(C) SUMMARY AND COMMENT With its long border with Iran,
Diyala remains a strategically vital focal point for some of
Iraq's most pressing problems, yet its Provincial Government
remains ill-equipped to confront the challenges facing it.
Although Diyala is no longer the haven for Al Qaida and other
insurgents that it once was, continuing USG assistance is
vital to stabilize Diyala and to prevent ongoing tensions
there from spreading to the adjacent disputed internal
boundary (DIBs) areas.
Full Document
ClassificationSECRET//NOFORN Header
VZCZCXYZ0084
PP RUEHWEB
DE RUEHGB #3373/01 3641617
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 301617Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5961
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
*******
S E C R E T BAGHDAD 003373
NOFORN
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/I: A/S FELTMAN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/20/2019
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, KTER, PTER, KDEM, PINR, PINS,
PHUM, PREF,
IZ, IR
SUBJECT: PRT DIYALA: CENTER OF GRAVITY FOR IRAQ'S
PROBLEMS
REF: A. 09BAGHDAD 2937
B. 09BAGHDAD 3065
C. 09BAGHDAD 2844
D. 09BAGHDAD 3120
E. 09BAGHDAD 3178
F. 09BAGHDAD 3335
G. 09BAGHDAD 2367
H. 09BAGHDAD 2547
Classified By: OPA Director Greta Holtz for
reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (U) This is a PRT Diyala message.
2. (C) SUMMARY AND COMMENT With its long border
with Iran,
Diyala remains a strategically vital focal point
for some of
Iraq's most pressing problems, yet its Provincial
Government
remains ill-equipped to confront the challenges
facing it.
Although Diyala is no longer the haven for Al Qaida
and other
insurgents that it once was, continuing USG
assistance is
vital to stabilize Diyala and to prevent ongoing
tensions
there from spreading to the adjacent disputed
internal
boundary (DIBs) areas. END SUMMARY AND COMMENT.
- - - - - - - - - - -
VULNERABILITY TO IRAN
- - - - - - - - - - -
3. (C) Strategically located between Iran and
Baghdad,
Diyala remains vulnerable to Iranian economic and
cultural
influence, as well as Tehran's apparent support for
insurgent
groups and attempts to manipulate local officials.
Diyala is
a major transit point, with more than 50 percent of
the
fruits and vegetables in Diyala imported from Iran,
along
with many other goods on their way to Baghdad.
Diyala is
also a major gateway for Iranians traveling on
religious
pilgrimages to places like Karbala and Najaf. In
meetings
with PRToffs, provincial officials, including the
Governor,
Dr. Abd-al-Nasr Muntsir al-Mahdawi (Sunni-Tawafuq)
and the
Provincial Council (PC) Chairman Abd-al-Talib
Muhammad Hasan
(Kurd) openly note the importance of cooperating
with Iran to
improve Diyala,s economic future. Facing the
current
drought conditions, the Governor made a trip to
Iran in
September 2009 to ask for the release of water into
the Wand
River in Khanaqin. As part of the negotiations for
the
subsequent release of the water, Mahdawi signed a
cooperation
agreement with the neighboring Iranian province of
Kermanshah
on areas including security, trade, water, customs
duties,
and cultural exchanges. (Note: This is notable for
the
numerous subjects covered by the agreement that are
clearly
within the central government,s sphere of
authority. End
note).
4. (S/NF) Governor Mahdawi and other provincial
leaders tell
us that Iranian agents and special groups are
supporting
various insurgent and political groups in Diyala,
undermining
the economy and provoking sectarian tension. The
perception
of Iran's interference appears to exist on multiple
levels,
for example, PC member Abdullah Jabbouri told
PRToffs that
Iranian agents are manipulating the Muqdadiyah City
Council,
while other PRT interlocutors have reported that
Diyala's
Deputy Governor, Furat Muhammad (ISCI), recently
traveled to
Iran to receive funds for the upcoming national
parliamentary
elections. Diyala shares a 250 mile-long border
with Iran,
and the Governor, multiple Provincial Council
members, and
other local leaders claim that Iranian agents have
many
members of the Iraqi security forces on their
payroll -
including border forces - thus enabling the
smuggling of
goods, including weapons and explosive devices,
into Diyala.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - -
SIMMERING SECTARIAN TENSION
- - - - - - - - - - - - - -
5. (C) Diyala continues to face the serious
potential for
increased sectarian violence. While many contacts,
including
the PC Chairman and the district head of
Muqdadiyah, estimate
that more than 90 percent of AQI in Diyala has now
been
Qthat more than 90 percent of AQI in Diyala has now
been
destroyed, the Shi'a-Sunni tensions that developed
over the
past years of struggle have not fully disappeared.
The
perceived imbalance in the implementation of rule
of law in
favor of Shi'a groups is exacerbating those
tensions. Sunni
groups say they are being targeted for arrest and
assassination by the Shi'a-dominated Fifth Division
of the
Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), especially the Iraqi
Police (IP)
(ref A). (NOTE: Among IA divisions, The Fifth has
the highest
percentage of Shi'a troops. END NOTE.) This
perception is
strengthened by the fact that approximately 90
percent of the
prison population in Diyala is Sunni, as stated by
Governor
Mahdawi and prison officials. (NOTE: the population
breakdown
in Diyala is roughly 50 percent Sunni, 35 percent
Shi'a, and
15 percent Kurd. END NOTE). During a recent
Provincial
Council session, PC member Amir Thamir (Allawi) and
others
openly accused Shi'a tribes of coordinating with
the IP on
the arrest of several Sunni leaders in the
Mansouriyah area
of Muqdadiyah to retaliate against their Sunni
tribal
neighbors. Thamir also claimed that the Prime
Minister's
office was behind these arrests.
6. (S/NF) Moreover, Sunni leaders believe that the
IP is also
working with the support of Iranian groups, and
possibly at
the behest of, or at least with the support of,
Iranian
groups. For example, in August 2009 the son of PC
member
Najim Harbie (al-Mutluq) was alleged to have been
assassinated with IP collusion at the direction of
Harith
Sa'dun, a well-known Jayesh Al Mahdi Special Groups
(JAM-SG)
leader with ties to al Quds Force. (NOTE: U.S.
military
direct intelligence report IIR 6 069 1143 10-DOI
20091116
from evaluated sources indicates that the vehicle
used in the
kidnapping belonged to the Director of the Major
Crimes Unit
of the IP. END NOTE). Despite this background,
after his
arrest by ISF in November 2009, the Deputy
Provincial Council
Chairman, Sadiq Ja'far Abdullah Muhammad (ISCI)
approached
the PRT to press for Harith's release. In addition,
Sunni
leadership asserts that a Shi'a-biased IP is not
only
supported by Iranian special groups, but also by
the central
government itself. Diyala's Sunni leaders blame the
central
government for helping to perpetrate sectarian and
politically biased arrests and assassinations of
Sunni
leaders - both civilians and Sons of Iraq (SOI). As
previously reported, a significant number of the
Sunni
(Tawafuq) provincial government leadership either
have
outstanding arrest warrants or are currently in
jail (ref B).
Diyala's Sunni leadership believes this is a
concerted
effort by central government powers to undermine
their
authority and set the stage for Shi'a dominance in
the
province (ref C).
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
SUNNIS COULD TURN TO VIOLENCE
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
7. (C) If the arrests, intimidation, and growing
disenfranchisement of Sunni groups in Diyala
continue, some
PRT contacts in Diyala believe that some Sunnis,
particularly
Sons of Iraq (SOI) or other groups vulnerable to
new Ba'ath
party messaging, may resort to armed conflict as
their best
perceived option to regain power against a
Shi'a-led
government. Diyala is the second largest source of
Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in Iraq, second
only to
Baghdad. Approximately 240,000 people of both Sunni
and
Shi'a ethnicity have been displaced, roughly half
of whom
reside in Diyala, and half in other provinces.
Working with
Embassy and international partners such as USAID,
UNHCR,
United States Institute of Peace, and International
Organization for Migration, the GOI's
Implementation and
Follow-Up Committee for National Reconciliation
(IFCNR) has
developed a special Diyala Initiative to enable and
encourage
IDPs to return home (ref D). Early results are
encouraging;
UNHCR reports that around 50,000 IDPs returned to
Diyala in
2009. But such progress is not yet consolidated,
and
shortages of jobs, housing, and essential services,
as well
as security concerns still loom as roadblocks.
Local
citizens in Diyala report that some Sunni families
who tried
to move back into Shi'a dominated areas such as
Khalis were
Qto move back into Shi'a dominated areas such as
Khalis were
threatened with violence that they believe is
condoned by
local Shi'a IP. For now, these incidents have
remained
isolated, but if they become more widespread and
the
perception of IP support grows--both real
possibilities--it
could spark wider violence from within the Sunni
community.
And in the event that Diyala Sunnis do resort to
arms in a
large numbers, it would heighten the risk of
similar actions
in neighboring provinces due to close tribal
connections.
- - - - - - - - -
ARAB-KURD TENSIONS
- - - - - - - - -
8. (C) Arab-Kurd tensions in the disputed internal
boundary
(DIBs) areas of Diyala could also reverberate in
the adjacent
Iraqi Kurdistan Region (IKR). While the majority of
the
Khanaqin area in northern Diyala may be Arab, Kurds
claim it
should be part of the IKR. (ref E). In a recent
meeting
with NEA A/S Feltman (ref F), Governor Mahdawi
noted that
tensions had improved in the DIBs area with the
involvement
of the Iraqi Army, but the situation was far from
stable.
Kurdish leaders in Khanaqin claim increased
tensions between
Arabs and Kurds are a result of intimidation from
ISF and
Ba'athist forces. On the Sunni side, some tribes in
the area
want to seek revenge for persecution at the hands
of
Peshmerga forces that controlled the area from 2003
to 2008.
This resentment continues to surface in the form of
assassinations, bombings, and other violence along
ethnic
lines, especially in areas such as Jalula and
Saadiya.
Moreover, this area continues to be used as a base
of
operations for Sunni insurgent groups such as
Naqshbandi
(JRTN) and, increasingly over the past six months,
pro-Ba'athist groups such as al-Awda and al-Hadba,
which are
now spreading into other parts of Diyala (ref C).
(NOTE:
While the extent of the pro-Ba'athist activities is
not
entirely clear, there is a real fear and perception
of a
Ba'athist resurgence. END NOTE).
9. (C) The ongoing struggle between the KRG and
central
government for control over the disputed areas in
Khanaqin
has also undermined the capacity of the local
civilian
leadership, especially with regards to financial
resources in
areas including Jalula and Saadiya (ref C). For
example,
when the PRT recently sought to provide support for
developing an education program in a disadvantaged
part of
Khanaqin, Assistant Governor for Technical Affairs
Ghadban
Taha Ismail asked why the provincial government
should fund
the effort, claiming "the KRG takes care of
Khanaqin." In
the end, the failure of central and provincial
authorities to
provide essential services has left communities
vulnerable to
other groups, including insurgents that could
exploit the
dissatisfaction to ignite ethnic tensions.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT ILL-PREPARED FOR CHALLENGES
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
10. (C) The provincial government continues to be
ill-prepared to address these challenges, due to a
lack of
administrative and technical capacity and weak
power dynamics
vis--vis the central government (ref F). Only
within the
past year has Diyala seen significant improvement
in the
security situation, and as such has not had the
chance to
develop a professional civil service with expertise
to
implement or execute a provincial development plan.
The
province remains woefully behind many others on
essential
services and governance. In addition, many members
of the
provincial government believe that the central
government is
systematically undermining their ability to provide
essential
services to their people by delaying the release of
budgetary
funds. A case of note for members of the Diyala
Provincial
Council is their July 2009 vote to terminate the
Diyala
Director General (DG) for the Administration of
Petroleum
Products for professional malfeasance. PC members
believe
that the central government's refusal to accept
their action
and remove the DG is a direct cchallenge to the
provincial
council's authority and illustrative of the central
government's sectarian bias, i.e. protecting the DG
of Oil
because of his close connections to ISCI and Iran
(ref G).
11. (C) In public statements and private
conversations with
PRToffs, a wide range of provincial officials
ranging from
Governor Mahdawi to PC officials and mayors cite
the ongoing
need for PRT guidance in order to promote stability
and
national unity and prevent the province from
slipping back
into sectarian turmoil. Hazim Serraj of the Iraqi
Red
Crescent, for example, recently appeared on Iraqi
TV praising
the PRT's work in creating jobs and promoting
national unity
by at the Aruba Market in Muqdadiya. Once one of
the largest
Qby at the Aruba Market in Muqdadiya. Once one of
the largest
Iraqi public markets outside of Baghdad, virtually
all
economic activity ceased in 2006-2007 as AQI and
Coalition
Forces battled for the market. But over the last
six months
the PRT has created a business development program
that has
helped over 500 shops reopen and create 2,000 jobs
(septel).
"The PRT has been instrumental in restoring life to
the
market and the city," Serraj said. "The program is
bringing
Sunnis and Shi'as back to the market to live and
work
together, and giving people hope for the future.
But we
cannot do it alone and need the PRT to help us
maintain this
progress." Diyala may not be the violent haven for
AQI and
like-minded groups that it was two years ago, but
the gains
made by the USG in helping to stabilize the area
are not yet
consolidated.
12. (C) COMMENT: Diyala's simmering ethnic and
sectarian
tensions make it fertile ground for various agents
of
instability, including Sunni insurgents, Ba'ath
elements, and
Iranian special groups units. Together with its
ethno-sectarian issues, Diyala's location between
Baghdad and
Iran, and along the fault line between the IKR and
the rest
of Iraq, make it strategically important to U.S.
interests in
Iraq. We will need to work for more equitable
treatment of
all groups in the province to help preclude the
possibility
that disenfranchised Sunnis will increasingly
revert to
violence as a means to redress their grievances,
potentially
sparking broader problems in adjacent provinces.
END COMMENT.
FORD