Friday, 22 January 2010, 09:00
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 COLOMBO 000050
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/INSB
EO 12958 DECL: 01/22/2020
TAGS PGOV, PREL, PREF, PHUM, PTER, EAID, MOPS, CE
SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: ASSESSING PROGRESS ON KEY ISSUES
REF: A. 09 COLOMBO 1176 B. COLOMBO 32 C. COLOMBO 8
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Classified By: AMBASSADOR PATRICIA A. BUTENIS. REASONS: 1.4
(B, D)

¶1. (S) According to Congressional mandates and
Administration policy, U.S. assistance to Sri Lanka,
particularly military assistance, is tied to progress by the
Government of Sri Lanka (GSL) on several key issues,
including treatment of IDPs, human rights, political
reconciliation, and accountability for alleged crimes
perpetrated by GSL troops and officials during the war with
the LTTE. The GSL has progressed more or less on each of
these issues since the end of the conflict. Continued or
increased U.S. assistance, however, hinges on the GSL
broadening and deepening this progress.

¶2. (S) Outlined below are these key issue areas with
discussion of what progress has been made so far and what
further progress we would like to see. It is important to
note that we are not offering this list as a set of
"benchmarks," which the GSL must meet to qualify for more
robust engagement. Our experience with benchmarks in the Sri
Lankan context (and elsewhere as well) is that the government
often makes notable progress but in areas not anticipated, or
in ways not foreseen, by our benchmarks. Thus, the following
list of favored steps is not meant to be exhaustive but
rather illustrative. Actual progress will have to be assessed
as it happens.

¶3. (S) It also is important to note that the upcoming
presidential election -- particularly if it were to result in
an opposition victory -- could radically alter the political
context of our assessment of GSL progress on key issues.
Opposition candidate General Fonseka has made many
significant promises in each of these issue areas, and we
could expect that his new government would be interested in
moving forward more quickly than the Rajapaksa government.
Nevertheless, the key issue areas of concern remain the same
notwithstanding the election, and we would expect any Sri
Lankan government to continue to make progress. Please note
that our lists of "Next Steps" are not in any order of
priority or importance.

IDPs
----

¶4. (S) There has been a dramatic improvement in the
treatment of IDPs and their living conditions over the past
several months. Whether because of international pressure or
electoral politics, the result is that 106,007 displaced
persons remain in GSL camps, according to UNHCR, down from a
high of over 280,000. Large numbers who left the camps remain
in transit camps or with host families and have not yet
returned to their places of origin. Although humanitarian
access to camps has been inconsistent since the end of the
war, most organizations reported that access was now granted
upon request. Protection monitoring and confidential
interviews with IDPs are still prohibited, and the ICRC
revised mandate has not been finalized. ICRC headquarters is
assessing whether to accept the GSL offer of a general rather
than a detailed MOU. Access to returnee areas for INGOs is
still limited to those engaged in de-mining and one medical
organization in the Vanni, although the government and local
authorities were reportedly working to extend this to other
groups. INGOs in Jaffna were recently authorized to work by
the Governor of the North but await confirmation from the
Presidential Task Force.

¶5. (S) Next steps:

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-- Renew ICRC mandate.
-- Provide transparent criteria and
regularized processes for INGO access to the north.
-- Provide transparent criteria and regularized processes for
access to returnee areas for journalists.
-- Continue to release or prosecute LTTE and other Tamil
detainees according to a judicial process.
-- Implement a national system for tracing separated
family members.
-- Continue GSL reintegration of returnees.

Human Rights
------------

¶6. (S) Numbers of disappearances have experienced a steady
and significant decline across the island since the end of
the war, and the Attorney General's Office, the Ministry of
Human Rights and Disaster Relief, and other institutions have
conducted investigations into some of the cases. For example,
on December 21, Attorney General Peiris told Ambassador that
there was an 11-person team working under Deputy Solicitor
General De Livera to look into questions of disappearances
and other potential violations under the Emergency
Regulations (ref A). Peiris claimed that 100 (presumably
innocent) people had been found in detention and released
during the previous 45 days, and the team was continuing its
investigations. He was going to Anuradhapura himself later
that week to look at 33 cases and to decide whether the
suspects could be released.

¶7. (S) Child soldiers affiliated with the TMVP have been
significantly reduced over the past year, with just five
reportedly remaining at the end of 2009, according to UNICEF;
the government appears to be working actively to find the
remaining child soldiers. On January 13, imprisoned
journalist J.S. Tissainayagam was released on bail, and Post
is not aware of any additional physical attacks on
journalists since June, although there still have been
threats.

¶8. (S) Next steps:
-- Disappearances continue to decline, and investigations
continue to rise. The team under A.G. Peiris, in particular,
should examine and process more cases.
-- All remaining child soldiers accounted for and
discharged/rehabilitated.
-- Press freedom: threats to individual journalists must end,
along with atmosphere of intimidation.
-- Press freedom: progress made in investigation of the killing
a year ago of Sunday Leader editor Lasantha Wickramatunga.
-- Remaining ex-LTTE "new" detainees, held since the end of
the war, are placed within a legal structure. All "older" LTTE
and Tamil detainees, held since before the end of the war, are
charged and prosecuted or released.
-- Lifting the Emergency Regulations.
-- Less harassment and intimidation of civil society organizations.

Political Reconciliation
------------------------

¶9. (S) Although progress has been slow, the presidential
elections -- particularly the fact that the two main
candidates are splitting the Sinhalese vote -- has moved
reconciliation issues higher on the political agenda. The A-9
road has been opened for nearly all travel by Sri Lankans
(NOTE: Foreigners are still not permitted to drive into the
North. END NOTE.), the curfew in Jaffna has ended, and
fishing restrictions in the North have been largely

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eliminated. Of the 12,000 ex-LTTE combatants held in
detainment camps since the end of the war, 712 were released
the week after the New Year, and the government has announced
it would release an additional 1,000 shortly. General Fonseka
has made reconciliation a prominent issue in his campaign,
signing a ten-point program for devolving power to the
North-East. In addition, in his widely distributed campaign
manifesto, Fonseka has promised he would: (a) abolish the
Executive Presidency; (b) reactivate the 17th Amendment to
the Constitution; (c) end the culture of "white van"
disappearances and extra-judicial killings; (d) eliminate the
press council and establish an environment of free media; (e)
return all remaining IDPs and double the resettlement
allowance they receive to 100,000 rupees (about USD 880); (f)
amend the Emergency Regulations; and (g) deal with all
war-related detainees by either prosecuting them, releasing
them, or placing them in rehabilitation programs.

¶10. (S) Next Steps:
-- Some sort of power-sharing or decentralization arrangement
to accommodate minority rights. Should be locally developed
(i.e. not necessarily the 13th Amendment) and satisfactory to
minority populations in Sri Lanka.
-- Lifting of High Security Zones.
-- Unrestricted access permitted throughout the North for
all Sri Lankans, diplomats, journalists, and NGOs.
-- Remaining no-threat or low-threat ex-LTTE combatants
in "new detainee" camps are released or placed into
rehabilitation programs.
-- Any low-risk "older" LTTE detainees convicted within the
justice system are removed from prison and placed into
rehabilitation programs.

Accountability
--------------

¶11. (S) Accountability for alleged crimes committed by GSL
troops and officials during the war is the most difficult
issue on our bilateral agenda, and the one we believe has the
lowest prospect for forward movement. There are no examples
of a sitting regime undertaking wholesale investigations of
its own troops or senior officials for war crimes. In Sri
Lanka this is further complicated by the fact that
responsibility for many of the alleged crimes rests with the
country's senior civilian and military leadership, including
President Rajapaksa and his brothers and opposition candidate
General Fonseka. Moreover, the fact that the LTTE leadership
has been destroyed and there is virtually no one to hold
accountable for LTTE war crimes makes prosecutions of GSL
troops or officials that much more difficult.

¶12. (S) Accountability also has not been a top priority for
Tamils in Sri Lanka. While Tamils have told us they would
like to see some form of accountability, they have been
pragmatic in what they can expect and have focused instead on
securing greater rights and freedoms, resolving the IDP
question, and improving economic prospects in the war-ravaged
and former LTTE-occupied areas. Indeed, while they wanted to
keep the issue alive for possible future action, Tamil
leaders with whom we spoke in Colombo, Jaffna, and elsewhere
said now was not time and that pushing hard on the issue
would make them "vulnerable" (ref. B).

¶13. (S) Despite these considerations, there have been some
tentative steps on accountability. Soon after the appearance
of the State Department Report to Congress on Incidents,
President Rajapaksa announced the formation of an experts'
committee to examine the report and to provide him with
recommendations on dealing with the allegations. At the end
of the year, the president extended the deadline for the

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committee's recommendations from December 31 until April. For
his part, General Fonseka has spoken publicly of the need for
a new deal with the Tamils and other minorities. Privately,
his campaign manager told the Ambassador that Fonseka had
ordered the opposition campaign to begin work planning a
"truth and reconciliation" commission (ref. C).

¶14. (S) Rajapaksa Next Steps:
-- Presidential experts' committee makes credible
recommendations for dealing with the allegations in the State
Department report.
-- A commission is formed to hear complaints and resolve
individual cases of war disappearances.
-- GSL publicly acknowledges human cost of war and losses
on both sides.
-- President institutes compensation program for families
of civilians killed in the war.

¶15. (S) Fonseka Next Steps:
-- Begins national dialogue on the war and its human costs.
-- Creation of a serious and credible truth and
reconciliation mechanism.
-- Considers compensation program.

BUTENIS