(S/NF) Summary & Comment: GOI, KRG and U.S. senior
officials agreed on the text of a Northern Security
Initiative that would create a joint security architecture
for the disputed internal boundary (DIBs) areas in the
northern provinces of Ninewa, Kirkuk and Diyala. The plan
would bring select Iraqi, Kurdish and U.S. forces under the
rubric of a shared command-and-control structure and
establish joint checkpoints and patrols, an integrated
intelligence apparatus and Combined Coordination Centers
(CCCs) to direct the combined forces' activities in defined
Combined Security Areas (CSAs) within the DIBs areas.
Full Document
ClassificationSECRET//NOFORN Header
VZCZCXRO5029
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #2824/01 2931919
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 201919Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5170
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
Content
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002824
NOFORN
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/19/2034
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PTER, MARR, IZ
SUBJECT: INITIAL AGREEMENT ON NORTHERN SECURITY INITIATIVE
Classified By: A/DCM Gary A. Grappo for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (S/NF) Summary & Comment: GOI, KRG and U.S. senior
officials agreed on the text of a Northern Security
Initiative that would create a joint security architecture
for the disputed internal boundary (DIBs) areas in the
northern provinces of Ninewa, Kirkuk and Diyala. The plan
would bring select Iraqi, Kurdish and U.S. forces under the
rubric of a shared command-and-control structure and
establish joint checkpoints and patrols, an integrated
intelligence apparatus and Combined Coordination Centers
(CCCs) to direct the combined forces' activities in defined
Combined Security Areas (CSAs) within the DIBs areas.
Consistent with the Security Agreement, the U.S. role is
supervisory and advisory. Once the parties have generated a
timeline to establish the CCCs and lists of personnel to
staff them, the agreement will be forwarded to PM Maliki and
KRG President Barzani for approval. The establishment of
CCCs, joint checkpoints/patrols and integrated intelligence
is expected to move ahead quickly.
2. (S/NF) Summary & Comment (continued): Agreement on the
Northern Security Initiative at the ministerial level
represents an important step towards constituting a
potentially significant mechanism for mitigating tensions in
northern Iraq. The joint security architecture would help
close seams between Kurdish and IA-held territories in the
north that AQI and others have exploited to perpetrate
attacks against minorities in recent months, with the
apparent goal of fomenting ethno-sectarian discord. Perhaps
as importantly, it could help tamp down tension in areas like
Kirkuk and Ninewa, where Arab-Kurd political rivalries have
threatened to flare into violence. End summary & comment.
THIRD MINISTERIAL ON NORTHERN SECURITY INITIATIVE
3. (S/NF) The third Northern Security Initiative Ministerial
Summit was held on October 17 at the Ministry of Defense
(MOD) in Baghdad (list of participants at para 9). (Note: The
previous two ministerials were held on August 16 at al-Faw
Palace in Baghdad and on September 5 at the KRG's Ministry of
Interior (KMOI) in Erbil. End note.) The goal was to review
a proposed joint security architecture for the DIBs areas in
Ninewa, Kirkuk and Diyala provinces. (Note: The GOI's MOD
prefers the phrase "Areas of Joint Interest" to DIBs. End
note.) The joint security architecture would comprise the
following elements: 1) checkpoints jointly manned by Iraqi
Army (IA), Peshmerga and U.S. forces (USF); 2) joint
IA/Peshmerga/USF patrols; 3) the establishment of three CCCs
to support and direct the combined forces' activities, and;
4) steps to facilitate intelligence sharing between
constituent elements.
4. (S/NF) The three sides negotiated on the basis of a
statement of six principles agreed on at the September
meeting. They are: 1) security of the people is paramount;
2) unity of effort in the proposed joint security forces is
critical; 3) force levels must be adequate to secure each
province; 4) forces in each province should reflect the
demographic composition of that area; 5) intelligence
organizations must work for the federal and provincial
governments (not political parties), and; 6) all security
forces must operate within the rule of law.
PARTIES APPROVE THE PROPOSED JOINT SECURITY PLAN
5. (S/NF) The parties agreed on the proposal for the joint
Q5. (S/NF) The parties agreed on the proposal for the joint
security architecture, to include joint checkpoints/patrols
and integrated command and intelligence structures, and
achieved more specificity on the (temporary) U.S. supervisory
role than had previously obtained. The next steps are for
the IA, IP and Peshmerga to draw up lists of personnel to
staff the operations centers in each of the three provinces
and to establish a timeline for initiation of the CCCs. The
entire package - including the outline of the structure,
proposed personnel lists and timeline for CCCs - will then be
submitted to PM Maliki and KRG President Barzani for final
approval. In Ninewa and Diyala, a CCC will be established
within the existing Ninewa and Diyala Operations commands
(NOC and DOC, respectively). In Kirkuk, there was spirited
discussion about where the CCC should be sited. The GOI
Minister of Defense argued that it should be co-located with
the IA 12th division; the KMOI believed it should be located
at U.S. Forward Operating Base Warrior. A temporary site
will be used through the upcoming elections; construction of
a new Kirkuk Operations Center would commence in the interim.
QUICK EXECUTIVE APPROVAL EXPECTED, BUT NOT ASSURED
BAGHDAD 00002824 002 OF 002
6. (S/NF) It is expected that the joint security plan will
quickly be approved by Maliki and Barzani so operations in
designated CSAs in the run-up to the election can take place
under the rubric of the Northern Security Initiative.
(Comment: However, Iraq is in the throes of a national
election season and final approval may be subject to
political pressures. End comment.) Consistent with the
Security Agreement, the U.S. role is supervisory and
advisory. The initial phase of the plan would last through
the elections and seating of a new government, and would
consist of establishing the three CCCs, integrating
intelligence functions and establishing joint checkpoints and
patrols. There was agreement that any movement of forces
within the DIBs areas would have to be authorized at the
Ministry level in the respective capitals. (Note: Discrete
combined operations in the CSAs - vice movements of troop
concentrations - would only need to be approved by the CCCs.
End note.)
POSITIVE ATMOSPHERICS AUGUR WELL
7. (S/NF) There was a great deal of uncertainty as to how GOI
Minister of Defense Abdul Qadir would approach the joint
security proposal, but he came well-briefed and prepared to
move the matter forward. Abdul Qadir stressed the importance
of elevating current levels of coordination between the
respective GOI and KRG ministries, increasing the number of
liaison officers within the military and police forces at the
governate level and at the ministry buildings in the
respective capitals. The parties not only reached agreement
on the proposal, but negotiated in good faith around several
issues that easily could have disrupted the proceedings.
Following the ministerial, KMOI Sinjari told the Ambassador's
Senior Advisor for Northern Iraq the agreement represented an
important achievement, expressed optimism that it would be
quickly implemented and thought it would positively transform
"the security atmosphere" across the DIBs. He was careful to
caution against overly high expectations, though.
BUT OUTREACH EFFORTS WILL BE IMPORTANT
8. (S/NF) Despite apparent goodwill at the national level,
there are fears within Arab and Turkoman communities in the
north that implementation of the plan could legitimize the
presence of Peshmerga in contested areas. The initiative
experienced turbulence in August/September, when PM Maliki
seemed to hesitate to take ownership of it in the face of
protests by Kirkuki Arabs and Turkomans. Those voices are
likely to be heard again when the approved plan is announced;
it remains to be seen whether the PM will be more resolute in
endorsing it this time around. Similarly, while the Kurds
strongly support the initiative, they are motivated more by a
desire to cooperate closely with U.S. forces than by prospect
of integrating their forces with IA or Iraqi Police elements.
We will need to engage concerned parties to assure them that
the purpose of the plan is to protect the Iraqi people and
prevent extremist elements from using violence to disrupt the
upcoming national elections. The plan represents the first
stage of a process to build confidence between forces as they
move toward developing a more permanent security solution in
the DIBs areas. The process of engaging communities in the
north to ensure their buy-in for the security plan will be
important.
9. (C) Principal participants in the October 17 summit were:
Q9. (C) Principal participants in the October 17 summit were:
U.S.: MNF-I Commanding General (CG) Ray Odierno; Lieutenant
General Mike Barbero, MNSTC-I CG; Major General JD Johnson,
MNC-I Commander; Major General Bob Caslen, MND-N Commander;
Brigadier General Joe Anderson, MNF-I Chief of Staff, and;
the Ambassador's Senior Advisor for Northern Iraq, Alan
Misenheimer.
Iraq: GOI Minister of Defense Abdul Qadir Mohammed Jassim,
GOI Minister of Interior Jawad al-Bolani; GOI JFGQ DCOS Ops
LTG Hashim; GOI Federal Police General al-Awadi; GOI IGFC
sGeneral Ali Ghedan; GOI MOD Spokesman Major General Al
Askri;
KRG: KRG Minister of Peshmerga Affairs Jafar Mustafa Ali
(Sheikh Jafar); KRG Minister of Interior, Abdul Karim
Sinjari; KRG Deputy Minister of Peshmerga Affairs, LTG
Sherwan Ali Abdulrahman, and; KRG Minister of Interior
Advisor, MG Hama Sa,ed.
10. (U) This message was cleared by MNF-I.
FORD