Excerpt from document
(S/NF) SUMMARY AND COMMENT: The Prime Minister created
the National Intelligence Cell (NIC) after the December 8
high profile terrorist attacks in Baghdad to consolidate
information and work with operational units to prevent future
attacks. While it started off slow, it now is beginning to
produce results.

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FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
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S E C R E T BAGHDAD 000466

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/02/2020
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PTER, IZ
SUBJECT: NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE CELL OPERATIONAL BUT
CHALLENGES REMAIN

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a. i., Robert S. Ford for reasons 1.4
(b, d)

1. (S/NF) SUMMARY AND COMMENT: The Prime Minister created
the National Intelligence Cell (NIC) after the December 8
high profile terrorist attacks in Baghdad to consolidate
information and work with operational units to prevent future
attacks. While it started off slow, it now is beginning to
produce results. The NIC must address the availability of
sufficiently trained personnel and information sharing to
improve its efficiency. Senior members of the NIC are
optimistic about the NIC's potential, but acknowledge the
challenges ahead. Without active support from the GOI and
interagency Iraqi intelligence, the NIC will be marginalized.
END SUMMARY AND COMMENT.

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New Iraqi National Intelligence Cell (NIC) Operational
------------------------------- ----------------------

2. (S/NF) The Prime Minister created the National
Intelligence Cell (NIC) after the December 8 high profile
terrorist attacks in Baghdad to consolidate information and
work with operational units to prevent future attacks. The
NIC passed USF-I intelligence and joint analysis to the
Baghdad Operations Center (BOC) leading to the coordinated
BOC-MOI anti-terrorist actions on January 12. Following the
operation, the NIC produced an after-action analytical
account of security in Baghdad from the point of view of the
various intelligence services. The NIC also predicted
accurately four recent indirect fire attacks based on
intelligence analysis.

3. (S/NF) The NIC is designed to coordinate information from
the Counter-Terrorism Service (CTS), the MOD's Director
General of Intelligence Services (DGIS) and the MOD's
Military Intelligence (M2), the MOI's National Iraqi
Investigation Agency (NIIA), the Kurdish Regional Government
(KRG), the Minister of State for National Security Affairs
(MSNSA), the Iraqi National Intelligence Service (INIS) and
the BOC. A remaining outlier in the Iraqi intelligence
realm, the Office of Special Investigations (OSI), is not
part of the formal NIC structure, and reports directly to the
Prime Minister's office. Greater coordination amongst Iraqi
intelligence services may limit OSI's ability to act
unilaterally. Under the day-to-day direction of MG Hasan
Da,aeem Ras,n of the MSNSA, the NIC works with the
operational commands under the MOD/Iraqi Ground Forces
Command and the Office of the Commander in Chief to
distribute its intelligence analysis to the appropriate
operators. USF-I J2 and Iraq's Train and Assist Mission
(ITAM) advisors work in a support capacity to share USF-I
intelligence and assist the NIC in the sharing of
intelligence amongst GOI agencies.

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Challenges Remain
-----------------

4. (S/NF) The NIC is not without its growing pains. A
substantial structural weakness of the NIC is a lack of
sufficiently trained personnel. The NIC runs 24/7, but
staffing is scaled down considerably after hours. Another
complicated issue is information sharing. Intelligence
agencies in general, and particularly the fledgling Iraqi
services, do not, as a matter of course, share information
and intelligence. Competition to prove value, the need for
credit, and ingrained security service custom and culture all
have a negative effect on passing information. Data systems
are by design stove-piped, creating further difficulties in
Qare by design stove-piped, creating further difficulties in
timely information-sharing. Infrastructure, budget, basic
office supplies, and support issues have created a difficult
work environment, but U.S. observers expect remaining
challenges to be overcome in the near term. Support for the
NIC comes through parent agencies due to the lack of an
independent budget line for the fusion cell.

5. (S/NF) Looking at individual parent agencies, MSNSA has
the leadership role and political connections which provide
legitimacy within the Iraqi interagency. DGIS provides highly
experienced and competent senior analysts, though
relationships at the senior level are developing slowly. CTS
has a strong tie with the NIC and competent liaison officers
that are learning to overcome hesitancy to share actionable
intelligence. INIS provides the chief Targeting Officer and
third in the NIC chain of command. The targeting section has
direct support of clandestine intelligence resources and
produce high quality daily and weekly summaries. NIIA

retains the ability to access local and federal law
enforcement information but must contend with political
rivalries that exist within the security ministries and
provides limited support to the NIC leadership. The KRG is
an active participant but remains on the periphery given the
NIC's current Baghdad focus. M2 remains a quiet advocate as
the organizations work through lines of operations.

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Comment
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6. (S/NF) There is a feeling of optimism by senior members
of the NIC, but it is tempered by acknowledgment of the
challenges ahead. Not least among these is senior MOD and
MOI leader suspicion of MSNSA Chief Wa'eli, deemed a staunch
Maliki loyalist and very partisan actor. There is some
concern that the NIC will suffer blame for any
election-related violence in Baghdad, and that it may be set
up as a fall guy for the finger-pointing that will likely
occur after a serious incident. The NIC has the potential to
serve as a step toward increased interagency intelligence
operations and reform. With parent agency acceptance and
Ministerial support, nascent institutional will and ability
to drive information sharing and transparency exists.
Without active support from the GOI and interagency Iraqi
intelligence, the NIC will be marginalized. The concepts and
problems are not new, and past attempts have not succeeded.
Hopefully, the NIC will fare better.
FORD