Excerpt from document
(S/NF) Summary: The Foreign Minister of the Mauritanian
High Council of State (HCE or junta), passed us indirectly a
personal "non-paper," urging the USG to pursue "principled
engagement" with the HCE. Continuing the effort to
communicate via alternative channels noted in reftel, a
senior Moroccan diplomat conveyed the previously promised
unsigned non-paper, in both hard and electronic form.

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DE RUEHRB #0207/01 0751411
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 161411Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY RABAT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9794
INFO RUCNMGH/MAGHREB COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBP/AMEMBASSY BAMAKO PRIORITY 0123
RUEHDK/AMEMBASSY DAKAR PRIORITY 0486
RUEHPG/AMEMBASSY PRAGUE PRIORITY 0242
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 1628
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 3564
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI PRIORITY 0420
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Content
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 RABAT 000207

SIPDIS
NOFORN

STATE FOR AF/W AND NEA/MAG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/16/2019
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PTER, MO, AL, MR
SUBJECT: UNOFFICIAL REQUEST FROM MAURITANIAN HCE FOR U.S.
ENGAGEMENT

REF: RABAT 0165

RABAT 00000207 001.3 OF 002

Classified By: CDA Robert P. Jackson for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

1. (S/NF) Summary: The Foreign Minister of the Mauritanian
High Council of State (HCE or junta), passed us indirectly a
personal "non-paper," urging the USG to pursue "principled
engagement" with the HCE. Continuing the effort to
communicate via alternative channels noted in reftel, a
senior Moroccan diplomat conveyed the previously promised
unsigned non-paper, in both hard and electronic form. The
non-paper articulately relates the background of the coup and
the HCE's post-coup efforts to move towards democratic
elections in June, with the likely participation of a retired
(Name Removed), who would promote moderation,
regional cohesion and security. The non-paper describes a
public exchange between Secretary Clinton and Mauritania's
Foreign Minister at Sharm el-Sheikh as positive, and seeks
more contact outside Nouakchott. It claims that better
relations are in the U.S. interest, citing the junta's
earlier good relations with Israel. The substance of the
six-page non-paper, which although unofficial, is marked
confidential, is summarized below, and the full text has been
emailed to Department (NEA/MAG). End summary.

2. (S/NF) (Name Removed), passed to A/DCM this non-paper promised
after the secret visit of HCE Foreign Minister, Dr.
Mohammad-Mahmoud Ould Mamedou, to Morocco in February 2009
(reftel). (Name Removed) said the paper was written by Mamedou,
who told him that he wanted it conveyed as an unofficial
communication, which he, (Name Removed), was unofficially
forwarding. (information removed) Pressed for background,
(Name Removed) insisted that Morocco had no foreknowledge of the
coup but acknowledged that the country had been concerned
about a growing Algerian role under President Abdellahi.

--------------------------------
Non-Paper: The HCE Seeks U.S.
Engagement, Hopes to be Moderate
--------------------------------

3. (S/NF) Calling the public meeting between Secretary
Clinton and Mauritania,s Foreign Minister at the Gaza
reconstruction meeting in Sharm el-Sheikh "positive," the
non-paper notes HCE wanted a deepening of ties and
"principled engagement" with the U.S. prior to the
Mauritanian elections scheduled for June 2009, according to
the statement.

4. (S/NF) Engagement with the military regime is in the
long-term security interests of the United States, it argues,
emphasizing the desire of the HCE to be a force for balance
and moderation, based on Morocco's approach. Mauritania is a
"strategically key country with moderate past and significant
potential," it says, asserting that the policies of the Bush
Administration had alienated Nouakchott and were out-of-step
with the approach taken by Mauritania's neighbors, other
states in the region, and other Western governments. The
policies of the former Administration pushed Mauritania to
break off ties with Israel and engage with Iran, which
contradicts the moderate approach that the government seeks
to follow, and is "not what the young modernizers of this
team wanted," it says. It indicates that Abdel Aziz would
likely run for president in the June 6 elections, after
resigning from the military, and projects that his presidency
would be good for regional cohesion and security. It
maintains that the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (Note: A
sub-regional group which includes Morocco and recently had
its Ministerial here) had agreed to observe the June 6
elections.

-----------------------------------

RABAT 00000207 002.3 OF 002

Not a Power Grab, a "Rectification"
-----------------------------------

5. (S/NF) The document espouses the HCE's commitment to
democratic elections in June and acknowledges the
unconstitutional nature of the coup in Mauritania, which
removed the first democratically elected President, Sidi
Mohamed Ould Cheikh Abdallahi. However, it argues that the
coup "is objectively a particular case" and should be viewed
as a "rectification" of the mismanagement of President
Abdallahi rather than as a traditional power grab. The
statement asserts that since the coup, the HCE has gained
popular support and has demonstrated its commitment to
moderation by ensuring civil liberties, freedom of the press,
and tolerance of opposition groups.

6. (C) Comment: We have no reason to doubt the authenticity
of the communication. The full text of the non-paper has
been emailed to NEA/MAG.

7. (U) Tripoli Minimize Considered.

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Jackson