Excerpt from document
(C) SUMMARY: A significant side-effect of the recent
election law crisis was the emergence of greater political
cooperation between some Sunni and ISCI Shia political
leaders. In mid-November, traditional Shia hard-liner and
ISCI/Badr bloc leader Hadi al-Amiri unexpectedly emerged as a
voice of moderation when he reached out to Sunni and Kurdish
leaders to propose an election law compromise (ultimately
accepted on December 6) that addressed the demands of all
three sectarian blocs.

Full Document
ClassificationSECRET//NOFORN Header
VZCZCXRO1668
RR RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #3175/01 3431801
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 091801Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5674
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0932
Content
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003175

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/08/2034
TAGS: PGOV, KDEM, IZ
SUBJECT: ELECTION LAW CRISIS FOSTERS SUNNI-SHIA COOPERATION

Classified By: Ambassador Christopher R. Hill for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (
d).

1. (C) SUMMARY: A significant side-effect of the recent
election law crisis was the emergence of greater political
cooperation between some Sunni and ISCI Shia political
leaders. In mid-November, traditional Shia hard-liner and
ISCI/Badr bloc leader Hadi al-Amiri unexpectedly emerged as a
voice of moderation when he reached out to Sunni and Kurdish
leaders to propose an election law compromise (ultimately
accepted on December 6) that addressed the demands of all
three sectarian blocs. At a dinner hosted by DPM Rafi
al-Issawi to celebrate the December 6 agreement, Issawi and
al-Amiri commented at length about how having to cooperate in
negotiations with the Kurds had helped foster greater
cooperation between some Sunni and Shia leaders. They
speculated that the newfound comity could mature into
political alliances in the course of forming a government
after the upcoming national elections. END COMMENT.

2. (C) Deputy PM Issawi, who helped lead the Sunni bloc's
participation in negotiations on an election law compromise,
hosted a victory dinner December 7 for U.S. and UN officials
who had helped bring about the deal. Throughout the evening,
comments by Iraqi interlocutors suggested that the deal
represented an essentially fair compromise whose terms would
not constitute a pretext for any of the major blocs to
boycott participation in the elections. Perhaps more
significant were the remarks by Issawi and ISCI/Badr bloc
leader Hadi al-Amiri regarding the nascent political
cooperation between their parties that emerged as a result of
their collaboration over the election law compromise. Two
weeks earlier, relations between Issawi and Amiri were
professional but strained as they heatedly negotiated
election law minutiae. By contrast, on the evening of
December 7, they sat together at dinner, joking about the
trials and tribulations of the process and reaffirming their
newfound friendship.

3. (S/NF) A leader of Shia armed resistance to Saddam and,
until the adoption of the constitution in 2005, coalition
forces, Amiri leads the Iranian-backed Badr Organization, a
constituent member of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq
(ISCI) umbrella party. Amiri is widely known to have played
a leading role in organizing attacks by the Badr Corps
militia (the strongest, most disciplined Shia militia at the
time and precursor to the current Badr Organization) against
Sunnis during the sectarian violence of 2004-2006. Sources
indicate that he may have personally ordered attacks on up to
2,000 Sunnis. One of his preferred methods of killing
allegedly involved using a power drill to pierce the skulls
of his adversaries. Given his role in sectarian violence and
prominent position in the dominant Shia coalition, it is
understandable that Sunni leaders were hesitant to view him
as a viable negotiating partner when he proposed a compromise
parliamentary seat distribution after the November 23
Shia-Kurd backed electoral amendment was adopted.

THE ENEMY OF MY ENEMY IS MY FRIEND
----------------------------------

4. (C) Issawi and Amiri suggested that the Kurds' prolonged
insistence on additional compensatory seats, which was viewed
as having been overly parochial, had prompted some Shia and
Sunni leaders to make common cause against the Kurds and
other hardliners (including Sunni VP al-Hashimi) as the
negotiations wore on. Issawi and Amiri agreed that they must
move beyond sectarian politics and went so far as to argue
Qmove beyond sectarian politics and went so far as to argue
for "Iraqi nationalism", vice Arab nationalism (which some
interpret to exclude the Kurds). Issawi noted that moderate
Kurdish leaders such as President Jalal Talabani and
Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) PM Barham Salih, who had
played critical roles in promoting national unity, had lost
influence after the July 2009 KRG elections to hardliners
like KRG President Masoud Barzani and, more worryingly, Iraqi
Kurdish Parliament Speaker Kamal Kirkuki. Issawi continued
that it was unfortunate that Barzani, who is a strong leader,
is now constrained by current KRG domestic politics in such a
way that his ability to compromise on national issues is
limited.

5. (C) With a second veto by VP Hashimi looming after the
November 23 amendment, Issawi and Amiri had spent several
days hashing out a seat distribution acceptable to both Arab
factions. They recognized that the Kurds insisted that they
preserve their current percentage of seats as a precondition
for any consensus agreement on an election law. Amiri had
previewed the emerging deal with Kurdistan Alliance List
(KAL) leader Fuad Masoum, then after formally presenting the
compromise to Massoum, Sunni and Shia leaders had pressured
the Kurds to accept. Amiri noted over dinner that he had

BAGHDAD 00003175 002 OF 002

spoken to Hashimi and former Iraqi PM Ayad Allawi (a secular
Shia) numerous times during the week leading up to the final
agreement on December 6. Issawi and Amiri confirmed that
despite their political differences (and, in some cases,
longstanding mutual enmity), leaders on both sides had been
compelled to work together to achieve a consensus agreement
that would allow the election law to withstand another
potential veto. Amiri commented that ISCI's leadership was
aware of his new relationship with Sunni political
heavyweights, and noted that it was something that
constituents in the Shia heartland would view with suspicion.

PROTRACTED NEGOTIATIONS LEAD TO MORE JUST LAW
---------------------------------------------

6. (C) Issawi and Amiri considered adoption of the election
law to be a particularly hard-won achievement given that the
Kurds threatened to boycott the elections after the
Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC) released the COR
seat distribution based on the November 8 election law
amendment. Similarly, Sunnis would have likely boycotted had
the Shia and Kurds simply overridden a potential Hashimi veto
of the November 23 amendment with a three-fifths absolute
majority in the COR. The compromise agreement allows the
parties to claim victory with their respective
constituencies; its terms are such that no one sectarian
group benefited unfairly.

7. (C) COMMENT: Given the existential issues (final
disposition of Kirkuk, disputes over shifting electoral
demographics) involved in the protracted negotiations,
consensus agreement on an election law and COR seat
distribution represents a significant political achievement
for Iraqi politics. The fact that it was achieved through a
joint effort by such seemingly incongruous political
bedfellows as Hadi al-Amiri and Rafi al-Issawi is promising.
Issue-based political alliances are not common in Iraq; the
fact that some Sunnis and Shia formed one in the final stages
of a contentious election law debate is an encouraging
indicator of a maturing political dynamic in Iraq. END
COMMENT.
HILL