Excerpt from document
(C) SUMMARY: Iraq's electoral campaign continues to
proceed apace with less than two weeks left until voting day.
Reports in the Western press of a Sunni election boycott are
vastly exaggerated; there are no serious indications that
Sunni voters will stay away from the polls in meaningful
numbers in protest of the recent de-Ba'athification
controversy.

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Content
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BAGHDAD 000475

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/22/2020
TAGS: PGOV, KDEM, IZ
SUBJECT: IRAQI ELECTION CAMPAIGN UPDATE: FEBRUARY 22, 2010

REF: A. BAGHDAD 454
B. BAGHDAD 441
C. BAGHDAD 440

Classified By: Acting Political Minister-Counselor Yuri Kim for Reasons
1.4 (b, d)

1. (C) SUMMARY: Iraq's electoral campaign continues to
proceed apace with less than two weeks left until voting day.
Reports in the Western press of a Sunni election boycott are
vastly exaggerated; there are no serious indications that
Sunni voters will stay away from the polls in meaningful
numbers in protest of the recent de-Ba'athification
controversy. Even MP Saleh al-Mutlaq and his supporters are
wavering in their calls for a boycott. While there continue
to be credible reports of campaign abuses, unfair tactics,
and intimidation of both candidates and party supporters,
USF-I has not/not detected a sustained spike in overall
violence since the campaign season opened. The Embassy will
continue to stress the importance of a fair, transparent, and
inclusive election process in meetings with relevant
contacts. END SUMMARY.

CAMPAIGN IN FULL SWING
----------------------

2. (SBU) Thousands of election candidates actively campaigned
throughout Iraq the past several days. Campaign posters and
banners have saturated major thoroughfares, blast walls, and
even fences in many cities, particularly in Baghdad and
Basra; campaign advertisements are almost omnipresent on the
television airwaves. Some candidates and parties are using
cell phone text messages to spread their message. Most
posters simply contain a candidate's name, picture, ballot
number and brief slogan. Others are much more elaborate,
with references to impressive educational credentials and
previous offices held. In the case of Shatha al-Sultani, it
was her familial and tribal connections that said it all.
Her message is: Vote for Shatha Razaq Noman al-Sultani, who
is not only Um Sajad (literally "the mother of Sajad"), but
also the wife of Sheikh Ahmed al-Kenani, who is the brother
of Sheikh Malik al-Kenani; the only person pictured is a man,
presumably either Sajad, Ahmed, or Malik. Campaign
activities may increase in the coming days as the Iraqiyya
coalition announced on February 20 that it was formally
ending its campaign freeze in protest of the disqualification
of some of its candidates for alleged Ba'athist ties.
(Comment: It is uncertain how strictly this freeze may have
been observed. Campaign posters for Iraqiyya head Ayad
Allawi and other candidates of the coalition quickly appeared
on Iraqi streets as soon as the formal campaign season began
on February 12. End Comment.)

3. (SBU) Some campaign materials continue to display
sectarian messages, particularly in the south where
anti-Ba'athist sentiment is running high. One poster for
former PM Ibrahim al-Ja'afari states, under his photo, "There
is no place for the Ba'ath in Iraq." More disturbing has
been the airing of gruesome television ads showing historical
footage of Ba'ath Party loyalists killing Shi'a Iraqis. Both
al-Furat TV, controlled by ISCI, and the al-Afaq station,
affiliated with Maliki's Da'wa Party, have aired this
footage. One ad on al-Afaq displayed the beheadings of Shi'a
while a news headline underneath reminded viewers that Sunni
MP Saleh al-Mutlaq had been banned from the elections due to
his Ba'athist connections.

4. (SBU) Prominent Iraqi officials are among those active on
the campaign trail. Beginning an extended campaign swing in
the south, PM Maliki arrived in Dhi Qar province on February
19 to attend a tribal conference and meet with local
officials. The following day, Maliki inaugurated eight water
Qofficials. The following day, Maliki inaugurated eight water
desalination centers in southern Basra. During a press
conference in the city of Basra, the PM made a point of
impugning incompetent officials for failing to protect Iraq's
security and sovereignty. Approximately 1,500 people
welcomed Maliki in the city of Amarah in Maysan province on
February 21, where he opened a major road overpass. On the
Sunni side, Deputy PM Rafi'e al-Issawi visited his hometown
of Fallujah, the biggest city in Anbar, on February 20 and
strongly encouraged its residents to vote in the elections.
Imams from the Anbar Sunni Endowment told PRToffs that they
expected Issawi to have a strong electoral showing in the
province. Parliamentary Speaker Iyad al-Samarrai arrived in
Mosul on February 20 to attend a campaign rally in Ninewa and
inspect local preparations for the elections, traveling north
from there to Erbil February 22 to see KRG President Barzani
in a highly publicized meeting.

5. (SBU) One prominent candidate absent from the domestic
campaign trail is Ayad Allawi, head of Iraqiyya. Rather than
mingle with voters in Iraq, he has been abroad yet again the

BAGHDAD 00000475 002 OF 004

past several days, visiting Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the UAE and
Egypt. According to press reports, Allawi met with Saudi
King Abdullah on February 20; he is due to return to Iraq on
February 22. (Note: The Sadrist Trend railed against
Allawi's travel on its party website and Iraqi news outlets,
calling on the GOI to prosecute Allawi for "soliciting
foreign intervention in Iraqi elections." End Note.) Other
candidates are also apparently taking a more laissez-faire
approach. Numerous candidates for Karbala province who live
and work in Baghdad, for example, are reportedly choosing to
spend the bulk of their time in the capital.

THE SUNNI BOYCOTT THAT NEVER WAS
--------------------------------

6. (C) Western media reports of a Sunni election boycott are
vastly overblown. On February 20, the Sunni-majority
Iraqiyya coalition, which still technically includes MP Saleh
al-Mutlaq and his Iraqi Front for National Dialogue (IFND)
party, announced in a press statement that it would fully
participate in the elections while still pressing for a
political solution to the disqualification of its candidates.
"The Iraqiyya bloc, while facing several challenges and
pressures, believes that the best response is the wide
participation of constituencies in the coming election,"
declared the statement. DPM Issawi confirmed to PolCouns
late February 20 that Iraqiyya was "definitely not
boycotting" and was actively encouraging all its supporters
to vote. Other prominent Iraqiyya candidates outside of
Mutlaq's party, including Adnan Pachachi, have reiterated the
same firm position.

7. (C) A broad canvassing of Sunni leaders within other
coalitions and parties shows no mainstream support for a
boycott, and in fact most are going on the stump harder than
ever. The Sunni-dominated Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP) issued a
statement February 22 expressing regret at the IFND's
withdrawal from the election race and declaring that the
building of the Iraqi state "requires the participation of
all segments of the Iraqi society." At a lavish wedding
party on February 20 that included many notable Iraqis
(septel), Sunni Sheikh Ali Hattam of the Alliance of Iraqi
Banners party -- the only significant Sunni entity in
Maliki's State of Law coalition -- criticized the recent
de-Ba'athification of candidates but said that he expected
Sunnis to nevertheless vote in force. Also at the party, MP
Mithal al-Alusi, the secular Sunni head of the Iraqi Nation
party, rejected the idea of a boycott and said that Mutlaq's
supporters would likely vote for Allawi. During a February
21 Diyala Tribal Council meeting, senior sheikhs (including
Sunnis) from around the province confirmed that there was no
validity to news reports that some tribes in Diyala were
considering boycotting the elections.

8. (SBU) Sunni imams, many of whom are affiliated with the
IIP, called on listeners during their recent Friday sermons
to participate in the elections. (Note: Shi'a imams also
continue to encourage Iraqis to vote. Reflecting the view of
Iraq's Shi'a religious establishment, in particular as
embodied by Grand Ayatollah Sistani, the Friday message at
the al-Hussein Shrine delivered by Sayed Ahmed al-Safi
included strong reminders about the importance of the
upcoming election and urged those listening to participate
freely: "The responsibility lays on all of you without
exception." End Note.) Representatives of the National
Democratic Institute (NDI) and the International Republican
Institute (IRI), which are conducting wide-ranging voter
QInstitute (IRI), which are conducting wide-ranging voter
education efforts in Iraq, report that they have not detected
a mood or trend among Sunni voters against voting in the
elections.

9. (C) Even Mutlaq, the one notable Sunni voice calling for a
boycott, appears to be wavering. In a phone call from Amman,
Mutlaq told PolCouns February 21 that candidates in the IFND
were no longer campaigning, but admitted that they were not
seeking to be taken off the ballots either. (Note: The list
of candidate names and their ballot numbers for the election
can no longer be altered. End Note.) He said he was prepared
to announce his party's return "once I am sure the election
will be fair." During a February 19 meeting in Ankara with
U.S. Ambassador to Turkey James Jeffrey, Turkish ambassador
to Iraq Murat Ozcelik received a phone call from Mutlaq (who
was in Damascus at the invitation of the Syrian government)
in which Ozcelik urged him not to boycott the elections.
Mutlaq appeared to have already relented as he complained to
Ozcelik about Allawi's reluctance to allow him to announce
his party's return to the campaign from an Iraqiyya venue.
(Comment: Mutlaq visited KRG President Barzani in Erbil
February 20 and claimed to PolCouns that Barzani promised to
do "anything I can" to get him back on the ballot. This is
likely wishful thinking. Barzani Chief of Staff Fuad Hussein
reported that the meeting had gone well, but that Mutlaq's

BAGHDAD 00000475 003 OF 004

expectations were too high. End Comment.)

10. (C) Aside from Mutlaq, other IFND candidates appear
ambivalent at best about the boycott call. In a conversation
with Emboff on February 21, MP Mustafa al-Hiti refused to
directly confirm that he would not participate in the
elections. While saying at one point that there was a
collective decision within the IFND to boycott the elections,
he later added that IFND members would "not give up their
rights and positions until the last minute before the
elections." MP Mohammad al-Tameem, who is contesting a
parliamentary seat in Kirkuk, told the press February 21
that, "We will take part in the election; we must, otherwise
we will lose our ability to influence the future of Iraq."
Tameem also said Mutlaq would "continue the way of peaceful
politics" and denied that the embattled IFND leader was
attempting to undermine the Iraqi political process or
instigate an armed conflict.

CAMPAIGN VANDALISM AND INTIMIDATION
-----------------------------------

11. (SBU) Many campaign posters in some areas of Iraq have
been torn, ripped down, or defaced with mud or paint thrown
across candidates' faces. Vandals burned some of Maliki's
posters and slung black paint and mud on those of Ayad Allawi
in several Shi'a-majority Baghdad neighborhoods over the
local weekend, for example. Two smaller parties claimed that
they lost 90% of their signs in the Ur neighborhood in
Baghdad's Adhamiyyah district. This vandalism is not
confined to Sunni-Shi'a animosity, but likely also reflects
rivalries between Shi'a-dominated parties and coalitions. To
help stem this problem, a spokesman for the Independent High
Electoral Commission (IHEC) on February 18 publicly reminded
Iraqis of prison penalties of at least one month and up to
one year for individuals destroying legitimate campaign
propaganda. The Interior Ministry confirmed on February 19
that it arrested five groups of people the previous evening
on suspicion of tearing down or defacing campaign posters.

12. (C) Reports continue to surface of election candidates or
party supporters being harassed or detained by GOI security
forces. A Sadrist candidate believed to be associated with
the Jaish al-Mahdi (JAM) was arrested February 22 in Wasit
province. While providing no specifics, Salim al-Jabouri,
spokesman for the Sunni Tawafuq coalition, alleged to local
press on February 19 that security forces were carrying out
"wide arrest operations" related to the elections in Diyala.
(Note: The arrest of an Iraqiyya member of the Diyala
Provincial Council (PC) on February 7 has led to charges that
the central government is trying to shape election results in
Diyala. This comes on top of earlier detentions and warrants
against IIP members of the PC; see ref A). Despite these
claims, however, there is no convincing evidence of
organizational intimidation occurring on a broad scale in the
country. (Note: Poloffs have repeatedly asked various
aggrieved parties to provide us with detailed information
that we might pursue with the GOI, but thus far our contacts
have failed to follow-up. End Note.) Similarly, while
members of the security forces have allegedly handed out
campaign materials for PM Maliki's State of Law Alliance
(SLA) or Interior Minister Bolani's Coalition for Iraq's
Unity (CIU), reports of these violations are isolated and
have not generated significant media attention.

ELECTION VIOLENCE: PERCEIVED OR REAL?
-------------------------------------

13. (SBU) In the largest terrorist incident of the last week,
Q13. (SBU) In the largest terrorist incident of the last week,
a suicide car bomb detonated February 18 near a checkpoint
outside the Anbar government center in Ramadi, killing at
least 11 people and wounding many others. Other notable
violent acts during the last few days include a February 18
car bomb in Mosul near a police station that injured more
than 20 individuals, and the killing of five police officers
by a roadside bomb near Khanaqin on February 21. Several
Christians in Ninewa province have reportedly been murdered
or kidnapped during this time period as well. (Note: It is
not clear if these attacks on Christians are related to the
election. In any case, Christian leaders have told PRToffs
and the local press that violence against Christians will not
affect their communities' attitudes towards voting. End
Note.) In the wake of several violent incidents in the
Kurdish province of Sulemaniyah, including a shooting
attributed to PUK security forces that resulted in the
wounding of three Goran party supporters at a campaign
gathering, the local IHEC office imposed a curfew on
campaigning in the province from 2100 to 0600 until March 5,
two days prior to the March 7 elections.

14. (C) Apart from the violence in Sulemaniyah, the extent to
which these incidents may be directly related to the upcoming

BAGHDAD 00000475 004 OF 004

elections is debatable. It is certainly possible that at
least some of them were designed to create an atmosphere of
fear so as to deter Iraqis from voting or to weaken PM
Maliki's security record, thereby hurting his election
prospects. On the other hand, Iraq remains a violent place
and many crimes are committed for non-political reasons.
USF-I has not/not detected a sustained spike in overall
violence in Iraq since the campaign season opened. Initial
reports of the assassination of election candidates since the
murder of an Iraqiyya candidate in Mosul on February 7 (ref
B) have proven unfounded. USF-I confirmed, however, an
unsuccessful attempt to assassinate an Iraqiyya candidate
outside of Mosul via a roadside bomb on February 22.

COMMENT
-------

15. (C) With less than two weeks to go until March 7, the
election campaign has proceeded relatively well given the
security and political challenges facing Iraq. Incidents of
campaign abuses, dirty tactics, and the intimidation of both
candidates and party supporters are unfortunate, but
inevitable in the charged electoral environment. The Code of
Conduct adopted by Iraq's major coalitions to stem
election-related violence and tensions (ref C) has
regrettably gained little traction in public. While UN SRSG
Ad Melkert embraced the code in a February 21 UNAMI press
statement and called on all parties and candidates to sign on
to the initiative, Iraqi political leaders have to date
largely ignored it in their public statements. Nevertheless,
the Embassy will continue to underscore the importance of
abiding by its principles in all relevant engagements. End
Comment.
FORD