Excerpt from document
(S/NF) SUMMARY. The Iraqi Army (IA) continued to
complicate the political situation in Salah Ad-Din (SAD) by
forming a cordon around the SAD Provincial Council building,
with orders from the Prime Minister to prevent access by the
Provincial Council Chairman. Additionally, the PM attempted
to replace the heads of both arms of intelligence at the
Ministry of Defense (MOD).

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P 130933Z FEB 10 ZDK
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Content
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000378

SIPDIS
NOFORN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/10/2020
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PTER, IZ
SUBJECT: POLITICAL MANEUVERING AND IRAQI SECURITY FORCES

REF: A. BAGHDAD 373
B. BAGHDAD 320
C. BAGHDAD 294

Classified By: Pol-Mil M/C Cameron P. Munter for reasons 1.4 (b, d)

1. (S/NF) SUMMARY. The Iraqi Army (IA) continued to
complicate the political situation in Salah Ad-Din (SAD) by
forming a cordon around the SAD Provincial Council building,
with orders from the Prime Minister to prevent access by the
Provincial Council Chairman. Additionally, the PM attempted
to replace the heads of both arms of intelligence at the
Ministry of Defense (MOD). Due to direct involvement by
USF-I Commanding General Odierno and fears of disruption to
the agencies involved during a critical election security
time-frame, the orders to replace the two intelligence heads
were withdrawn. As campaign season officially kicks off
February 12, Post expects to see more maneuvering by the PM
and opposition parties within the security and intelligence
ministries. End Summary

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IA Involvement in Salah Ad-Din Disputes
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2. (C) On February 9, the Iraqi Army formed a cordon around
the Salah Ad-Din (SAD) Provincial Council (PC) building, with
orders from the Prime Minister to prevent access by the PC
Chairman Ahmed Abdullah Abid Khalaf (Abu Mazin). The IA
Commander in SAD initially resisted the order, noting that
the Police were responsible for this type of security action,
but complied after the PM reiterated the command that the IA
establish the cordon (ref A). The Iraqi Police maintain
security of and control over the building; all other PC
members and visitors are allowed access through the IA
cordon. (NOTE: The PM's order is the latest act in the
three-month standoff (refs A and B) over the seating of the
governor-elect. End note.) The DCM and POL M/C each urged
senior advisors to the PM to remove the IA from the SAD PC
building (ref A).

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Press Highlights IA Campaigning Examples
----------------------------------------

3. (C) In the lead up to the national elections, both local
press and foreign press focus on pushes from official organs
of the state to promote individual candidates. A recent NPR
story highlighted Sunni concerns over a free and fair
election, and followed-up a report on the Independent High
Electoral Commission's (IHEC) promises to Anbari Sheiks with
a tale of Iraqi Army units nearby handing out calendars
emblazoned with photos of PM Maliki on them. One soldier
told the reporter he had been ordered to hand out the
calendars, while another soldier openly campaigned for Maliki
as the cars stopped at the checkpoint. Post will continue to
track these stories.

--------------------------------------------- ----
Attempt to Change MOD Intel Heads Fails...For Now
--------------------------------------------- ----

4. (S/NF) MG Hazim Bakhit Taiah Al-Ja'afari, Director
General of the MOD Directorate General for Intelligence and
Security (DGIS) notified USF-I on February 5 that he had been
told that he was being replaced as the Director General of
DGIS. He said that SMG Ala'a Jassim Al-Amiri, the Joint
Headquarters (JHQ) Military Intelligence Chief (M2) had also
met with the MinDef and was told that he was being replaced.
After discussions with MOD, and direct involvement in
correspondence from USF-I Commanding General Odierno to
MinDef, neither change occurred due to the potential
organizational disruption they would have caused in the lead
up to the elections. According to MG Hazim, he was to be
Qup to the elections. According to MG Hazim, he was to be
replaced by a Kurd named Shargl, who is reportedly a former
Minister of Peshmerga. Shargl had met with the Minister of
Defense at the request of President Jalal Talabani. MG Hazim
was to continue to work with Shargl for an unspecified period
of time.

5. (S/NF) MG Hazim reported the Prime Minister issued an
order three days prior that replaced the JHQ M2, SMG Ala'a
Jassim Salman Al-Amiri, with Hatim Jabar Al-Maksusi. Hatim
works with Abu Ali Al-Basri and the Office of Special
Investigations (OSI) which report directly to the PM and does
not participate in some inter-intelligence cells, such as the
National Intelligence Cell (NIC). SMG Ala'a was to remain
with the M2 through the elections working with Hatim.

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Comment

BAGHDAD 00000378 002 OF 002

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6. (C) As the election campaign season officially kicks off
February 12, Post expects to see more maneuvering by the PM
and opposition parties within the security and intelligence
ministries. Whether through the promise of patronage, or
trying to hedge post-election fall-out by seeding security
forces and intelligence services with allies (ref C), both
Maliki and his opponents may take further advantage of
friendly or divided units to score political points. Others
may follow suit, whether through pressure within the Ministry
of Interior to support MinInt Bolani's candidacy and party or
maneuvering by Peshmerga units in the disputed areas to
influence voters to back the two larger Kurdish parties and
candidates. End Comment.
HILL