Excerpt from document summary
(S - N/F) Summary: The FNDD sees opportunity in General
Aziz's upcoming resignation to work on internal divisions in
his support base -- hopefully leaving him out in the cold.
Diplomatic activities (including travel by President
Abdallahi) will continue as will open resistance. The FNDD
fears France as a spoiler. Sanctions, as always, are seen as
critical.

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Content
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 NOUAKCHOTT 000269

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/14/2019
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, MR
SUBJECT: THE FNDD'S INTERIM STRATEGY

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Dennis Hankins for reason 1.4 (b and d
)

1. (S - N/F) Summary: The FNDD sees opportunity in General
Aziz's upcoming resignation to work on internal divisions in
his support base -- hopefully leaving him out in the cold.
Diplomatic activities (including travel by President
Abdallahi) will continue as will open resistance. The FNDD
fears France as a spoiler. Sanctions, as always, are seen as
critical. End Summary

2. (S - N/F) Dragging Out Aziz' Limbo: Charge met April 13
at the embassy with FNDD "Foreign Minister" Mohamed Ould
Maouloud to discuss the Front's strategy in coming weeks.
Ould Maouloud said, "we are avoiding anything that might
cause Aziz to change his mind about resigning," saying they
see opportunity to reverse the coup once he relinquishes his
formal ties to power. While never accepting the electoral
plan put forward by Aziz, the FNDD will do whatever it can to
get a postponement of the date (if they can't get the
election canceled all together). Ould Maouloud said that as
soon as Aziz resigns, President Abdallahi will send a letter
to the President of the Constitutional Council trying to
pre-empt any statement that there is a "presidential vacancy"
that would allow President of the Senate Ba M'Bare to assume
the interim presidency. Charge shared the highlights of his
previous conversation with the President of the
Constitutional Council and suggested the FNDD may also want
to have President of the National Assembly Messaoud Ould
Boulkheir challenge M'Bare's succession since it would be
difficult to dodge a complain from the President of the
National Assembly whose legitimacy is not subject to debate.
Charge also noted the possibility of finding a candidate to
challenge Aziz' ability to run for president under the
provisions of the Africa Charter, ratified by MauriQnia,
which bars coup leaders from running for office. Ould
Maouloud said he was not confident the Constitutional Council
would "do the right thing" if put on the spot noting they had
a mixed record to date -- knocking down Aziz' efforts to
expel Ould Boulkheir from the National Assembly presidency
but also giving its blessing to the CENI electoral commission
appointed by the regime. That said, Ould Maouloud said they
would put challenges in front of the Constitutional Council
as a delaying tactic. Should they win, the FNDD will be
thrilled. If they lose, they will denounce the process as
further evidence of Aziz' manipulation of the system.

3. (S - N/F) Looking for betrayals: Ould Maouloud said they
saw the possibility that some of those whom Aziz is putting
in place to watch out for his interests in the interim
between his resignation and the elections could turn against
him. The FNDD is focused particularly on General Ghazwany as
someone who might "get up the courage" to abandon General
Aziz -- with the chance of that happening increasing the
longer Aziz is technically a civilian. Ould Maouloud
understood that General Aziz will try to maintain
behind-the-scenes control of the BASEP Presidential Security
Battalion even after he sheds his uniform. He believes
Ghazwany is bristling at that interference -- which makes the
BASEP more a personal militia than ever. Were Ghazwany to
abandon Aziz politically, Ould Maouloud believes Aziz would
try to come back by force by using the BASEP as well as
Tuareg fighters provided by Malian Tuareg leader Ibrahim Ag
Bahanga. Were the occasion to arise, Ould Maouloud suggested
that, "beyond four or five BASEP officers who are personally
loyal to Aziz," the BASEP itself would not necessarily come
out in force against other military units. As for the
Tuareg, Ould Maouloud sees them as too far away for what, if
it ever happens, he would expect to be a rapid change. When
asked whether the President and FNDD leadership had discussed
what they would offer Ghazwany if he were to turn on Aziz,
Ould Maouloud discussed the possibility of naming Ghazwany as
a greatly empowered Minister of Defense (abolishing the
long-held "real military power" held by the Presidential
Personal Military Chief of Staff previously held by Aziz and
shifting that power to civilian control). Ould Maouloud
emphasized that these types of scenarios are being discussed
but added, "the problem with being a Front is that WE ARE A
Front," meaning that this type of sensitive discussion has to
be held at the level of a far smaller group of which he is a
member.

4. (S - N/F) Ould Maouloud believed President of the Senate
M'Bare could also renege on his understanding with Aziz. He
sees M'Bare as a very weak person, however, so he assumes
M'Bare would be at best a "follower" of a wave against Aziz.
Ould Maouloud also did not discount the possibility of a
double-cross by intelligence chief General Hady, but he was
not as sure the result of a Hady-led action against Aziz
would be as positive as one led by Ghazwany.

5. (S - N/F) Ould Maouloud emphasized that targeted
sanctions and a clear international denunciation of the
electoral process would be essential in getting Aziz'
putative allies to turn on him. Ould Maouloud hoped Uganda
would move forward on a Security Council PRST denouncing
coups in Africa although he was worried the Ugandans were
being dissuaded by Libya. Ould Maouloud worried that
previously strong political support from Algeria was fading
in favor of a "security agenda" being pushed by Algerian
military and intelligence services.

6. (S - N/F) French Spoilers: Ould Maouloud said the
greatest FNDD concern was that, while they might be able get
Ghazwany and others to abandon Aziz politically, the French
intelligence services might intervene to get Ghazwany to
stick with Aziz' game plan.

7. (S - N/F) Comment: The FNDD is not unrealistic enough to
believe that Aziz' allies are likely to turn on him, but they
do believe it could happen. Lacking their own forces, the
FNDD cannot mount a counter-coup but must hope for a
continually deteriorating economy and internal rivalries to
spark a revolt (they don't see Aziz ever backing away through
a political settlement). Aziz' desire to seek the veneer of
legitimacy by going to elections through a short-lived
civilian transition government is seen by the FNDD as a
moment of vulnerability they can exploit. At the same time,
Aziz got to where he is today through a mastery of palace
intrigue. Overtly or behind-the-curtain, Aziz has been
running security for some time now and knows how to stage and
how to counter coups. He will now be at his point of maximum
awareness. The FNDD is, unfortunately, poorly placed to
influence the military inner circle. Most of the FNDD
leaders consider themselves intellectuals who have never
developed relations with the coarser military -- who
generally come from warrior tribes. We know there is
personal resentment against Aziz within the military, but we
do not know its depth or whether any of the military would
run the risk of turning on Aziz.

HANKINS