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(C) SUMMARY: The combination of Iraqi Council of
Representatives (COR) high profile questioning of senior
Iraqi security officials, including Prime Minister Nouri
al-Maliki, and Maliki's own public effort to coordinate
intelligence agencies is doing little to bolster Iraqi public
confidence in its national security and intelligence
institutions.

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O 221337Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5828
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
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Content
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003295

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/21/2019
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, KDEM, IZ
SUBJECT: DEC 8 BOMBINGS RESULT IN FINGER POINTING, NEW
INTEL COMMITTEE

REF: A. BAGHDAD 3183
B. BAGHDAD 3267
C. BAGHDAD 3193

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Robert S. Ford for reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d).

1. (C) SUMMARY: The combination of Iraqi Council of
Representatives (COR) high profile questioning of senior
Iraqi security officials, including Prime Minister Nouri
al-Maliki, and Maliki's own public effort to coordinate
intelligence agencies is doing little to bolster Iraqi public
confidence in its national security and intelligence
institutions. This public posturing resulted in the removal
of a senior Baghdad security official despite insider
acknowledgments that the removal is anticipated to have
little practical effect. Nevertheless, GOI resolve and
cohesion remain high, and the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) are
pressing onward at a newly ordered higher state of alert,
somewhat buoyed by recent recognition of its success in
disrupting a portion of the December 8 attacks. U.S.
officials continue to urge the GOI to refocus its public
message on calls for national unity and to cease its public
finger pointing. END SUMMARY.

Parliament Questions PM and Ministers
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

2. (C) Maliki endured a six-hour session of questioning on
security matters at the Council of Representatives (COR) on
December 10 (ref A). COR members complained about the lack
of a clear strategy to combat terrorism, the alleged presence
of Baathists in the security forces, and poor security
coordination in Baghdad between the Ministry of Interior
(MOI), the Ministry of Defense (MOD), and the Baghdad
Operations Command (BOC). Maliki held to a calm and
consistent defense of his administration's efforts to combat
terrorism but acknowledged that intelligence shortfalls are
the GOI's greatest weakness. (Note: COR Speaker Ayad
al-Samarrai reinforced this point December 15 to NEA A/S
Feltman, noting that weak Iraqi intelligence collection was a
contributing factor to recent security incidents (septel).
End note.) The PM underscored the limitations on his ability
to act given the nature of Iraq's consensual government, the
halting progress toward national unity, and limited budgetary
resources. Following the PM's presentation, the COR hosted
Minister of Defense Abd al-Qadir al-Mufriji, Minister of
Interior Bulani, Minister of State for National Security
Shirawn al-Waili, recently removed BOC Commanding General
Abud Qanbar and other security officials for questioning
December 12-14.

3. (C) In Parliament, Office of the Commander-in-Chief
(OCINC) Commanding General Faruq pressed for the removal of
key Defense Ministry individuals, while MPs encouraged Faruq
to transfer or replace security officials working along the
Iraq-Syria border. Bulani called for the BOC to be linked
directly to the Interior and Defense Ministries to improve
efficiency. (Note: The PM immediately named MOI Federal
Police Commander Lieutenant General Hussein al-Awadi as
deputy to the Baghdad Operations Center (BOC), in apparent
hopes of improving coordination between the BOC (which
reports to the PM and the MOD) and the MOI. End note.) The
Iraqi press reported that Defense Minister Abd al-Qadir
reminded the COR of the vast improvements in security since
he assumed his post in 2006, but admitted that the units who
responded to the early morning intelligence on December 8
Qresponded to the early morning intelligence on December 8
were possibly negligent.

4. (S/NF) Maliki has not called publicly for the removal of
Minister of Interior Bulani, but indicated privately he would
have no objection if the COR sought a vote of no confidence
in the beleaguered minister. USF-I sources corroborated this
report, adding that Maliki had joined forces with MP leaders
and the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq to scheme Bulani's
removal from his post. (Comment: The efforts have been
unsuccessful to date. Bulani is still the Minister and has
not been threatened with a vote of no confidence. Maliki and
Bulani have a contentious relationship that has been
exacerbated by political aspirations of both as well as
recent security incidents. End note.) One MOI source
reported that Bulani stormed out of a meeting with the PM
after the two officials had a heated exchange in the days
following the December 8 bombings.

BAGHDAD 00003295 002 OF 002

5. (C) Maliki emphasized the creation of a new intelligence
committee during his remarks to the COR, and on December 17
announced an intelligence rewards program (ref B). These
very public steps could discredit further the current
intelligence and security coordination mechanism. Post had
heard reports that OSI head al-Basri will be in charge of the
new intelligence coordination mechanism, with Minister of
State al-Waili as his possible deputy. Al-Waili,
nonetheless, told acting PolMil Couns on December 20 that he
heads the group with a two star military deputy. The
Political Council for National Security held a session
December 16 chaired by President Talabani. Maliki reportedly
used the session to outline his plans to combat terrorism.
Vice President Tariq al Hashemi told DCM and Pol M/C December
19 that Maliki and his poor security record were strongly
criticized within the PCNS. PCNS members roundly harangued
Maliki and his government for "failing to coordinate or seek
input." Recommendations were made by several sides but there
was no apparent decision for action, according to al Hashemi.
(Note: The PCNS is comprised of the Presidency Council, the
Prime Minister and two Deputy Prime Ministers, the Speaker of
the COR and heads of all major political blocs as a means for
the Iraqi political leadership to develop consensus and
bargain on key issues. End note.)

6. (S/NF) Another OCINC-led security related committee met
over the course of several days beginning on December 15, as
ordered by the Prime Minister. According to BOC Brigadier
General Wasifi, this committee includes participation from
every intelligence, security, federal police, Iraqi army, and
operations command headquarters in the country. The purpose
of this committee is to develop an operational needs
statement for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
systems.

BOC Commander Removed
- - - - - - - - - - -

7. (S/NF) Maliki dismissed the head of the BOC, General Abud
Qanbar, December 10, due to rumors that he had received
reports of possible attacks in the early morning of December
8. General Abud responded to these allegations in Parliament
with a well documented presentation claiming the he received
this information, but that it did not provide accurate,
actionable intelligence. The second-ranking official in the
Interior Ministry, the well-connected Deputy Minister
al-Asadi, told the DCM on December 12 that the PM had removed
General Abud to satisfy the political demand for action. He
doubted it would lead to much change in Baghdad security
operations. (Note: USF-I confirmed that they did pass
information to the BOC regarding potential bombings on
December 8, but agreed that it did not provide any insight
into specific details of the attacks. The information in the
report referred to a possible attack against the court
building in Karkh, with a vehicle-borne improvised explosive
device between 1830 and 2030 on December 8. End note.)
General Abud will retain his rank, and is currently serving
as an advisor to the new BOC Commanding General, Lieutenant
General Ahmed Hashem, formally the Deputy Chief of Staff for
Operations (DCoS OPS) at the Ministry of Defense. General
Abud told a BOC advisor that the PM plans to assign him as
the new DCoS OPS once he is satisfied that the transition to
Qthe new DCoS OPS once he is satisfied that the transition to
the new BOC Commander is complete.

8. (C) COMMENT: With an election date on the horizon, the
public appears to attribute political motives as much as
security strategy to the recent flourish of the COR's and
PM's public maneuvers. Maliki has staked his reputation on
security gains achieved in Iraq, and is likely cognizant of
the impact such security breaches could have on his State of
Law coalition in the upcoming national election. Recent
attacks have targeted Iraqi government facilities as opposed
to civilian targets such as markets and schools, which seems
intended to undermined the public's confidence in the GOI's
authority and ISF capabilities. It is worth noting that the
ISF is on higher readiness in Baghdad now and have scored
some successes against the December 8 attackers. We will
continue to urge Iraqi leaders in the government and the COR
alike to redouble their calls for national unity and resist
the finger pointing which could foster public cynicism in the
short term and damage to ISF credibility in public eyes if it
continues. END COMMENT.
FORD