli 00000748 002.2 of 005
whereabouts of the named GOL delegation. Boudabbous refused to
clarify what had happened and continued with his lecture as if
he had been uninterrupted. The U.S. team withdrew from the
lecture, and taking a few moments to regroup, the Charge
discussed the situation with xxxxxxxxxxxx [Note: Charge attempted to
contact
A/S-equivalent for the xxxxxxxxxxxx, who did
not answer his phone throughout the morning. End note.] xxxxxxxxxxxx
told the Charge that he would inform Foreign Minister Musa Kusa
of the U.S. side's objections to the delegation and format of
the dialogue. Charge conveyed the importance of the initiation
of the dialogue, as previously agreed, to the bilateral
relationship and future engagement, including at the upcoming UN
General Assembly session.
5. (C) As the U.S. delegation was in the process of departing
the MFA, FM Kusa arrived but deliberately ignored the Charge's
attempt to discuss the issue with him. Shortly thereafter,
xxxxxxxxxxxx called to inform the Charge that FM Kusa would lead the
dialogue himself at 1830 hours and that he would like to host a
dinner for the team at 2100 hours, as previously scheduled.
Kusa's staff later revised the schedule to begin at 1730 local
time, "to ensure sufficient time for substantive discussions."
Take two: the dialogue finally commences
6. (C) At 1730 local time, the U.S. delegation met an
appropriate GOL interagency team, led by the Foreign Minister,
at Libya's Foreign Ministry. Kusa opened the meeting by
stressing the need for bilateral dialogue. He noted that he had
heard about the U.S. delegation's response to the professor's
viewpoint during the morning meeting, calling it an example of
the "bad chemistry" that had plagued the relationship. Kusa
portrayed the Libyan government as ready to continue a
results-driven human rights dialogue based on mutual respect.
He acknowledged that the GOL needs U.S. assistance to improve
the human rights situation. Specifically, Kusa requested U.S.
assistance to combat illegal immigration and
trafficking-in-persons, to upgrade and build capacity in Libyan
prisons, and to train police. Kusa said that he had requested
EU assistance to tackle the illegal immigration problem,
specifying that in a country of six million people, Libya had
three million immigrants, most of whom were illegal. However,
he said that the European governments did not agree to assist in
combating the problem. With borders 6,000 km long, mostly along
the desert, and poor neighboring countries, Libya "can do
nothing" according to Kusa, to combat illegal immigration
unilaterally. He described a dire situation in Libya, with
increasing crime, disease, and other problems, as the result of
illegal immigration. He said that one human rights organization
(not specifying which one) had brought to his attention the
existence of a trafficking-in-persons problem in Libya, which
Kusa noted could only be identified and combated with foreign
assistance.
7. (C) Kusa further noted that Libya needed to take advantage of
U.S. experience to upgrade Libya's prisons and detention
facilities. He said Libya needed training for police officers
and wardens on how to deal with prisoners in a way that respects
their human rights. Referring to a UK project to upgrade Libyan
prisons and train police officers, Kusa explained that the UK
had sent experts to work on the issue areas he specified but
that Libya needed even more assistance than what the UK was able
to provide.
8. (C) Kusa went on to discuss the method for evaluating human
rights issues on both sides. He asked that the annual State
Department Human Rights Report be a subject of discussion within
the framework of the dialogue. Kusa referred to "fallacies" in
the 2008 Human Rights Report on Libya, specifically recalling a
section on the rights of women and the existence of political
prisoners. On the first issue, he pointed to various facts
proving that women are empowered in Libya - "at least 150 women
work in the Foreign Ministry." Regarding political prisoners,
he insisted that the "political prisoners" to which the report
referred were actually fundamentalists with links to Al Qaeda,
whom the GOL was trying to rehabilitate. He explained that the
Libyan government was "stretching its hands" and "opening its
heart" to dialogue and discussion for the sake of transparency
and to correct the wrong information that the USG was reporting
on the human rights situation in Libya.
9. (C) Acting A/S Stewart thanked Kusa for taking a personal
interest in launching the dialogue, noting that the dialogue
would be integral to broader bilateral efforts to expand
Tripoli 00000748 003.2 of 005
cooperation across several spheres, including
political-military, economic, education, and culture. She noted
that the USG was engaged in human rights dialogues with many
countries throughout the world, as the U.S. Congress and
American people expect, and that the U.S. delegation would
welcome the opportunity to address Libya's needs for technical
assistance in the areas outlined by Kusa. She explained that
the human rights dialogue could be a model for engagement in
other subject areas. NEA/MAG Office Director Maggie Nardi
suggested that issue-specific working groups be designated to
tackle each issue. Kusa expressed his agreement with the
suggestions and emphasized the need for direct political
dialogue in order to address "significant issues." He
highlighted positive bilateral coordination on Darfur with USSES
Gration, as well as the security and military engagement, which
CODEL McCain had recently discussed with Muatassim and Muammar
al-Qadhafi (reftel). Kusa went on to discuss his interest in
broadening the framework for U.S.-Libyan relations in a number
of areas, including combating fundamentalism. Acting A/S Stewart
outlined our proposed framework for the dialogue with twice
yearly senior-level meetings and working groups to advance
progress in the interim on priority topics, including joint
polices and projects involving multilateral institutions, prison
conditions and management, migration and refugees, and specific
human rights cases as they arise. FM Kusa declared his
agreement with this general framework and asked the U.S.
delegation to propose a work plan and timetable for discussing
agenda items and actively addressing them.
Libyan delegation addresses illegal immigration, prisons, u.s.
Human rights report
10. (C) Turning the floor to his delegation, Kusa said that a
group of specialists had been gathered on the Libyan side for
the purpose of the dialogue. Stating "I do not even know all of
their names," Kusa introduced the delegates he recognized and
excused himself from the meeting. During the remaining two
hours of discussion, the Libyan delegates would not admit their
government needed assistance in the areas outlined by Musa Kusa
-- illegal immigration, trafficking in persons, prison upgrades,
or police training. Instead they parsed terms and argued over
definitions. Arguing that Libyan society and culture is
misunderstood by the USG, Abdussalam el-Tumi, Chairman of the
Human Rights Commission at the Ministry of Justice, maintained
that neither "prisoners" nor "prisons" existed in Libya; rather,
Libya has "detention facilities" designed to rehabilitate those
"sons and brothers" who have gone astray. Tumi described a
Libya-UK prison program by which the UK provides technical
assistance and training to Libyan police officers and prison
guards. He said that UK representatives had visited Libya's
criminal detention facilities, photographed, and reported that
detainees were treated in accordance with international human
rights conventions. Tumi described the judicial process by
which detainees are tried and sentenced, laws stipulating
detainee rights, and the treatment of detainees in detention
centers. Tumi eventually admitted that the GOL required
assistance in the care of detainees -- specifically in the
provision of medical care, vocational training, and social
reintegration programs -- as well as in training police officers
and upgrading and building capacity of prison facilities.
11. (C) Tumi asserted that trafficking-in-persons did not exist
in Libya. Regarding the Human Rights Report, Tumi charged that
it was not based on facts, was distanced from reality, and
contained sections that were "laughable." He said that the
Libyan government responded to individual charges of human
rights abuse and that the issue areas outlined by Kusa -
involving women's empowerment and female circumcision - were
misconceived. He insisted that "human rights as a complete
concept" does not exist anywhere in the world, and he expressed
his hope that the dialogue would continue in order to eliminate
all misunderstandings regarding the human rights situation of
each nation.
12. (C) Dr. Mohamed Salah al-Saghir, Head of the Department of
International Law and Agreements at the MFA, also expressed his
support for the dialogue and highlighted the international
conventions and agreements to which Libya was a party. As Libya
was a party to the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), Saghir said that the Human
Rights Report must be wrong in its assertion that women in Libya
face discrimination. He insisted that international conventions
have supremacy over local law and are embodied within local laws
as soon as the GOL signs them.
Tripoli 00000748 004.2 of 005
13. (C) AA/S Stewart assured the Libyan team that the Embassy
would work with them to discuss their objections to the Human
Rights Report over the next few months. NSC representative
Scott Busby encouraged the GOL to become party to the 1951 UN
Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol and to sign a
Memorandum of Agreement with the UN High Commission on Refugees
as important steps to address Libya's illegal immigration
problem. Busby outlined areas where the U.S. might be able to
provide assistance if Libya would provide assurance that it was
complying with the international treaties and conventions it had
signed involving refugees. Murad Hamim from Libya's
International Organizations Department at the MFA responded that
the GOL did not need to sign the 1951 Convention, as it was
already a party to the 1969 Organization of African Union (OAU)
Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in
Africa, which embodies many of the same principles as the 1951
and 1967 Convention and Protocol. He noted the GOL's surprise
that the USG is not a party to the Convention on the Protection
of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their
Families. Briefly addressing the issue of prisons, Harris noted
that the United States and Libya both had responsibilities under
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and
other treaties to provide proper treatment for persons under
detention and that the United States looked forward to working
with Libya in the context of the Human Rights Dialogue to share
our experiences in efficient and humane management of detention
facilities. In the time before the next meeting we looked
forward to discussing next steps for progress and cooperation on
this issue.
14. (C) Hamid Ahmed Hdhiri of Libya's NSC noted that the problem
of illegal immigration flows into Libya require dramatic
solutions to the root causes of the problem -- solutions that go
beyond security. He called for U.S. assistance to combat the
flow of illegal immigration from both security and economic
perspectives. Hdhiri recognized the value of the 1951 and 1967
UN Refugee Conventions, but he expressed Libya's concern that
the treaty could inflict harm on the country by encouraging
additional immigrants to flow across the borders. He
characterized Libya as a transit, rather than a source country,
for illegal immigrants and called it a "burden" to the nation.
He said that Libya was providing a humanitarian service by
accepting protective responsibility for illegal immigrants who
had been returned from European sea ports. Hdhiri noted that
Muammar al-Qadhafi had suggested that an international
conference convene to address the root causes of immigration
from Sub-Saharan Africa, namely poverty and lack of
opportunities for economic development.
15. (C) Finally, the Libyan delegation asserted that civil
society does not exist in Libya because it is unnecessary.
Representatives justified their statements by claiming that
Libya is a homogenous, unified society in which one group does
not dominate the other, and described civil society
organizations as designed solely to address the needs of groups
which are disadvantaged or discriminated against within a
society. In response to the U.S. delegation's concern about the
registration process for NGOs, one delegate explained that
individuals could form issue-focused "charity groups" to address
specific "causes," such as anti-smoking or environmental
awareness campaigns. The U.S. delegation tried to explain that
"charity groups" might count as "civil society" if only they
were unrelated to the government (although currently no charity
group can be formed outside of the umbrella of a
quasi-governmental organization) and that contacts with similar
groups in the United States and elsewhere would represent the
kind of international communication and links we hope other
civil society groups could enjoy, but the Libyan side did not
appear to grasp our understanding of civil society.
16. (C) Both sides ended the discussion by agreeing that the
U.S. would develop work plans on the agenda items and timelines
for addressing them. They agreed that the next session of the
dialogue would take place after six months and that the U.S.
side would host. Although both sides had agreed before the
dialogue began to the wording for a joint press statement
announcing that the dialogue had been launched, the Libyan side
changed the wording at the last minute to inaccurately describe
the discussions as covering also security, military issues, and
political issues and downplaying the human rights focus, and was
unable to compromise with the U.S. delegation on a
mutually-acceptable statement. Likewise the Libyan side reneged
on a commitment to state publicly that the dialogue had been
initiated, without explanation of its reasoning. Immediately
after the meeting, the Libyan side hosted a dinner for the U.S.
Tripoli 00000748 005.2 of 005
delegation, during which substantive issues were not formally
discussed. Musa Kusa was unable to attend, although two members
of the original delegation identified by the GOL, Dr. Ali
al-Rishi, the Secretary of Immigration and Expatriate Affairs at
the MFA, xxxxxxxxxxxx did.
What really happened?
17. (C) xxxxxxxxxxxx told us that he
had been called to a meeting xxxxxxxxxxxx to
discuss the Human Rights Dialogue. Rolling his eyes skyward,
xxxxxxxxxxxx said that "someone" had gotten to the Leader and
portrayed the talks as an effort by the U.S. to embarrass Libya.
xxxxxxxxxxxx declined to identify who in the GOL had scuttled the
talks, but hinted broadly that a decision had been made at the
highest levels to switch the delegation at the last minute. The
GOL's last-minute change to the proposed joint statement --
portraying the talks as more general in nature and focused on
security and military issues as well as political issues --
likely was the deal struck by FM Kusa to get the talks back on
track after our delegation walked out of the morning session.
The GOL's readiness to drop the statement on the condition that
both sides keep the talks quiet seems to indicate that Kusa and
more Western-leaning officials needed to mollify hardliners who
were concerned about the public perception of the talks. The
GOL has kept its word and never publicized any aspect of the
talks, although they had plenty of footage and still pictures
from the meeting.
18. (C) Comment: In spite of the bizarre, fitful start, FM Kusa
made it clear that he personally values the dialogue. His
direct, personal involvement will be essential to the dialogue's
successful continuation. And while the substance of the
dialogue may have exposed some very wide gaps in our two
countries' understanding of some key human rights concepts, it
also revealed some common ground and seemingly genuine desire
for engagement, particularly in the areas of refugees and
migration, and prison conditions. We look forward to working
with the interagency and the GOL to develop work plans and
timelines for meaningful action on the agenda items. End Comment.
Next steps
19. (SBU) As agreed with the Libyan delegation, State DRL will
take the lead to draft and clear work plans and suggested action
timelines for each of the specific human rights areas identified
during the talks for submission to the Libyan MFA by mid-October.
Cretz