(S/NF) Summary: Muammar al-Qadhafi's recent appointment of
his son Saif al-Islam as "General Coordinator" and attendant
indications of a succession plan have stirred up old rumors of
rivalry between seeming frontrunners for the throne, Saif
al-Islam and his brother, National Security Advisor, Mutassim
al-Qadhafi.
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Content
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000924
NOFORN
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR NEA/MAG
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/19/2019
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PINR, LY
SUBJECT: LIBYAN SUCCESSION: QADHAFI ORCHESTRATING THE BOYS' HIGH WIRE
ACT?
REF: A) TRIPOLI 883; B) TRIPOLI 685; C) TRIPOLI 212; D) 08 TRIPOLI 699; E) TRIP
OLI 487; F) 08 TRIPOLI 870; G) STATE 43049; H) TRIPOLI 661; I) TRIPOLI 208; J)
TRIPOLI 899
CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Tripoli,
Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
1. (S/NF) Summary: Muammar al-Qadhafi's recent appointment of
his son Saif al-Islam as "General Coordinator" and attendant
indications of a succession plan have stirred up old rumors of
rivalry between seeming frontrunners for the throne, Saif
al-Islam and his brother, National Security Advisor, Mutassim
al-Qadhafi. Saif al-Islam's return from a 12-month self-imposed
absence from Libyan politics and his recent new appointment
clearly indicate that his star is on the rise in the
constellation of Libyan succession contenders. Qadhafi pere was
reportedly disappointed in Mutassim's management of September 1
Revolution Day anniversary events and his late September travel
to UNGA. Nevertheless, Mutassim's continued engagement on the
U.S. file and continuing efforts to coordinate a meeting
between his father and POTUS -- demonstrate that he may see this
portfolio as his ticket to continue playing in the succession
game (Ref A). Contacts assert that Saif al-Islam may be the
"face of reform," due to his high-profile, public status, and
the current favorite to succeed his father, but that Mutassim
should not be counted out of the succession game, particularly
given his backing by conservatives in the regime, such as
PM-equivalent Al-Baghdadi al-Mahmoudi, and his rumored ability
as National Security Advisor to access significant military and
security elements, including brother Khamis's elite 32nd Brigade
force. End Summary.
SAIF'S RETURN FROM THE COLD
2. (S/NF) Muammar al-Qadhafi's October 6 speech to Revolutionary
Committee members in Sebha marked the peak of a remarkably
resurgent six weeks for Saif al-Islam, which began with the
latter's high-profile return to Libya on August 20 with
convicted Lockerbie bomber Abdel Basset al-Megrahi (Ref B).
Saif has also recently begun to re-engage international media,
with profiles in two CNN feature reports on his efforts to
"rehabilitate" former Libyan Islamic Fighting Group members
(septel). He has also been involved in attempting to settle the
ongoing contretemps between the GOL and Canada (septel). Saif's
reentry onto the public scene signaled the end of his August
2008 self-announced retreat from politics, and comes after some
significant setbacks for him over the past year at the hands of
regime conservatives. In March, the draft constitution (a
Saif-initiative that was to include a position for him as head
of a 100-member council of deputies) was dropped from the agenda
of the annual General People's Congress (Ref C). During the
same meeting, the Congress installed or kept ministers
historically opposed to Saif's reform agenda, such as
PM-equivalent Al-Baghdadi al-Mahmoudi (who kept his position
after Muammar al-Qadhafi publicly called him a corrupt thief
just six months earlier) (Ref D). Late April witnessed the
sudden nationalization of Saif's quasi-independent media
company, which included the take over of his al-Libia satellite
channel mid-broadcast by the state-run Jamahiriya News Agency
(Ref E) on reported grounds that Saif was overreaching in
expanding media freedom.
3. (S/NF) Saif's slide was juxtaposed with younger brother
Mutassim's rise, with the latter completing a state visit to
Russia in October 2008 (Ref F), meeting the Secretary of State
in Washington in March 2009 (Ref G), accompanying Qadhafi on the
historic visit to Italy in June, welcoming CODEL McCain in
August (Ref H) , and accompanying his father to New York for the
UN General Assembly. Mutassim was very visible at his father's
side throughout these high level visits. Additionally,
Al-Baghdadi al-Mahmoudi's ability to maintain the PM-equivalent
position proved to be positive for Mutassim, who is reportedly
close to the conservative PM and, in the past, has orchestrated
reactions against Saif's interests through the PM's office (Ref
I). Regime insiders also tell us that Mutassim remains the only
one who can actually challenge his father.
WHAT SAIF'S RETURN MEANS FOR MUTASSIM
4. (S/NF) As Saif's star rises again, local observers are
turning their eyes toward Mutassim for a reaction. Mutassim has
time and time again evinced his aversion to the spotlight via
media encounters or public events. Evidence of the elder
Qadhafi's disappointment in Mutassim's management of September 1
Revolution Day anniversary events, as well as specific missteps
in New York (i.e., Mutassim's inability to get necessary
permissions for a tent to be pitched for the Libyan leader) have
surfaced (Ref A). Saif is rumored to have trumped Mutassim
during a recent order for all expatriate residents of the
National Oil Company housing compound to vacate their houses.
The residents report that while Mutassim originally gave the
TRIPOLI 00000924 002 OF 002
order for everyone to move immediately, Saif intervened to block
the demand in order to give the occupants more time to pack up
and move. [Note: The reason for the demolition of the housing
compound is rumored to be to clear a way for Aisha al-Qadhafi
(known to have disagreements with Saif) to build a home adjacent
to a park near the location. End note.]
5. (S/NF) Simultaneous with Saif's apparent ascendancy, Mutassim
has moved in an uncharacteristically quick manner to reengage on
the U.S. file. On November 8, he approved the 505 agreement,
which had previously languished in his office for nearly six
months (Ref J). A few days before, on November 5, he personally
engaged the Ambassador on the treatment of Libyan ships at U.S.
ports and Libyan diplomtas by U.S. border authorities.
Additionally, Mutassim renewed his desire to coordinate a
meeting between the Libyan leader and POTUS (Ref A). According
to the Egyptian Embassy here, Mutassim was also expected to meet
Egypt's Intelligence Chief Omar Suleiman during a November visit
to Tripoli (septel), and his staff advised us that he will meet
the Turkish PM during the latter's historic upcoming visit.
THE SUCCESSION QUESTION - WILL IT BE SAIF OR MUTASSIM?
6. (S/NF) Contacts suggest that although Mutassim is not as
skilled in public relations as his older brother Saif, he wields
significant power from behind the scenes. As National Security
Advisor (NSA), Mutassim directs at least some of Libya's
national security policy decisions, including purchases of
equipment, and he reportedly plays on issues regarding the
military purse. Contacts also report that younger brother
Khamis al-Qadhafi, Commander of the 32nd "Khamis" Brigade
(widely known to be the most well-trained and well-equipped
force in the Libyan military), is closer to Mutassim than to
Saif. [Note: At least one contact has commented that Khamis
could come out as a dark horse in the succession race. End
note.] Mutassim's role as NSA and his reported closeness to
Khamis would give Mutassim access to some of the most important
military and security elements of the regime. Nevertheless, the
ultimate authority over the regime's security apparatus remains
in question. Independent website Libya al-Youm reported
November 4 that the Minister-equivalent of Defense, Major
General Abu Baker Younis Jaber, recently called on his officers
to swear allegiance to Saif in his new post, making it unclear
whether the military establishment will report to Mutassim or
Saif -- or both -- in the future. [Note: Muammar al-Qadhafi
reportedly mediated a conflict between Mutassim and Younis Jaber
earlier this year involving their respective roles in military
procurement. (Ref I). End Note.]
COMMENT
7. (S/NF) As Libya undergoes this latest round of Qadhafi's
political restructuring, without a constitution or clarified
succession plan, burgeoning sibling rivalry among Qadhafi's
progeny is near inevitable. Qadhafi has placed his sons
(daughter Aisha is considered by some shrewder and smarter than
her brothers but does not seem to be playing a visible role in
the succession struggle) on a succession high wire act,
perpetually thrown off balance, in what might be a calculated
effort by the aging leader to prevent any one of them from
authoritatively gaining the prize. It is also difficult to
precisely gauge Mutassim's depth of ambition for the leadership
role since those around him do not freely engage on the topic.
The rivalry is likely to play out publicly over the next few
months in a continued realignment of political and business
interests, as reformists ("Saif backers") and conservatives
("Mutassim backers") continue to vie for the elder Qadhafi's
attention. Mutassim appears to believe that progress in the
U.S. relationship could prove key to keeping him in the game if
he does indeed aspire to play a crucial role in the post-Leader
era. Whichever of the Qadhafi children wins the "prize," there
is a high level of anxiety among our Libyan contacts, given the
potential for chaos in the absence of the traditionally "guiding
hand" of the Leader and given the absence of viable state
institutions to insure stability. They see a best possible
outcome as a division of the spoils, with Saif handling the
domestic side of the house and Mutassim handling the security
and possible foreign relations part. A second possibility is a
"trinity," whereby Saif would be the political face of the
regime, Mutassim the national security face, and Khamis the
military/security face. End Comm.
CRETZ