From:
Der
Spiegel
10/5/2005 8:34 05ALMATY3603 US Office Almaty CONFIDENTIAL
This record is a partial extract of the original cable.
The full text of the original cable is not available.
TAGS: KZ, PGOV, PHUM, PREL, POLITICAL
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: A/S FRIED'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT
C o n f i d e n t i a l almaty 003603
Sipdis
E.o. 12958: decl: 10/03/2015 Tags: kz, pgov, phum, prel, political
Subject: kazakhstan: a/s fried's meeting with president nazarbayev
Classified By: Ambassador John Ordway, reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).
1. (C)
Assistant Secretary Dan Fried met with Kazakhstani President
Nazarbayev in Astana on September 30 for over an hour. On the
Kazakhstani side the participants included Presidential
Administration Head Dzhaksybekov, Foreign Minister Tokayev,
and Assistant to the President Masimov. Ambassador Ordway, DOD
DAS Jim MacDougall, NSC Director David Merkel, and SA DAS John
Gastright accompanied Fried. The atmosphere was cordial, and
Nazarbayev was relaxed and engaged throughout the meeting. He
made a point of referring to each member of the delegation and
where he had met him before. In the case of Merkel, this led
to a retelling of a telephone conversation that Merkel had
facilitated with President Bush during the 2000 election on
the situation in Chechnya. Nazarbayev referred to prepared
papers only at the end to bring up some issues that had not
come up in the course of the largely free-form conversation.
This message reports the conversation thematically.
Democratization
---------------
2. (C)
Assistant Secretary Fried noted the strong progress Kazakhstan
had made under President Nazarbayev's leadership in
establishing its sovereignty, and in building a free market
system. Economic reforms have provided Kazakhstan with a
strong basis to take advantage of its hydrocarbon resources.
The U.S. had been a partner of Kazakhstan, most recently in
fighting terrorism, and looked forward to continuing this
partnership. Now, the U.S. and the entire world were watching
to see how Kazakhstan handled the upcoming Presidential
elections. They represented the next step forward for the
democratic evolution of Kazakhstan. The decision about the NGO
law had been a good one. The President's speeches to the
nation (in February) and to Parliament (in September) had laid
out clearly where he stood on the issues, and the U.S.
appreciated them very much. Good elections would mark another
step forward in our relationship, which must be based on the
broad range of our shared interests: security, the economy,
and democratization. Kazakhstan is poised very well compared
to the other countries in the region: large, wealthy, and on
the verge of elections that can provide the winner a strong,
democratic mandate. The U.S. cannot build a relationship with
any Central Asian country on the basis of security alone. As
Secretary Rice has said, our interest in security and in
democracy is indivisible.
3. (C)
Fried said that he wanted to express the hopes of his
government for a deepening of our relationship, especially
after the elections, if they are democratic. We take seriously
Nazarbayev's commitments that they be free and fair.
4. (C)
Nazarbayev said that those post-Soviet leaders who had put
political development first had made a serious error, as shown
by the failures of Gorbachev, as well as the leadership in
Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan. Trying to implement democratic reform
in poor countries will end up badly. Kazakhstan, he said, had
chosen a different path: first the economy, then politics. The
development of small and medium enterprises, and a middle
class, sets the stage for electing representative who will
have a stake in the system. Nazarbayev said that that USG
would not tolerate a group of people trying to take over the
White House, and added that the U.S. was trying to lecture to
others without knowing the true situation in the countries
concerned. As a friend of the U.S., Nazarbayev said, this
approach would only stimulate those like Lukashenko who
criticize the U.S.
5. (C)
Kazakhstan, Nazarbayev said, had reached a point where its
economic development now required liberal reforms of society.
His goal, he said, was a sustainable democratic Kazakhstan
that cannot be turned back. After the election, he would sit
down personally with all political forces and seek a consensus
on further democratic reforms. If necessary, the constitution
could be changed to accommodate the reforms. (Note: This is a
nod toward two of the major criticisms by the opposition over
the past year, who refused to participate in the existing
commission on democratization because it was not chaired by
Nazarbayev, and who have been insisting on constitutional
reform to reduce executive powers.)
6. (C)
Fried told Nazarbayev that what had happened in Georgia,
Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan was the result of political and
economic failures. The U.S., he said, supports democratic and
economic reform; revolution was the result of failure and
never the preferable route. The U.S. is not interested in
revolution; we are interested in reforms like those Nazarbayev
had just described.
Elections
---------
7. (C)
On the upcoming election, Nazarbayev was supremely confident.
He cited Western polls that showed him with 70% support.
(Note: A 2004 IRI poll did show impressively high approval
ratings for Nazarbayev, but did not pose a direct election
question. Senior Presidential Administration officials have
told us that their polls indicate electoral support for
Nazarbayev has grown from 42% in February, to 70% in
September. Both have a margin of error of 3%. End Note.) In
campaign mode, Nazarbayev boasted that he would not even leave
his office in the pre-election period. (Comment: not likely.)
He continued, enthusiastically, to denigrate united opposition
candidate Zharmakhan Tuyakbay, calling him a Soviet procurator
responsible for sending patriotic students to jail in 1986 --
and adding that they had the documents to prove his involvement
8. (C)
Note: Tuyakbay was chairman of the lower house of parliament,
and the first candidate on the Otan party list in the
September 2004 parliamentary elections, until he broke with
Nazarbayev later that year, charging massive falsification of
the results. The reference to 1986 refers to massive
anti-Soviet demonstrations in Almaty in December 1986 after
Gorbachev sacked long-time party boss Kunayev, an ethnic
Kazakh, and replaced him with Gennadiy Kolbin, an ethnic
Russian with no previous association with Kazakhstan.
Tuyakbay's role in prosecuting the students will not play well
with the Kazakh electorate where his primary appeal lies.
End Note
9. (C)
Nazarbayev acknowledged, indirectly, that corruption will be a
major element in the campaign. He said, however, that charges
against his administration would backfire as the opposition
had truly corrupt persons in their ranks. Turning strategic,
Nazarbayev promised that the elections would be free, fair and
transparent. He said that given the strength of his support he
did not need any "supplemental measures." He added that he
welcomed as many international observers as possible,
especially from the OSCE.
10. (C)
Fried said that he appreciated Nazarbayev's evaluation of
elections. It was particularly astute to welcome the presence
of OSCE observers, since this could protect the government
from unfounded charges of election manipulation. Fried added
that he knew that on December 5, the day after the elections,
the first thing Secretary Rice would ask would be "what does
the OSCE think" -- not what the opposition had charged. Fried
said that he hoped he would be able to say that they were
pretty good elections. If so, this would be the best news of
the year.
Security
--------
11. (C)
Assistant Secretary Fried praised Kazakhstan's support for the
war on terrorism, and for its contingent in Iraq. Nazarbayev
said that Kazakhstan was not yet prepared to join NATO or to
have a U.S. base, but did want a closer security and defense
relationship. He asked for U.S. assistance with Caspian
security. This would not mean deployed forces or bases, but
would include technical assistance and training, and help with
control of the air and sea. He suggested that we might want to
consider concluding a detailed, comprehensive, confidential
action plan in this area.
Regional Issues
---------------
12. (C)
Assistant Secretary Fried provided an overview of his
discussions in Tashkent and Bishkek. Nazarbayev underscored
the risk to Kazakhstan of a breakdown in Uzbekistan. He said
that he had been working for some time to encourage Karimov to
undertake reform, particularly economic reform. Now, however,
he has given up any hope that Karimov will be able to move his
country forward and avoid a societal breakdown. Nazarbayev
predicted that there would be turmoil in the Fergana Valley
that would then spread to other cities in Uzbekistan.
Kazakhstan was preparing to receive refugees, and he noted
that there are 1.5 million ethnic Kazakhs in Uzbekistan who
are discriminated against and deprived of their rights.
13. (C)
Nazarbayev said that his offer of a Central Asian economic
community remained on the table, offering open borders,
unified tariffs, and free movement of people and capital.
Karimov, however, is afraid to open the border. Nonetheless
there are already 500,000 Uzbeks working illegally in
Kazakhstan, along with 200,000 Kyrgyz. Kazakhstan is prepared
to establish consortia on energy and transportation, and to
develop hydroelectric projects in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.
The region is interlinked, he said. Kazakhstan can provide
food and meat, and will buy power and cotton. He said he did
not know why there was not agreement on this. However, a
meeting in Dushanbe had approved the consortia and there would
be a supra-national body to control them. (Note: This
initiative appears to be limited to Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and
Tajikistan.)
14. (C)
Nazarbayev commented briefly on Turkmenistan, saying that
Niyazov "is getting crazy." Nazarbayev said Niyazov had
renamed the first month of the year "Turkmenbashi." Since
then, Nazarbayev said he had been calling him "Mr. January,"
which infuriates Niyazov.
15. (C)
Fried asked for Kazakhstan's support for Kyrgyzstan, saying
that the new leadership there were facing very difficult
problems. They were focusing on the right issues, but solving
them would be tough. Nazarbayev said Kyrgyzstan was a bankrupt
country, whose external debt equalled its GDP. Kazakhs
consider themselves "brothers" with the Kyrgyz, and had
already outlined a course to help them through their current
difficulties. Nazarbayev said he would meet with Bakiyev on
October 6, and was ready to go to Bishkek. Kazakhstan was
providing help to get Kyrgyzstan through the winter, possibly
coal and oil, and had already sent grain. Nazarbayev said that
he would take Kazakhstani bankers there to see opportunities,
and added that Kazakhstan needed to export capital. He had
provided political support by attending Bakiyev's
inauguration.
16. (C)
Nazarbayev expressed support for U.S. efforts in Afghanistan.
He noted that Kazakhstani companies might be able to assist
with reconstruction efforts. The GOK has raised this issue
with the GOA. Nazarbayev noted that an Uzbek decree which
prevents land access to Afghanistan for Kazakhstanis (NFI)
could hamper efforts to assist with reconstruction.
Partnership with the U.S.
-------------------------
17. (C)
Nazarbayev outlined his vision of strategic partnership and
true friendship with the U.S. He referred pointedly to an old
Kazakh saying said that the country is geographically located
between the Russian bear and the Chinese dragon, and (mixing
metaphors a bit) remarked that it's dangerous for a fly to be
between two camels. However, while Kazakhstan had some
vulnerability, it must have, and does have, excellent
relations with both of these powerful neighbors. At the same
time, Kazakhstan wanted to develop its partnership with the
U.S., but the U.S. must understand that Kazakhstan cannot
"split" with either of its neighbors. On the bilateral
relationship, much has already been done. The U.S. is the
largest foreign investor in Kazakhstan (providing 35% of all
FDI). Kazakhstan aspired to be among the top five oil
exporters within ten years. The fact that U.S. oil companies
are in a very prominent position in Kazakhstan was the result
of a deliberate choice.
18. (C)
Nazarbayev continued, noting that Kazakhstan is the "only
Muslim country" with the U.S. in Iraq. (Comment: This isn't
true; we've tried to gently correct the record a couple of
times but Nazarbayev keeps repeating this. End Comment.) He
described the Kazakhstani contingent as a symbolic
contribution, but important for the U.S. When America's
closest friends leave, he said, Kazakhstan will be there with
the U.S. Nazarbayev said he told Bill Clinton that Kazakhstan
would donate $250,000 for Hurricane Katrina relief -- again an
important symbolic gesture of support. Kazakhstan had
supported the U.S. on terrorism from the first day. Working
together with the U.S., Kazakhstan had solved its problems
with denuclearization and non-proliferation.
19. (C)
Kazakhstan was not asking for grants or loans; having paid off
its IMF debt it needed no credits. However, Kazakhstan was
interested in true cooperation on a range of issues --
attracting U.S. investment in the SME sector, and obtaining
U.S. economic and political support for strengthening the
independence of Kazakhstan in a way not directed against China
and Russia. "We can do it in a smart way," Nazarbayev said, by
making the presence of the U.S. "very powerful." Nazarbayev
said that the U.S. and Kazakhstan should sign an agreement on
strategic partnership (as the U.S. had done with China, Russia
and Uzbekistan). "That would be political support. We would
not ask for anything, just sign the agreement that would
provide for mutual obligations which could be fulfilled.
20. (C)
Fried said that Nazarbayev had outlined ideas on the bilateral
relationship in which the U.S. was very interested, i.e.
deepening political and economic relations and security
cooperation. The relationship would deepen and grow as
Kazakhstan proceeds through economic and political reforms.
Other Issues
------------
21. (C)
At the end of the meeting, Nazarbayev referred to briefing
papers for the first time. He said that Kazakhstan was holding
a conference on Central Asia in Washington October 25, and was
seeking high-level administration attendance. The Kazakhstani
delegation would be led by his Assistant, Karim Masimov, whom
he hoped would be able to see Secretary Rice to deliver a
letter responding to President
Sipdis
Bush's recent letter. He asked for U.S. assistance with WTO
accession. Finally, he asked for U.S. support for Kazakhstan's
candidacy for OSCE Chairman-in-Office in 2009. He admitted
that further reform efforts would be needed, including strong
performance on the presidential elections, for Kazakhstan to
be a viable candidate.
22. (U) A/S Fried has cleared this cable.
23. (U) Dushanbe minimize considered.
Ordway
Nnnn