From:
Der Spiegel
<<234212>>
11/11/2009 14:13
09ISLAMABAD2716
Embassy Islamabad
CONFIDENTIAL
TED0542
ACTION SCA-00
INFO LOG-00 AF-00 AID-00 AMAD-00 INL-00 PERC-00 PDI-00
DS-00 EUR-00 E-00 FBIE-00 VCI-00 H-00 TEDE-00
INR-00 IO-00 L-00 MOFM-00 MOF-00 VCIE-00 NSAE-00
ISN-00 NIMA-00 GIWI-00 ISNE-00 FMPC-00 SP-00 SSO-00
SS-00 SCRS-00 DSCC-00 PRM-00 DRL-00 NFAT-00 SAS-00
FA-00 SRAP-00 SWCI-00 PESU-00 SRMC-00 SANA-00 /000W
------------------D6CDB4 111521Z /38
O 111413Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5896
INFO AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
AMEMBASSY KABUL
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMCONSUL LAHORE
AMCONSUL KARACHI
AMCONSUL PESHAWAR
NSC WASHINGTON DC
CIA WASHINGTON DC
SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL
TAGS: PGOV, KDEM, PK
SUBJECT: INTERIOR MINISTER SEEKS USG HELP IN PROTECTING
C o n f i d e n t i a l islamabad 002716
E.o. 12958: decl: 11/10/2034 Tags: pgov, kdem, pk Subject: interior
minister seeks usg help in protecting president zardari
Classified By: ANNE W. PATTERSON, REASONS 1.4 B AND D
1. (C) Summary: In a November 9 meeting with Ambassador Patterson,
Interior Minister Rehman Malik requested that the USG issue a public
statement in support of Pakistani democracy. He suggested that such a
statement would be useful in protecting President Asif Ali Zardari from
military-induced pressure for Zardari to leave office. In addition, it
would help dispel persistent charges from the Muttahida Quami Movement
(MQM) that the United States and the United Kingdom had urged it to
withdraw support for the National Reconciliation Ordinance, thereby
placing Zardari at-risk. Malik assessed that Saudi Arabia and the
Pakistan Muslim League - Nawaz (PML-N) were cooperating with the
military and MQM to bring down President Zardari. Despite these charges,
Malik was optimistic that the Supreme Court would not/not strip Zardari
of his presidential immunity and suggested that even if it did, the
government would simply cease prosecution of Zardari's cases, thereby
allowing him to continue to hold office. End Summary.
2. (C) Interior Minister Rehman Malik met November 9 with Ambassador
Patterson to provide a read-out of his meetings with senior officials of
the Muttahida Quami Movement (MQM) in Dubai. Throughout the meeting,
Malik was clearly nervous that the USG was distancing itself both from
him and President Zardari. Malik claimed that during the course of his
Dubai meetings, the MQM had repeatedly stated that both the United
States and the United Kingdom had urged the party to oppose the National
Reconciliation Ordinance (NRO) -- a move that led the government to
withdraw the legislation from parliamentary consideration and placed the
future of President Zardari at-risk. Malik claimed that the MQM stated
it had received this message during the Sindh Governor's recent trip to
the United States and that Altaf Hussain had been approached by the
British government in London. Ambassador strongly denied these
allegations, stating that the USG had not/not had any such discussions
with the Sindh Governor.
3. (C) Interior Minister Malik further expressed concern that the
Secretary was displeased with the civilian government upon her return
from her recent trip to Pakistan. Malik attributed this impression to
rumors from unspecified sources. Ambassador emphasized to Malik that she
had heard no such thing and that in contrast, she was confident that
the Secretary had been very pleased both with her visit and with her
meetings with Pakistan government counterparts.
4. (C) Minister Malik inquired as to whether the Ambassador was aware
that the "establishment" -- local short-hand for the military and the
intelligence services -- was involved in working against the NRO and for
President Zardari's departure. Ambassador told Rehman that we were
aware of such allegations. Minister Malik reported that the MQM had told
him directly in the Dubai meetings that the military was involved,
although Malik personally did not/not believe that Chief of Army Staff
(COAS) Ashfaq Pervaiz Kayani was involved in the plotting. Malik also
claimed that the MQM was meeting regularly with the Pakistan Muslim
League - Nawaz (PML-N) and that PML-N leader Nawaz Sharif was, in turn,
pressuring Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry to disqualify President
Zardari. Malik also assessed that Saudi Arabia was working to unseat
President Zardari. Malik intended to visit Prince Muqrin bin Abdul Aziz,
Chief of Saudi General Intelligence, in Saudi Arabia and then travel on
to London to meet with MQM Convener Altaf Hussain.
5. (C) Malik suggested that the best way to deal with military pressure
would be for President Zardari to make internal changes within the
military hierarchy. Malik proposed that Zardari recreate the Deputy
Chief of Army Staff position and move Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI)
Director General Ahmad Shuja Pasha into that position in March 2010.
Zardari could then commit to elevating Pasha to COAS in October 2010 on
the expiration of Kayani's term. Malik suggested that Kayani could then
be moved to Chairman of the Joint Staff. Comment: Malik seemed to
believe that ISI DG Pasha was unilaterally behind the push to oust
Zardari -- which we know is not/not the case. End Comment.
6. (C) Despite these concerns, Malik reiterated the government's line
that Zardari is not in any real danger on expiration of the NRO. He
asserted that the Chief Justice would not/not revoke Zardari's
presidential immunity. Even if he did, Malik claimed that the Interior
Minister can instruct prosecutors to dismiss charges in any court case.
He shared that, in one of his own corruption cases, this had been done,
and that in another case, the Supreme Court had ruled his imprisonment
illegal. Malik also added that President Zardari had the ability to
pardon anyone.
7. (C) Malik pressed the Ambassador for issuance of a strong statement
from the United States. Ambassador inquired as to the content and the
audience. Malik suggested that it be a public statement saying that the
United States supported democracy in Pakistan.
8. (C) Comment: Malik was clearly worried that President Zardari and his
inner circle of advisors -- including Malik -- had lost the support of
the international community. Malik appeared to believe that such support
was essential for their survival in the face of military plotting
against them. Malik's view that ISI DG Pasha is behind the moves against
President Zardari and that COAS Kayani is not involved is either naive
or intentionally misleading. It would be impossible for Pasha to move
without Kayani's acquiescence. Malik's views on Zardari's legal troubles
presuppose that Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry will be bound by normal
interpretations of the law and precedent. Such an assumption ignores
Chaudhry's penchant for ignoring both in recent rulings and his personal
animosity towards Asif Ali Zardari. End Comment. Patterson