Excerpt from document
(S/NF) Summary: Continuing the effort to communicate via
alternative channels noted in reftel, a senior Moroccan
diplomat conveyed the previously promised unsigned
"non-paper," as a personal message from the Foreign Minister
of the Mauritanian High Council of State (HCE or junta),
urging the USG to pursue "principled engagement" with the
HCE.

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Content
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 RABAT 000206

NOFORN
SIPDIS

STATE FOR AF/W AND NEA/MAG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/12/2019
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PTER, MO, AL, MR
SUBJECT: MAURITANIA FORMALLY REQUESTS U.S. ENGAGEMENT VIA
MOROCCO

REF: RABAT 165

RABAT 00000206 001.4 OF 002

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THIS CABLE HAS BEEN CANCELLED BY THE ORIGINATING OFFICE AND WILL BE
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Classified By: CDA Robert P. Jackson for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

1. (S/NF) Summary: Continuing the effort to communicate via
alternative channels noted in reftel, a senior Moroccan
diplomat conveyed the previously promised unsigned
"non-paper," as a personal message from the Foreign Minister
of the Mauritanian High Council of State (HCE or junta),
urging the USG to pursue "principled engagement" with the
HCE. The non-paper articulately relates the background of
the coup and the HCE's post-coup efforts to move towards
democratic elections in June,(information removed), who would promote moderation,
regional cohesion and security. The non-paper describes a
public exchange between Secretary Clinton and Mauritania's
Foreign Minister at Sharm el-Cheikh as positive, and seeks
more contact outside Nouakchott. It claims that better
relations are in the U.S. interest, citing the Junta's
earlier good relations with Israel. Substance of the 6-page
non-paper, which although unofficial, is marked confidential,
is summarized below and full text emailed to Department
(NEA/MAG). End Summary

2. (S/NF) (information removed), passed to A/DCM this non-paper promised
after the secret visit of HCE Foreign Minister, Dr.
Mohammad-Mahmoud Ould Mamedou, to Morocco in February 2009
(reftel). (Name Removed) said the paper was written by Mamedou,
who told him that he wanted it conveyed as an unofficial
communication, which he, (Name Removed), was unofficially
forwarding. (Name Removed) indicated that DGED chief Mansouri,
who has led Moroccan policy on Mauritania was aware and in
accord with the message and his passing it, but he equally
stressed that this was not an official communication from
either government. Pressed for background, (Name Removed)
insisted that Morocco had no foreknowledge of the coup, but
acknowledged that the country had been concerned about a
growing Algerian role under Abdellahi.

Non-Paper: The HCE Seeks U.S. Engagement, Hopes to be Moderate
--------------------------------------------- ---------

3. (S/NF) Calling the public meeting between Secretary
Clinton and Mauritania,s Foreign Minister at the Gaza
reconstruction meeting in Sharm el-Cheikh "positive," the
non-paper notes HCE wanted a deepening of ties and
"principled engagement" with the U.S. prior to the
Mauritanian elections scheduled for June 2009, according to
the statement.

4. (S/NF) Engagement with the military regime is in the
long-term security interests of the United States, it argues,
emphasizing the desire of the HCE to be a force for balance
and moderation, based on Morocco's approach. Mauritania is a
"strategically key country with moderate past and significant
potential," it says, asserting that the policies of the Bush
Administration have alienated Nouakchott and are out-of-step
with the approach taken by Mauritania's neighbors, other
states in the region, and other Western governments. The
policies of the former administration pushed Mauritania to
break off ties with Israel and engage with Iran, which
contradicts the moderate approach that the government seeks
to follow, and is "not what the young modernizers of this
team wanted," it says. It indicates that Abdel-Aziz would
likely run for president in the June 6 elections, after
resigning from the military, and projects that his presidency
would be good for regional cohesion and security. It
maintains that the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (Note: A
sub-regional group which includes Morocco and recently had a
its Ministerial here) had agreed to observe the June 6
elections,)

RABAT 00000206 002.4 OF 002

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THIS CABLE HAS BEEN CANCELLED BY THE ORIGINATING OFFICE AND WILL BE
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Not a Power Grab, a "Rectification"
-----------------------------------

5. (S/NF) The document espouses the HCE's commitment to
democratic elections in June and acknowledges the
unconstitutional nature of the coup in Mauritania, which
removed the first democratically elected President, Sidi
Mohamed Ould Cheikh Abdallahi. However, it argues that the
coup "is objectively a particular case" and should be viewed
as a "rectification" of the mismanagement of President
Abdallahi rather than as a traditional power grab. The
statement asserts that since the coup, the HCE has gained
popular support and has demonstrated its commitment to
moderation by ensuring civil liberties, freedom of the press,
and tolerance of opposition groups. The full text of the
non-paper has been emailed to NEA/MAG.

6. (U) Tripoli Minimize Considered.

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Jackson