Excerpt from document summary
(S/NF) By many measures, Tunisia should be a close US
ally. But it is not. While we share some key values and the
country has a strong record on development, Tunisia has big
problems. President Ben Ali is aging, his regime is
sclerotic and there is no clear successor.

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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6565
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
Content
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 TUNIS 000492

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA AA/S FELTMAN, DAS HUDSON, AMBASSADOR-DESIGNATE
GRAY, AND NEA/MAG FROM AMBASSADOR

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/13/2029
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, ECON, KPAO, MASS, PHUM, TS
SUBJECT: TROUBLED TUNISIA: WHAT SHOULD WE DO?

Classified By: Ambassador Robert F. Godec for E.O. 12958 reasons 1.4 (b
) and (d).

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Summary
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1. (S/NF) By many measures, Tunisia should be a close US
ally. But it is not. While we share some key values and the
country has a strong record on development, Tunisia has big
problems. President Ben Ali is aging, his regime is
sclerotic and there is no clear successor. Many Tunisians
are frustrated by the lack of political freedom and angered
by First Family corruption, high unemployment and regional
inequities. Extremism poses a continuing threat.
Compounding the problems, the GOT brooks no advice or
criticism, whether domestic or international. Instead, it
seeks to impose ever greater control, often using the police.
The result: Tunisia is troubled and our relations are too.

2. (S/NF) In the past three years, US Mission Tunis has
responded by offering greater cooperation where the Tunisians
say they want it, but not shied from making plain the need
for change. We have had some successes, notably in the
commercial and military assistance areas. But we have also
had failures. We have been blocked, in part, by a Foreign
Ministry that seeks to control all our contacts in the
government and many other organizations. Too often, the GOT
prefers the illusion of engagement to the hard work of real
cooperation. Major change in Tunisia will have to wait for
Ben Ali's departure, but President Obama and his policies
create opportunities now. What should we do to take
advantage of them? We recommend:

-- keep a strong focus on democratic reform and respect for
human rights, but shift the way we promote these goals;
-- seek to engage the GOT in a dialogue on issues of mutual
interest, including trade and investment, Middle East peace,
and greater Maghreb integration;
-- offer Tunisians (with an emphasis on youth) more
English-language training, educational exchanges, and
cultural programs;
-- move our military assistance away from FMF, but look for
new ways to build security and intelligence cooperation; and,
-- increase high-level contacts but stress that deeper US
cooperation depends on real Tunisian engagement. End Summary.

--------------------------------------------- -----
The Backdrop: Historic Relations and Shared Values
--------------------------------------------- -----

3. (SBU) The United States and Tunisia have 200 years of
close ties and common interests, including advancing regional
peace, combating terrorism, and building prosperity. Since
independence, Tunisia deserves credit for its economic and
social progress. Without the natural resources of its
neighbors, Tunisia focused on people and diversified its
economy. In a success all too rare, the GOT is effective in
delivering services (education, health care, infrastructure
and security) to its people. The GOT has sought to build a
&knowledge economy8 to attract FDI that will create high
value-added jobs. As a result, the country has enjoyed five
percent real GDP growth for the past decade. On women's
rights, Tunisia is a model. And, Tunisia has a long history
of religious tolerance, as demonstrated by its treatment of
its Jewish community. While significant challenges remain
(above all the country's 14 percent unemployment rate) on
balance Tunisia has done better than most in the region.

4. (SBU) On foreign policy, Tunisia has long played a
moderate role (although recently its goal has been to &get
along with everyone8). The GOT rejects the Arab League
boycott of Israeli goods. Although it broke ties with Israel
in 2000, the GOT has from time to time taken part in quiet
discussions with Israeli officials. The GOT also supports
Mahmoud Abbas' leadership of the Palestinian Authority.
Tunisia participated in the Annapolis conference and has
supported our efforts to promote Israeli-Palestinian
negotiations. The GOT is like-minded on Iran, is an ally in
the fight against terrorism, and has maintained an Embassy in
Iraq at the Charge level. Moreover, Tunisia recently signed
a debt forgiveness agreement with the GOI on Paris Club
terms; it is the first Arab country to do so.

5. (SBU) Finally, although Tunisians have been deeply angry
over the war in Iraq and perceived US bias towards Israel,
most still admire the &the American dream.8 Despite the
anger at US foreign policy, we see a growing desire for
English-language instruction, a wish for more educational and

TUNIS 00000492 002 OF 005

scientific exchanges, and a belief in the American culture of
innovation. Tunisians see these as important for their
future.

--------------------------------------------- --------
The Problem: A Sclerotic Regime and Growing Corruption
--------------------------------------------- ---------

6. (C) Despite Tunisia's economic and social progress, its
record on political freedoms is poor. Tunisia is a police
state, with little freedom of expression or association, and
serious human rights problems. The GOT can point to some
political progress in the last decade, including an end to
prior review of books and ICRC access to many prisons. But
for every step forward there has been another back, for
example the recent takeover of important private media
outlets by individuals close to President Ben Ali.

7. (C) The problem is clear: Tunisia has been ruled by the
same president for 22 years. He has no successor. And,
while President Ben Ali deserves credit for continuing many
of the progressive policies of President Bourguiba, he and
his regime have lost touch with the Tunisian people. They
tolerate no advice or criticism, whether domestic or
international. Increasingly, they rely on the police for
control and focus on preserving power. And, corruption in
the inner circle is growing. Even average Tunisians are now
keenly aware of it, and the chorus of complaints is rising.
Tunisians intensely dislike, even hate, First Lady Leila
Trabelsi and her family. In private, regime opponents mock
her; even those close to the government express dismay at her
reported behavior. Meanwhile, anger is growing at Tunisia's
high unemployment and regional inequities. As a consequence,
the risks to the regime's long-term stability are increasing.

--------------------------------------------- ---------------
US-Tunisian Relations: If Only We Would Say This Is Paradise
--------------------------------------------- ---------------

8. (S/NF) US-Tunisian relations reflect the realities of the
Ben Ali regime. On the positive side, we have accomplished
several goals in recent years, including:

-- increasing substantially US assistance to the military to
combat terrorism;
-- improving (albeit still with challenges) some important
counterterrorism programs;
-- strengthening commercial ties, including holding a TIFA
Council meeting, hosting several trade and economic
delegations and growing business activity;
-- building ties to young people and the cultural community
through expanded English-language programs, a new film
festival, and new media outreach efforts; and
-- encouraging congressional interest in Tunisia.

9. (C) But we have also had too many failures. The GOT
frequently declines to engage, and there have been too many
lost opportunities. The GOT has:

-- declined to engage on the Millennium Challenge Account;
-- declined USAID regional programs to assist young people;
-- reduced the number of Fulbright scholarship students; and,
-- declined to engage in Open Skies negotiations.

Most troubling has been the GOT's unilateral and clumsy
effort to impose new and retroactive taxes on the American
Cooperative School of Tunis. There is little doubt that this
action was at the behest of powerful friends (probably
including Leila Trabelsi) of the International School of
Carthage. It raises important questions about Tunisian
governance and our friendship. If, in the end, the GOT's
actions force the school to close we will need to downsize
the Mission, limit our programs, and dial down our relations.

10. (C) At the same time, the GOT has also increasingly
tightened controls that make it exceptionally difficult for
the US Mission to conduct business. The controls, put in
place by Foreign Minister Abdallah, require the Mission to
obtain written MFA permission for contact with all official
and semi-official Tunisian organizations. Mid-level GOT
officials are no longer allowed to communicate with embassy
personnel without express authorization and MFA-cleared
instructions. All meeting requests and demarches must be
conveyed by diplomatic note. Most go unanswered. All
Embassies in Tunis are affected by these controls, but they
are no less frustrating for that.

11. (C) Beyond the stifling bureaucratic controls, the GOT
makes it difficult for the Mission to maintain contact with a

TUNIS 00000492 003 OF 005

wide swath of Tunisian society. GOT-controlled newspapers
often attack Tunisian civil society activists who participate
in Embassy activities, portraying them as traitors.
Plain-clothes police sometimes lurk outside events hosted by
EmbOffs, intimidating participants. In one example of the
GOT's tactics, we awarded a local grant through MEPI to a
Tunisian woman, but her boss at the Commerce Ministry told
her not to pursue it. She persisted for a time, but backed
out when she began receiving anonymous death threats.

12. (C) Some of the GOT's actions may be related to its
intense dislike of the former Administration's &freedom
agenda.8 The GOT considered this policy dangerous and
believed it opened the door for Islamic extremists to seize
power. GOT leaders have made no secret of their disapproval
of the Ambassador's and other EmbOffs' contacts with
opposition party leaders -- in particular the Progressive
Democratic Party's Nejib Chebbi, the object of President Ben
Ali's intense personal animus -- as well as civil society
activists who criticize the regime. They were intensely
critical, as well, of the previous Administration's use of
public statements (such as on World Press Freedom Day 2008),
which they believed unfairly targeted Tunisia.

----------------------
So, What Should We Do?
----------------------

13. (C) Notwithstanding the frustrations of doing business
here, we cannot write off Tunisia. We have too much at
stake. We have an interest in preventing al-Qaeda in the
Islamic Maghreb and other extremist groups from establishing
a foothold here. We have an interest in keeping the Tunisian
military professional and neutral. We also have an interest
in fostering greater political openness and respect for human
rights. It is in our interest, too, to build prosperity and
Tunisia's middle class, the underpinning for the country's
long-term stability. Moreover, we need to increase mutual
understanding to help repair the image of the United States
and secure greater cooperation on our many regional
challenges. The United States needs help in this region to
promote our values and policies. Tunisia is one place where,
in time, we might find it.

-----------------
The Extended Hand
-----------------

14. (C) Since President Obama's inauguration, Tunisians have
been more receptive to the United States. Senior GOT
officials have warmly welcomed President Obama's statements
and speeches. His address in Cairo drew particular praise,
with the Foreign Minister calling it &courageous.8
Meanwhile, some civil society contacts who had been
boycotting Embassy functions in opposition to the war in Iraq
have started coming around again. Generally, the metaphor of
the &extended hand8 in President Obama's inaugural address
has resonated powerfully with Tunisians. Concretely, the
Tunisians have welcomed many of the Obama Administration's
actions, including the decision to close the Guantanamo Bay
detention center and the plans for troop withdrawals from
Iraq. Above all, Tunisians have been pleased by the
President's tone, statements and actions (so far) on Middle
East peace.

-----------------------------------------
How To Advance Democracy and Human Rights
-----------------------------------------

15. (S) The Obama Administration creates an important
opportunity, then, to explore whether and how to pursue a
more productive bilateral relationship. GOT officials say
the United States tends to focus on issues where we do not
see eye-to-eye. They bristle at our calls for greater
democratic reform and respect for human rights, and protest
they are making progress. For years, the Embassy's top goal
has been to promote progress in these areas. We need to keep
the focus, especially with 2009 an election year in Tunisia.
Ben Ali is certain to be reelected by a wide margin in a
process that will be neither free nor fair. In this context,
we should continue to underscore the importance of these
issues, and to maintain contacts with the few opposition
parties and civil society groups critical of the regime.

16. (C) We should consider how this policy objective is
publicly manifested, however. For several years, the United
States has been out in front -- publicly and privately --
criticizing the GOT for the absence of democracy and the lack
of respect for human rights. There is a place for such

TUNIS 00000492 004 OF 005

criticism, and we do not advocate abandoning it. We do
recommend a more pragmatic approach, however, whereby we
would speak to the Tunisians very clearly and at a very high
level about our concerns regarding Tunisia's democracy and
human rights practices, but dial back the public criticism.
The key element is more and frequent high-level private
candor. We recommend being explicit with GOT leaders that we
are changing our approach, while also making clear that we
will continue to engage privately with opposition parties and
civil society.

17. (C) In addition, we should increase our efforts to
persuade our European partners, and other like-minded
countries, to step up their efforts to persuade the GOT to
accelerate political reform. While some in the EU (e.g.,
Germany, the UK) agree with us, key countries such as France
and Italy have shied from putting pressure on the GOT. We
should work to get them to do so, and to condition further
assistance and advanced EU associate status on it.

----------------------------
Advancing Other US Interests
----------------------------

18. (C) Whether we succeed on democracy and human rights, the
United States has an interest in building relations with a
wide spectrum of Tunisians, particularly the young. To do
so, and to build good will with the GOT, we should offer the
government a dialogue on a range of issues of mutual
interest, backed up by increased assistance. Of greatest
interest to the GOT would be increased engagement on economic
issues, i.e., on increasing bilateral trade and investment,
as well as the provision of technical assistance, especially
involving technology transfer. The Tunisians would welcome a
revival of the US-North African Economic Partnership, as well
as other efforts that would promote North African economic
integration.

19. (C) In addition, we should offer serious engagement in
high-priority areas for Tunisians that will also benefit the
United States, including:

-- more, and more comprehensive, English-language programs;
-- Ph.D. scholarships for Tunisian students to study in the
United States, such as those that USAID used to make
available in the 1970's and 1980's;
-- more support for University linkages;
-- more science and technology exchanges -- to give substance
to a bilateral S&T agreement that, with no money behind it,
has had little impact; and
-- more cultural programming.

20. (C) In addition to talking to the GOT, we need to engage
directly with the Tunisian people, especially youth. The
Embassy is already using Facebook as a communication tool.
In addition, we have the Ambassador's blog, a relatively new
undertaking that is attracting attention. Over the past
couple of years, the Embassy has substantially increased its
outreach to Tunisian youth through concerts, film festivals,
and other events. Our information resource center and
America's Corners are popular ways for Tunisians to access
unfiltered news and information. We should continue and
increase such programs.

-------------------------------------------
Advancing Broader Foreign Policy Objectives
And Security Cooperation
-------------------------------------------

21. (C) We should also seek new ways to engage Tunisia in
pursuit of our broader foreign policy agenda. We believe
that the GOT would welcome this kind of engagement, and that
it would pay dividends, not only in our bilateral
relationship but also on transnational issues. For example,
we continue to count on GOT support for our efforts to
promote Israel-Palestinian and Israeli-Arab peace. Although
Tunisia has limited influence within the Arab League, it
remains in the moderate camp, as demonstrated most recently
by its refusal to participate in the extraordinary Doha
Summit on the situation in Gaza. At appropriate moments, we
would recommend doing more to brief the GOT on our efforts in
the peace process and to draw them into providing additional
support. Special Envoy Mitchell's stop here in April was
well received and we should look for ways to continue such
consultations.

22. (S/NF) There are opportunities in the area of security
cooperation, too. For starters, we know that Tunisia could
be doing a better job in sharing intelligence with us about

TUNIS 00000492 005 OF 005

the threat of terrorism in North Africa. This was all too
clear when, yet again, the GOT failed recently to share
information with us in a timely fashion on a reported plot
against US military personnel. GRPO has been taking steps to
increase cooperation through liaison channels; while there
has been progress, more is possible.

23. (C) On military cooperation, the time has come to shift
our military assistance away from FMF to more targeted
programs that meet specific needs. There is increasing
evidence the Tunisian military does not need FMF to the
degree it claims, and in any event it has bought us too
little in the way of cooperation. Rather, we should focus on
working with the Tunisians to identify a small number of
areas were cooperation makes sense. The recent use of the
Section 1206 and PKO programs to provide the Tunisian
military with ground surveillance radar and unmanned
surveillance aircraft is a good example.

--------------------------------------------- -------------
Our Message: Deeper Cooperation Depends On Real Engagement
--------------------------------------------- -------------

24. (S) Tunisia is not an ally today, but we still share
important history and values. It is fair to consider Tunisia
a friend, albeit cautious, closed and distant. Most
importantly, in a region in turmoil, Tunisia has better
prospects than most even though it is troubled. In the end,
serious change here will have to await Ben Ali's departure.
But President Obama's new tone and policies may create a
window of opportunity. We should use it to make overtures to
the GOT in areas where they seek our involvement or
assistance. And, we should seek to engage all Tunisians
(especially the young) in ways that will improve the future
for both our countries.

25. (S) To succeed, however, we need resources and commitment
from Washington. New and expanded programs will require
money and staff to implement them, particularly in public
affairs. Senior US Government officials must also be
prepared to visit more often than in recent years to engage
the Tunisians. Meetings outside Tunisia are a good tool,
too. The Secretary's recent meeting with North African
Foreign Ministers on the margins of the Gaza Reconstruction
Conference in Sharm el-Sheikh provides one model for
engagement and offers the added benefit of allowing us to
also promote greater Maghreb integration.

26. (S) Finally, we recommend US officials be clear in all
meetings with Tunisians: more US cooperation depends on real
Tunisian engagement. For too long Tunisia has skated by. A
small country, in a tough region, the GOT relies on vague
promises of friendship and empty slogans. More can and
should be expected of Tunisia. The GOT frequently says it is
a US ally and calls for greater US engagement. We should
respond clearly: yes, but only if we get genuine help from
Tunisia on the challenges that matter to us all. The
Tunisian government loves the illusion of engagement. The US
government should press for the hard work of real
cooperation.

Godec