Excerpt from document summary
(C/NF) Summary: Senator Sylla stated he and a group of
anti-coup activists are determined to stop Aziz and derail
upcoming elections, through violence if necessary. To this
end, he wants to obtain arms and logistical support from the
Israelis, and have Post serve as an intermediary between the
two parties to facilitate contact.

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Content
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NOUAKCHOTT 000308

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/29/2019
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PINR, MR
SUBJECT: SENATOR SYLLA: OUR RECURRING VIOLENT BIT ACTOR

REF: A. NOUAKCHOTT 215
B. 08 NOUAKCHOTT 739
C. 08 NOUAKCHOTT 582
D. NOUAKCHOTT 220

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Dennis Hankins for reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d).

1. (C/NF) Summary: Senator Sylla stated he and a group of
anti-coup activists are determined to stop Aziz and derail
upcoming elections, through violence if necessary. To this
end, he wants to obtain arms and logistical support from the
Israelis, and have Post serve as an intermediary between the
two parties to facilitate contact. President Abdallahi
previously distanced himself from Sylla's agenda -- an agenda
that is likely delusional Post plans to cut off contact.
End summary.

2. (C/NF) PolAsst met with Senator Youssef Ould Tijani Sylla
of M'Bout, at his request, on April 29. A well-known visitor
to the Embassy (Refs A, B, and C), in previous meetings Sylla
has frequently called for more radical opposition to the
coup. Sylla began this meeting by summarizing his recent
trip to Portugal, Spain, and France, rattling off the various
figures he met with. He also held interviews with Portuguese
TV and radio "to explain the Mauritanian situation." (Note:
Sylla speaks Portuguese fluently. End note.) He then cut to
the real point of the meeting. "We have a problem," he said
gravely. General Aziz has threatened to cut ties with the US
after he is elected, and after that, the Europeans may be
next, he stated. This would leave the anti-coup activists
out in the cold, subject to "being killed or put in prison,"
and the junta free to fully embrace Libya and Iran. Aziz
must be stopped, he said, and to do that "We need arms
through the support of Israel." Money was of no interest, he
said; "we are ready to sacrifice our lives" to stop the coup.
When asked to clarify what he meant by "stopping" Aziz, he
said "capture or liquidate him." PolAsst noted that the USG
did not support violent resistance, even if it were in the
name of restoring democracy and overturning a coup, but Sylla
was undeterred.

3. (C/NF) As for logistics, Sylla said all they would need
is "four or five cars, some AK-47s and machine guns." Fifty
men at most would be sufficient he said, remarking that he
had three sons of his own, and could discreetly assemble a
"good team" in his home district of M'Bout. Noting that Aziz
was not well protected these days, he would be easy to take
out, he reasoned. (Note: Indeed, Aziz has been spotted
several times around various parts of Nouakchott with minimal
or no visible personal protection. End note.) PolAsst asked
what his plan would be after Aziz was removed -- "Abdallahi
will come back as President" and there would be no more
constitutional problems, he said. When pressed about what
Generals Ghazouani, Hadi, and others in the military and
security services would do if Aziz were eliminated, Sylla
said they would do "nothing." Sylla stated that this course
of action had already been decided upon; "now we just need
the means." He said if there were no political consensus
found soon, his group would want to be ready to act by the
start of the official campaign. (Note: The campaign starts
officially on May 21 and ends on June 4. End note.) Sylla
reasoned that during the campaign would be the easiest time
to make an attempt on Aziz, as he will be meeting with people
constantly. "It would be very easy for someone wearing a
boubou (customary Mauritanian dress for males) to conceal a
weapon and infiltrate a meeting," he said.

4. (C/NF) Sylla asked for Post to provide him with contact
information for the Israeli ambassador for Mauritania so he
could make initial contact. Noting that time was of the
essence given the compacted electoral calendar, he stated
several times that this was "very urgent." (Note: Sylla
stated that he had not/not met with any Israeli diplomats
during his recent trip to Europe. End note.) He said he
would prefer contact with the Israelis to be initiated by the

NOUAKCHOTT 00000308 002 OF 002

US Embassy and stated the necessity of having a "logistical
plan in place to aid this group of Mauritanian democrats who
want your support."

5. (C/NF) Sylla said he had recently met with National
Assembly President Messaoud Ould Boulkheir to discuss the
current situation. When PolAsst asked if Boulkheir was in
agreement with this plan to obtain arms, Sylla replied "If he
isn't in agreement, he is almost in agreement."

6. (C/NF) Comment: A serial name dropper, Sylla frequently
cites others (e.g., Abdallahi, Boulkheir, etc.) in
conversations in an attempt to lend legitimacy to his own
plans. During Charge's last visit to President Abdallahi in
Lemden (Ref D), Charge asked about Sylla, since he often
boasted of meeting with Abdallahi and liked to suggest he was
acting on behalf of the President and/or the FNDD leadership.
Abdallahi praised Sylla for his "clear anti-coup position."
When Charge noted Sylla was the most radical anti-coup figure
he had met yet due to his advocacy of violence and plans to
obtain arms from Israel, Abdallahi chuckled and said, "We did
not discuss THAT, I can assure you." Abdallahi reiterated
that their struggle was a peaceful one, but conceded that
Sylla did have a "hot streak."

7. (C/NF) Comment continued: There are several problems
with Sylla's "plan," not the least of which is that should
his group succeed in killing Aziz, it is highly unlikely that
Ghazouani, Hadi, and others would sit by and do "nothing"
(particularly given the fact that Sylla and his associates
are not White Moor). Moreover, weapons can be obtained
relatively easily in Mauritania; if Sylla merely wanted to
assemble a cache of weapons, he would hardly need American or
Israeli assistance to do so. There is always the possibility
that Sylla is leading a false flag operation on behalf of
Aziz to goad the US into giving support to his plan,
whereupon the press would have a field day and Aziz could
trumpet "foreign interference" to rally support. End comment.

8. (C/NF) Next Steps: We have met Sylla enough times to
determine he is not worth meeting again. We have
consistently held a strong position against armed action but
he keeps coming back. We would have cut off contacts long
ago -- indeed, Charge passed on Sylla's most recent urgent
request for a meeting to PolAsst -- but for the fact that he
is a senator, does have some limited weight in
Afro-Mauritanian circles, and meets occasionally with
Abdallahi. Months old rumors of FNDD small arms procurement
indicated someone might be planning an armed response to the
coup. If that someone was Sylla, we wanted early warning.
If there is something behind Sylla's plots (we are
skeptical), the signs are that Sylla would prove someone
worse than Aziz.
HANKINS