S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000115
NOFORN
SIPDIS
STATE FOR NEA/FO AND NEA/MAG; NSC FOR AGUIRRE
E.O. 12958 DECL: 2/11/2020
TAGS MTCRE, PARM, PREL, MNUC, ETTC, KSCA, LY
SUBJECT: LIBYA INSISTS BALL IN U.S. COURT ON SCUD B ALTERNATIVE
REF: A) State 11501; B) 09 Tripoli 753; C) 09 Tripoli 960
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CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Tripoli, Department of State. REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1. (U) This is an action request; see para 8.
¶2. (S) Summary: In a February 9 meeting with the Ambassador,
the head of Libya’s Scud B destruction program, General Ahmed
Azwai, insisted that the USG was mostly responsible for
Libya’s delayed fulfillment of Scud B destruction commitments.
Azwai blamed the USG for hampering Libyan efforts to find a
Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)-compliant alternative
weapons system to replace its Scud B stock and refused to
discuss a destruction timeline until Libya acquires a
replacement system. The Libyans passionately believe that the
U.S. committed to assisting in the search for an alternative
weapons system, and they want the U.S. to fulfill that
commitment. Azwai indicated that Libya still wants to purchase
the Russian Iskander missile that Libya originally proposed
(ideally at the originally stipulated purchase price), but
said that it is up to the U.S. to decide whether that is
acceptable -- if not, then he believes the U.S. should find an
acceptable alternative. Azwai made no mention of the French
Scalp missile or any other proposed alternatives during the
meeting, suggesting that the Scalp proposal may have been an
independent move by Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi. Azwai requested
U.S. support for Libya’s bid for MTCR membership. End Summary.
AZWAI: THE U.S. COMMITED TO FIND AN ALTERNATIVE SYSTEM FOR LIBYA
¶3. (S) General Ahmed Azwai, head of Libya’s Scud B
destruction program, met with the Ambassador, accompanied by
Pol/Econ Chief, on February 9 to reiterate Libya’s
expectations that the USG identify a suitable alternative to
the Scud B system. (Note: The meeting was scheduled in
response to a September 2009 Embassy request for a status
update on Libya’s MTCR-related commitments. End note.) Azwai,
joined by Tajuri al-Shiradi of the MFA’s International
Organizations office, as well as Libya’s “Rocket Committee,”
reviewed the history of U.S.-Libya negotiations on the
elimination of Libya’s Scud Bs and insisted that the 2004
trilateral agreement included “promises by the U.S. and UK to
find a replacement for the Scud B system.” Referencing an
English language version of the agreement that Azwai provided,
the Ambassador explained that the wording did not commit the
U.S. or UK to find a replacement system, but noted that we had
in fact suggested alternative missile systems in the past,
which Libya refused.
¶4. (S) Azwai insisted that the language of the agreement
obligates the U.S. and UK to help Libya find a suitable
replacement system. Azwai argued that instead of helping Libya
fulfill its commitments, the U.S. had thrown obstacles in
Libya’s way, first by initially rejecting Libya’s request to
purchase Iskander missiles from Russia and then by delaying
the sale by stalling the approval process. Azwai noted that
Libya had already signed a contract with Russia to purchase
the Iskander missiles when the U.S. objected (he asserted that
the UK had assented to the sale). “The process dragged on for
two years, and we could not wait that long~and now, we still
do not have an acceptable alternative,” he said. According to
Azwai, the two other systems the U.S. suggested -- one from
Ukraine and another from Russia -- were both “unacceptable
alternatives” due to the technical and range specifications
needed to guarantee Libya’s national security. “We must have a
replacement system,” he stated. “I will not allow 12,000
Libyan soldiers to remain unarmed and vulnerable. If I give up
their weapons before I have a replacement, they will turn on
me.” He argued that Libya had already given up some of its
rocket systems and codes and did not intend to give up any
more until it could replace its current stock.
ISKANDER STILL BEST ALTERNATIVE TO LIBYAN SCUD B
¶5. (S) While Azwai told the Ambassador that Libya was
“actively looking” for an alternative system, he believes that
the Iskander system originally proposed by the Libyan side is
still the best alternative to Libya’s Scud Bs. However,
according to the Rockets Committee, the price of that system
has increased by one hundred percent. Azwai expressed Libya’s
continued desire to purchase the Iskander missile at a lower
price than that which the Russians were currently offering,
and he sought U.S. approval for such a purchase. “In the
beginning,” he commented, “we were hoping for a U.S. system,
but you said there was none.” He continued that “the only
friend for Libya is Russia on
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weapons sales.” (Azwai did not mention the French Scalp system
that Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi’s staff raised with Emboffs in
November 2009, suggesting that the proposal may have been an
independent move by Saif.) Azwai emphasized that he expected
the U.S. to suggest viable alternatives, and for those
suggestions to be offered either in writing or in the context
of another meeting with him.
¶6. (S) The Ambassador asked whether Libya had begun to
develop a timeline for the destruction of its Scud B missiles
and suggested that a U.S. technical team come to Tripoli to
discuss destruction plans. Per reftel guidance, the Ambassador
offered that the USG could support Libya’s Scud B destruction
with technical and financial assistance. Initially Azwai
refused to discuss destruction plans until an alternative
system has been identified, but as the Ambassador reiterated
his points, Azwai asked that the Rocket Committee make note of
the U.S. offer. He asked whether the U.S. would fund
destruction “one hundred percent,” or partially, snidely
remarking that “we Libyans need to be careful about what the
American offers really mean.” He underscored that Libya “will
not think about destruction until you [the U.S.] fulfill your
commitment.” Azwai said that he would not be willing to
discuss destruction until after a contract for a replacement
system was signed. Furthermore, since the Libyans perceive the
delays in meeting Libya’s MTCR commitments as rooted in U.S.
inaction on the issue, Azwai demanded that Libya receive an
extension on its MTCR-commitment deadline.
LIBYA’S BID FOR MTCR MEMBERSHIP
¶7. (S) Azwai further complained that the United States had
not supported Libya’s recent bids to become a full MTCR
member. Members of the Rocket Committee specified that they
had requested support from several embassies in Libya, with
the exception of the United States, but had also requested
support in Paris, at the most recent MTCR meetings. Azwai said
that Libya had fulfilled the stipulations the MTCR committee
required for membership, including adopting new legislation,
but still could not obtain full membership. He inferred that
the U.S. was part of the reason Libya’s membership was
blocked. The Ambassador highlighted that the USG could not act
on a request that was not directly raised with us and advised
the Rocket Committee to send an official request for U.S.
support of Libya’s membership in order for it to be considered
in Washington. Azwai agreed to do so.
COMMENT AND ACTION REQUEST
¶8. (S/NF) This meeting revealed what appears to be a
fundamental misunderstanding regarding the terms and
obligations of the involved parties of the 2004 trilateral
Scud B disposition agreement. Azwai was adamant that the U.S.
was obliged to help Libya identify a Scud B replacement system
and made it clear that, unless we do, he has no intention of
moving forward on destruction. It is unclear whether Azwai’s
position is based on a concrete Libyan legal interpretation of
the 2004 agreement or a purely political assessment that Libya
has gotten less than it was promised during the 2003-2004
negotiations regarding its WMD programs. We have been hearing
the latter with increasing frequency from the highest levels
of the Libyan government, including Libyan leader Muammar
al-Qadhafi. It is clear that further discussions -- either at
the expert or political level -- will be required in order to
make progress on the replacement and destruction issues. The
Department’s guidance on next steps on these issues, as well
as Libya’s MTCR membership bid, is requested.
CRETZ