Excerpt from document
(C) SUMMARY: In a meeting with visiting Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Middle East Kahl on January 11,
Turkish Ambassador Murat Ozcelik said senior KRG officials
recently signaled for the first time an understanding that
Kirkuk would not ultimately be annexed to the Iraqi Kurdistan
Region (IKR), and that "some sort of compromise" on Kirkuk
was necessary.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 000172

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/23/2030
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, KDEM, IZ, TU
SUBJECT: TURKISH AMBASSADOR ON ARTICLE 140 AND KIRKUK

Classified By: A/DCM Gary A. Grappo for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

1. (C) SUMMARY: In a meeting with visiting Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Middle East Kahl on January 11,
Turkish Ambassador Murat Ozcelik said senior KRG officials
recently signaled for the first time an understanding that
Kirkuk would not ultimately be annexed to the Iraqi Kurdistan
Region (IKR), and that "some sort of compromise" on Kirkuk
was necessary. Turkey supported temporary special status for
Kirkuk (albeit with reservations); a period of ten years
could be "fair". Ozcelik anticipated that Sunni Arabs, who
strongly oppose special status, would require considerable
convincing and stressed that all parties must help give KRG
President Barzani political cover by referring to Article 140
as a point of reference for whatever formula was agreed.
Ozcelik said Barzani had asked him to participate in a
Turkoman-Kurd reconciliation effort in Kirkuk and a parallel
Sunni Arab-Kurd effort in Ninewa. He believed progress on
the latter was unlikely until after the upcoming national
election. Details on elections, government coalition
formation and Iran's nuclear ambitions are reported septel.
END SUMMARY.

KRG SIGNALS "SOME SORT OF COMPROMISE" NEEDED ON KIRKUK
--------------------------------------------- ---------

2. (C) DASD Kahl asked Ozcelik for his assessment of what
concessions on Article 140 and Kirkuk the Kurds would seek in
exchange for Kurdish Alliance List (KAL) support for a
government coalition. Ozcelik accompanied Turkish Minister
of Interior Atalay for talks between Turkey, the GOI and the
KRG on December 21 in Erbil, where KRG Minister of Interior
Sinjari said the KRG understood that Kirkuk would not be
attached to the Iraqi Kurdistan Region. Sinjari said it was
understood in the KRG that "some sort of compromise" on
Kirkuk and implementation of Article 140 was necessary, and
the Kurds were prepared to "work on that". Ozcelik said he
was "certain" Sinjari, a close confidante of Barzani, would
not comment directly on a subject as sensitive as Kirkuk
unless he was confident he was accurately reflecting KRG
President Barzani's thinking. He claimed it was the first
time a senior Kurdish leader suggested to Turkish officials
that there could be some flexibility in the KRG's approach to
implementation of Article 140 and Kirkuk.

TURKEY (GRUDGINGLY) SUPPORTS SPECIAL STATUS FOR KIRKUK
--------------------------------------------- ---------

3. (C) Claiming that having Kirkuk more closely tethered to
the KRG would have served long-term Turkish commercial
interests better, Ozcelik said Turkey nonetheless supports
"some version of special status" as articulated in UNAMI's
report on DIBs areas. (Comment: Conventional wisdom is that
Turkey opposes having Kirkuk become part of the Iraqi
Kurdistan region. End comment.) It was not a comfortable
policy position for Turkey to endorse, Ozcelik said, but the
idea of "dual nexus" (Kirkuk would be formally linked to both
Baghdad and the KRG) was "too complicated" for Iraq. He
highlighted that the mechanism by which a semi-autonomous
Kirkuk received its budget would be an important element
requiring careful negotiation with the parties.

4. (C) DASD asked whether special status for Kirkuk would be
temporary, and whether it would require a constitutional
amendment. Saying the issue needed to be explored, Ozcelik
speculated that if the parties were able to buy enough time,
Qspeculated that if the parties were able to buy enough time,
the Kurds would understand that increased economic activity
in the context of a more stable Iraq made administrative
boundaries less important. "Special status (for Kirkuk) for
a period of ten years or so could be fair", Ozcelik said, and
could allow sufficient time for Kurds to realize that they
did not have to have direct control of Kirkuk to greatly
influence it to the benefit of the KRG. He anticipated that
Sunni Arabs, who strongly oppose special status, would
require considerable convincing. He stressed that all
parties needed to help Barzani "save face" by referring to
Article 140 as a point of reference for whatever formula was
agreed on.

5. (C) The Ambassador's Senior Advisor for Northern Iraq
(SANI) asked how such a process would account for hardline
Kurdish leaders like Kamal Kirkuki, whom Barzani had used to
justify his own inflexibility on Kirkuk. Noting that any
political process included multiple actors representing a
range of views, the most extreme of which were often used by
more moderate players to advance their agendas, Ozcelik said
the upcoming elections had complicated the rhetoric. After
elections and formation of a new government, it would be
important to assess the new Prime Minister's views on Article
140 and Kirkuk. Ozcelik urged consultation with former PM
Iyad Allawi and VP Adel Abd al-Mehdi (both potential PM
candidates whom Turkey endorses) on Article 140 and disputed
internal boundary (DIBs) areas.

TURKOMAN-KURD RECONCILATION EFFORT IN KIRKUK
--------------------------------------------

6. (C) Ozcelik said he and KRG President Barzani had
discussed the idea of a Turkoman-Kurd reconciliation
committee for Kirkuk. Ozcelik would chair the Turkoman side;
Barzani's chief of staff, Fuad Hussein, would chair the KRG
side. Ozcelik claimed Kirkuki Turkomans had realized the
limits of their influence during the recent, bruising
election law debate and speculated they were now more
receptive to working constructively with Kurds.(Comment: It
is not clear to us that such is the case. End comment.) He
admitted that the prevailing view in Ankara was that the
Kurds were always troublesome, and more difficult than the
Arabs to deal with in terms of advancing Turkish interests.

PARALLEL KURD-SUNNI ARAB EFFORT IN NINEWA
-----------------------------------------

7. (C) Ozcelik said Barzani also requested his help in
reconciling Sunni Arabs and Kurds in Ninewa, where the
(Kurdish) Ninewa Fraternal League (NFL) had boycotted the
(Sunni) al-Hadba Gathering (AHG)-dominated Ninewa Provincial
Council. Ozcelik said he believed ending the NFL boycott was
"doable", but only after upcoming national elections. A
structured mechanism of engagement would be needed to clarify
the process and help achieve solutions on the ground, he
said.

LINGERING KURDISH FEARS OF TURKEY'S INTENTIONS
--------------------------------------------- -

8. (C) Addressing Turkey's role, Ozcelik said that despite
recent progress in mending Turkish-KRG ties, the Kurds feared
that Turkey's hardline Turkish General Staff (TGS) and
nationalist elements could orchestrate a reversal of Turkey's
current policy of reconciliation. It was important for
Turkey to underscore to the KRG that Turkey's long-term
security and, critically, commercial interests lay in keeping
Turkey-KRG relations on an even keel.

9. (C) DASD Kahl cleared on this message.
HILL