S E C R E T ALGIERS 000020
SIPDIS
NOFORN
EO 12958 DECL: 01/05/2020
TAGS PGOV, PREL, MOPS, PINR, AG, US
SUBJECT: ALGERIA STRONGLY PROTESTS TSA LISTING
REF: ALGIERS 15 (NOTAL)
Classified By: Ambassador David D. Pearce; reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
Summary
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¶1. (S/NF) MFA Americas Director General Sabri Boukadoum
expressed to the Ambassador January 6 the GOA’s “profound
dismay” regarding Algeria’s inclusion on the TSA list for
enhanced screening. He said this message came directly from
President Bouteflika. The TSA decision, Boukadoum stressed,
did not accurately reflect the level and quality of our
bilateral relations, especially in regard to counterterrorism
cooperation. Algeria’s placement on the list had created the
impression that Algeria was part of the problem, a
misunderstanding that is now circulating in the international
press. Boukadoum told the Ambassador that Algeria’s leadership
would like an official U.S. statement to correct this
impression. Ambassador replied that the intent of the new
measures was to ensure air travel safety and not to
discriminate or embarrass our friends and partners. Ambassador
emphasized that the U.S. valued its counterterrorism
cooperation with Algeria and hoped the bilateral relationship
would continue to grow and develop. END SUMMARY.
GOA Not Pleased, Seeks Removal from List
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¶2. (C) MFA Americas Director General Sabri Boukadoum called
the Ambassador to the MFA on January 6 to deliver instructions
expressing the “profound dismay” of Algeria’s highest
authorities at Algeria’s inclusion in the TSA list of
countries subject to new air passenger screening measures. MFA
Director for the Protection of Algerian Citizens Overseas
Hocine Sahraoui, a representative of the presidency, Houria
Khiari, and U.S. desk officer Abdulmutalib Bouacha also
attended. Boukadoum stressed several times at the outset of
the meeting that his demarche instructions came directly from
the “highest authority” -- i.e., President Bouteflika.
¶3. (C) Boukadoum told the Ambassador that he had been asked
to convey two main points. The first concerned Algeria’s
inclusion on the TSA list. Algeria respected and understood
the U.S. need to secure the safety of its citizens and
interests. But Algeria’s inclusion on this list did not
accurately reflect either the level or the quality of our
bilateral relations, and especially the nature of those
relations with regard to the fight against terrorism. The
placement of Algeria on a list that includes state sponsors of
terrorism and countries of interest creates the impression
that Algeria is part of the problem and less than a full
partner in the fight against terrorism.
GOA Seeks U.S. Statement on Algeria as Key CT Partner
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¶4. (C) The second point, he said, besides the GOA’s desire to
be removed from the list, was that the country’s leadership
hoped to see an official U.S. statement that would underscore
Algeria’s important counterterrorism partnership with the U.S.
-- in order to help correct the erroneous image of Algeria
that had been created by coverage of the TSA story in the
international media and on the Internet. “We are partners,” he
said. “The highest levels did not appreciate this.”
¶5. (C) Boukadoum said Algeria’s Ambassador to the U.S.
Abdullah Baali would deliver the same message in Washington.
Baali also had instructions to see Secretary of Homeland
Security Napolitano.
U.S. Focus is on Air Travel Safety
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¶6. (C) The Ambassador said GOA views would be reported fully
and immediately to Washington. He told Boukadoum that
President Obama had addressed the issue squarely in a
statement the previous day. The problem was that on Christmas
Day a terrorist had gotten through. This had been a systemic
failure, and as a result the President had ordered two reviews
-- one of our watch list system, and another of aviation
screening procedures. The intent of the new measures was not
to discriminate against or embarrass any persons, groups, or
countries, and most especially not our friends and partners.
The intent was to do the necessary to ensure air travel
safety, for everyone. President Obama had thus made clear on
January 5 that he had personally ordered, and approved, the
new measures. And he had promised that more steps could be on
the way in coming days, whether with regard to information
integration or passenger screening.
U.S. Values Counterterrorism Cooperation with Algeria
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¶7. (C) At the same time, the Ambassador continued, the
President also had made clear that an important part of our
approach would be to deepen cooperation with our international
partners. This was where Algeria, and US-Algerian cooperation,
came in. The Ambassador noted that we have worked together to
improve both the quality and level of our bilateral exchanges
in recent years, and he hoped that trend would continue. It
was unnecessary to say how much the United States valued its
counterterrorism cooperation with Algeria, as well as our
overall relationship with Algeria. We hoped to continue to
develop and build on the progress that has been made.
¶8. (C) Boukadoum reiterated that Algeria’s disagreement was
not with the measures themselves. Rather Algeria protested its
inclusion on TSA’s list because it gives the impression that
Algeria is not cooperating. “We are cooperating on
counterterrorism, and we will continue to do so,” he stated.
Meanwhile, Boukadoum asserted that other countries with
nationals who have committed terrorist acts have not been
placed on the list. Boukadoum argued that to suggest that
Algeria is part of the problem is simply unfair. He regretted
that international press coverage of the TSA screening
measures had cast Algeria in this light and not as country
that is a victim of terrorism.
Comment
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¶9. (S/NF) A key line in this demarche was the point that
Algeria’s inclusion on the TSA list “does not reflect the
level and quality of our relations, or the nature of our
relations in the fight against terrorism”. With this, the GOA
implicitly brought the quality of the entire relationship into
play. What grates is that, instead of being seen as a nation
that has suffered from terrorism and as an active leader in
combating it, they feel instead cast as part of the problem
and associated with state sponsors. This sense of damage to
Algeria’s international reputation, and especially by the way
the story has pinged around in the press and on the Internet,
is what undoubtedly fueled President Bouteflika’s “profound
dismay”. That said, it is encouraging that Algeria carefully
separated the meeting yesterday -- to inform us of their
approval of EP-3 overflights by Africa Command against AQIM in
the Sahel -- and the meeting today on the TSA issue. This
suggests they are trying to separate issues and limit damage.
But domestic and regional public opinion does count, so the
leadership will want to redress somehow what they perceive as
a blow to their national dignity and international prestige.
Hence the request that a senior U.S. official make a statement
that will help turn around the negative image in the
international media.
¶10. (S/NF) It is worth remembering that no country is more
important than Algeria in the fight against al-Qa’ida in the
Sahel and Maghreb. So it is probably worth looking for a good
chance to make that point publicly, and at as high a level as
possible. If we do not, it is doubtful that we would see any
dramatic gestures or sudden moves by Algeria. On the contrary,
counterterrorism cooperation would probably continue, to the
extent it is in the interest of both sides. It would more
likely be a matter of what we don’t see - mil-mil relations
frozen instead of advancing, efforts to expand law enforcement
cooperation slowed, large commercial contracts going to
non-U.S. bidders, reduced Embassy access to senior officials,
and generally less receptivity to coordination on regional
issues and in multilateral fora. PEARCE