Excerpt from document
(S/NF) SUMMARY: As the first test of the newly operational
tripartite Combined Security Mechanisms (CSM) in northern
Iraq, Ninewa Provincial Governor Atheel al-Nujaifi - whose
freedom of movement in Kurdish-controlled areas of Ninewa has
been circumscribed since he took office in 2009 - visited two
towns in Kurdish-controlled Tel Kayf, a district within the
disputed internal boundary (DIBs) areas.

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DE RUEHGB #0282/01 0341356
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
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FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6434
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
Content
S E C R E T BAGHDAD 000282

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/02/2030
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PTER, PBTS, IZ
SUBJECT: NINEWA GOVERNOR TESTS FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT,
ENCOUNTERS KURDISH RESISTANCE

REF: BAGHDAD 271

Classified By: A/DCM Gary A. Grappo for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

1. (S/NF) SUMMARY: As the first test of the newly operational
tripartite Combined Security Mechanisms (CSM) in northern
Iraq, Ninewa Provincial Governor Atheel al-Nujaifi - whose
freedom of movement in Kurdish-controlled areas of Ninewa has
been circumscribed since he took office in 2009 - visited two
towns in Kurdish-controlled Tel Kayf, a district within the
disputed internal boundary (DIBs) areas. Kurdish leaders
denied the request to visit (they later acceded after
high-level U.S. intervention and modification of the
itinerary), obstructed al-Nujaifi's freedom of movement, and
appeared to have actively coordinated violent demonstrations
along the route. Al-Nujaifi's convoy, escorted by U.S. and
Iraqi forces (USF and ISF), was delayed at checkpoints,
pelted with rocks and produce, and at one point came under
scattered small arms fire (there were no reported
casualties). According to U.S. Forces - Iraq (USF-I)
commanders, discipline among Kurdish peshmerga forces was
less than what it should have been. In televised interviews
on February 1 and 2, al-Nujaifi claimed he had been the
subject of an "assassination attempt". KRG officials in turn
claimed that local populations had demonstrated to protest
al-Nujaifi,s travel to their communities. Senior Embassy
and USF-I leaders engaged senior KRG and GOI interlocutors on
February 2 to urge that they refrain from inflammatory media
statements, abide by the terms of the CSM and underscore that
implementation of the CSM is an iterative process that will
have to be worked through. Engagement of senior KRG and GOI
leaders by Embassy and USF-I officials continues. While
al-Nujaifi was clearly seeking to provoke a response, the
Kurdish peshmerga's lack of discipline and provocative
actions came dangerously close to costing lives (and could
well have but for the restraint and professionalism of ISF
and USF). Al-Nujaifi was ultimately able to visit two towns
within the DIBs area of Ninewa to which he was unable to
travel just three days ago; however, this initial test of the
CSM architecture was inauspicious. The events of February 1
exposed prevailing mistrust between GOI and KRG actors,
required high-level U.S. intervention and suggested that
considerable work is needed to further clarify the CSM
protocols and reinforce to senior KRG and GOI leaders the
serious political equities associated with the CSM
architecture. END SUMMARY.

TESTING THE WATERS
------------------

2. (S) On January 31, the day initial operating capability
was achieved on the CSM) across the disputed internal
boundary (DIBs) areas of northern Iraq (reftel), Ninewa
Provincial Governor Atheel al-Nujaifi's personal security
detail (PSD) notified the Ninewa Combined Coordination Center
(NCCC) that al-Nujaifi intended to travel on February 1 to
Tel Kayf and al-Qosh. Both towns are located in DIBs areas
of Tel Kayf district in north central Ninewa. Tel Kayf is in
a Combined Security Area (CSA) governed by CSM protocols;
al-Qosh is outside the CSA. (Note: Al-Nujaifi told USF and
PRT leaders in Ninewa several weeks ago that he intended to
test the freedom of movement provisions of the CSM early.
Our understanding was that he would first send his PSD to
test coordination and travel mechanisms. End note.) Kurdish
liaison officers at the NCCC denied al-Nujaifi's request to

travel to al-Qosh, saying Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG)
President Barzani's express permission was needed. Barzani
was outside the country and more time would be needed to
secure his permission. Since the NCCC was unable to resolve
the issue, it referred it to the Senior Working Group
Coordination Center (SWGCC) in accordance with CSM protocol.

3. (S) Late on January 31, USF-I commanders contacted
al-Nujaifi to ask if he would drop al-Qosh from his
itinerary. He agreed to do so. In parallel, USF-I
commanders made multiple attempts to convince KRG leaders to
allow al-Nujaifi to travel to Tel Kayf in accordance with the
freedom of movement envisioned in the CSM. There was no
resolution in discussions with KRG leaders, who either denied
the request or said a "national decision" by more senior KRG
officials was needed. In absence of a decision from the KRG,
USF-I, with ISF participation, decided to support
al-Nujaifi's request to travel to Tel Kayf and, as a
substitute for al- Qosh, to nearby Wana, a town in western
Tel Kayf district also located in a Ninewa CSA.

ACTION ...
----------

4. (S/NF) Early on February 1, the NCCC notified all
personnel of al-Nujaifi's planned movement to Tel Kayf and
Wana. Peshmerga at three unilateral checkpoints just outside
al-Qosh prevented Tel Kayf's Mayor, Bassim Bello, from
traveling from his home in al-Qosh to Tel Kayf to meet with
al-Nujaifi. Bello said the peshmerga and asayish treated him
rudely, told him they were acting under orders and said they
had had imposed a curfew on Tel Kayf District. After lengthy
discussions and intervention by PRT Ninewa through the KRG
liaison to the Ninewa Operations Center (NiOC), Bello managed
to leave al-Qosh, navigate the peshmerga and asayish
checkpoints and reach his office in Tel Kayf.

... AND REACTION
----------------

5. (S) Al-Nujaifi and his PSD, including Iraqi Security
Forces, rendezvoused with USF (including the local U.S.
battalion and brigade commanders) and traveled together to a
peshmerga checkpoint on the edge of Tel Kayf town. Peshmerga
forces prevented the convoy from passing through the
checkpoint. Negotiations between the U.S. brigade commander
and peshmerga leaders (all wearing peshmerga general officer
rank insignia) ensued and a crowd of 300-plus individuals,
mostly young men holding sticks, formed. A large KRG flag
was stretched across the road and peshmerga brandished
crew-served machine guns and rocket propelled grenades.
Peshmerga leaders told the U.S. brigade commander that
al-Nujaifi and ISF would not be allowed to enter Tel Kayf,
and that a battalion from the 3rd Peshmerga Brigade had
reinforced Tel Kayf the night of January 31 to help ensure
that. (Note: Reinforcing Tel Kayf without notifying the NCCC
contravened CSM protocols. End note.)

6. (S) After a series of telephone conversations with the
NCCC, the senior peshmerga officer at the NCCC conveyed
agreement for al-Nujaifi to enter Tel Kayf town. Despite
that, a flyover by U.S. aircraft, maneuvers by U.S. tanks and
smoke grenades were needed to disperse the crowd, which
blocked the road. As the crowd scattered, it threw rocks and
refuse at the convoy, damaging vehicles. Al-Nujaifi was able
to enter Tel Kayf town, where he met with Mayor Bello in his
office. The residents of Tel Kayf in the vicinity of
municipal offices were pleasant in their interactions with
ISF and USF soldiers providing perimeter security for
al-Nujaifi. (Note: Suggesting the peshmerga may have brought
in the hostile crowd that confronted the convoy at the
checkpoint outside of Tel Kayf. End note.)

7. (S) Following the meeting with Nujaifi, Mayor Bello
returned to his home in al-Qosh without incident. Governor
al-Nujaifi traveled from Tel Kayf to Wana for a meeting with
the Wana sub-district mayor. On the outskirts of Wana,
unidentified individuals directed small arms fire against
al-Nujaifi's convoy. Iraqi Security Forces arrested a number
of military-aged males attempting to throw rocks and other
objects at the convoy. (Note: Al-Nujaifi's chief of staff
said six were arrested; Kurdish representatives at the NCCC
claim 10 were detained and some KRG sources characterized the
detainees as kidnap victims. They are to appear in court on
February 3. End note.) After meeting with Wana's
sub-district mayor, al-Nujaifi's convoy returned to Mosul
without further incident.

MAKING POLITICAL HAY
--------------------

8. (S) Al-Nujaifi subsequently gave televised interviews on.
February 1 to al-Jazeera and al-Mosulia television channels,
claiming he was the victim of an attempted assassination
during his travel to Tel Kayf and Wana. GEN Odierno, USF-I
Commanding General (CG), sent a note to KRG PM Salih on
February 2, urging restraint and underscoring the expectation
that the KRG would abide by the terms of the CSMs. Ninewa
PRT Team Leader (TL) spoke with al-Nujaifi by phone twice on
February 2. He underscored the U.S. commitment to
al-Nujaifi's freedom of movement and the CSM, conveyed that
we were engaging senior KRG leaders, urged al-Nujaifi to
refrain from inflammatory media statements, and noted that
despite the difficult circumstances, al-Nujaifi was able to
visit and have meetings in a part of the province to which he
had been unable to travel just a few days ago. (Note: PRT TL
and USD North Deputy CG will meet with al-Nujaifi on February
3. End note.) Embassy expressed similar concerns to GOI
officials.

9. (S) Al-Nujaifi was determined and confident in his
conversation with PRT TL. He thanked the USF for their
professionalism, commended ISF elements, described his
meetings in Tel Kayf and Wana as productive, agreed his
freedom of movement had been protected, said he will conduct
similar movements in the near future and will coordinate
those with the CCC, and agreed to tone down his rhetoric "if
the Kurds toned down theirs first". He asked that Ambassador
and USF-I CG take the following steps: 1) inform KRG leaders
that their "assassination attempt" (sic) against him was
inconsistent with their professed commitment to democracy and
freedom, and 2) recognize that his convoy encountered
checkpoints beyond the CCPs that were "clearly independent
Pesh checkpoints" that violated the CSM. DPM Issawi, who had
just spoken with al-Nujaifi, told PolCouns on February 2 that
al-Nujaifi was "calm" because of his understanding that the
Embassy and USF were actively engaging the KRG to secure
adherence to the CSM.

10. (S/NF) COMMENT: Our information is al-Nujaifi was not/not
targeted for assassination. According to USF-I commanders,
command and control of and discipline among Kurdish peshmerga
forces was less than what it should have been. The peshmerga
did not participate with USF and ISF in facilitating freedom
of movement as envisioned under the tripartite CSA, sent
additional reinforcements into DIBs areas in anticipation of
the PGOV,s travel, did not use the CCC to coordinate (but
rather as an information gathering mechanism), and actively
participated in efforts to agitate the crowds and prevent USF
from facilitating al-Nujaifi's freedom of movement. This
first test of freedom of movement under the CSM was bumpy,
underscoring that further work is needed to clarify the CSM
protocols for all partners and to reinforce to senior KRG and
GOI leaders the serious political equities associated with
the CSM architecture. END COMMENT.
HILL