09NOUAKCHOTT333 Date17/05/2009 08:40 OriginEmbassy Nouakchott ClassificationSECRET Header
(C) Summary: Ambassador called on the junta "Foreign
Minister" on May 12 amid a wave of negative press featuring
accusations of improper interference by the Embassy in
internal affairs, an apparent GIRM suspension of visa
issuances for official Americans, and attempts to limit
in-country USG diplomatic travel.
Full Document
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FM AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT
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INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RUCNMGH/MAGHREB COLLECTIVE
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 0660
RUEHDO/AMEMBASSY DOHA 0582
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0645
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID 2187
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0992
RUEHPG/AMEMBASSY PRAGUE 0217
RHMFISS/COMSOCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUEHDS/USMISSION USAU ADDIS ABABA
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1103
Content
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 NOUAKCHOTT 000333
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/14/2014
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, ODIP, MR
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S CALL ON JUNTA "FOREIGN MINISTER"
REF: A. NOUACKCHOTT 512 B. NOUAKCHOTT 330
NOUAKCHOTT 00000333 001.2 OF 002
Classified By: Ambassador Mark M. Boulware for reasons 1.5 (b)
and (d).
C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (CLASSIFICATION CHANGE)
1. (C) Summary: Ambassador called on the junta "Foreign
Minister" on May 12 amid a wave of negative press featuring
accusations of improper interference by the Embassy in
internal affairs, an apparent GIRM suspension of visa
issuances for official Americans, and attempts to limit
in-country USG diplomatic travel. Ambassador advised that
USG policy opposing the coup and attempts to legitimize it
through unilateral elections remained constant although the
USG hoped for progress in ongoing mediation. He urged that
efforts be made to maintain as normal a relationship as
possible given respective positions, protested attempts to
limited mission travel and advised that inaction of visas
threatened remaining USG programs of mutual interest. The
"Minister" warned against "inappropriate activities" and
blamed slow visa issuance on newly tightened controls such
those the USG has, but said that he would look into the
matter.
2. (C) Ambassador called on junta "Foreign Minister"
Mohamed Mahmoud Ould Mohamedou on May 12 and within days of
his return to post against a backdrop of an organized
campaign against the Embassy by the junta government and
pro-coup forces. A wave of negative press in the days before
the Ambassador's return featured calls that DCM Hankins
(then Charge) be declared persona non grata and accused the
Embassy and our democracy partner NDI of improper
interference in the internal affairs of Mauritania implying
USG financing of pro-democracy parties (ref A). At the same
time, the GIRM, already painfully slow to respond to our visa
requests, seemed virtually to stop the process altogether
while the Foreign Ministry pronounced "inopportune" a planned
trip by the Embassy's political officer to a southern town
to meet with police and local election commission officials
(ref B).
3. (C) The Ambassador noted that he had requested the
meeting in order to share his perspective on US policy toward
Mauritania following his stay in Washington as well as to
raise some administrative concerns. Regarding the former, he
said that notwithstanding the change in administration, the
USG continued to oppose the coup d'tat and the junta's
unilateral decision to organize early elections. He went on
to say that we were nonetheless hopeful that a consensual
solution for a return to constitutional order acceptable to
the international community could still be found and that we
were closely following Senegalese mediation efforts.
4. (C) "Foreign Minister" Mohamedou replied that in spite
of preparations for elections the GIRM remained open to such
mediation but that if it were not successful, the GIRM would
carry out the decision of the Estates General on Democracy to
hold those elections. He said that it was time for the USG
to review its policy and insisted that there was no longer a
military regime as General Aziz had stepped down to become a
"simple citizen" while the High Council of State's role was
now limited to security matters. He argued that Mauritania
was on its way back to constitutionality and that the US
should support that and realize that the measures such as the
targeted travel sanctions in the wake of the coup should be
removed.
5. (C) Ambassador Boulware noted that absent consensual
agreement, it was unlikely that the elections as currently
planned would produce any significant change in USG policy.
He urged that, nonetheless both the Ministry and the Embassy
work to preserve as much harmony in the relationship as
possible consistent with the positions of our respective
governments. To that end, the Ambassador expressed concern
that the Ministry appeared to have virtually stopped visa
issuances for official Americans and that these delays were
beginning to impact longstanding programs like the Peace
Corps that were clearly in our mutual interest. Mohamedou
denied any detailed knowledge about pending visa requests but
said that when he had taken charge of the ministry he found
the visa approval process chaotic and introduced procedures
NOUAKCHOTT 00000333 002.2 OF 002
C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (CLASSIFICATION CHANGE)
to properly screen and vet applications"just as you do"and
that this was necessarily somewhat time consuming. He
promised, though, to look into the matter.
6. (C) Similarly, the Ambassador noted our surprise that a
routine diplomatic note advising it of a planned mission to
the southern town of Rosso to meet with local police and
election commission officials had resulted in a responding
note advising that the trip was "inopportune." Mohamedou
said that he thought the point of the trip was strange and
said that "the President" agreed (presumably interim
"President" Ba M'Bare). He also noted that the security
situation was delicate and had to be taken into account.
Ambassador Boulware stated that the Embassy does not request
permission to travel within Mauritania nor is that required
under conventions. He observed that notifications of planned
travel were a simple courtesy enabling the GIRM to take any
advisable security measures but said further that we will
continue to seek meetings with local officials whenever we
thought it useful. Mohamedou responded that Mauritania had
to remain vigilant against inappropriate behavior such as in
the "recent affair of the Iranians in Morocco."
7. (S) Comment: It is not yet clear whether, as some
sensitive reporting suggests, that the visa slow down and
attempts to limit movements by Embassy staff are the
individual initiatives of "Minister" Mohamed Mahmoud Ould
Mohamedou or rather are part of a broader effort by pro-junta
elements to put the Embassy on the defensive, limit its
effectiveness or extract a higher price for USG opposition to
the coup. While unwilling to compromise on fundamental
issues neither do we intend to be drawn into an escalating
diplomatic row at this moment that can only distract from the
current mediation attempts. If there is no sign of
improvement following the Ambassador's intervention, we will
insure that our concerns and possible consequences are made
known to a wider circle of authorities in the hope that the
"Minister" will be corrected.
BOULWARE