(S/NF) SUMMARY: Embassy seeks to develop with the
Government of Iraq (GOI) a Man-Portable Air Defense Systems
Reduction Program (MANPADS Program). The program would
follow a "host-country model", used in Yemen and Pakistan,
through which Post would partner with GOI and use Department
funds to pay rewards for the surrender of MANPADS outside of
GOI control, after verifying the authenticity and disposal of
the weapons.
Full Document
ClassificationSECRET//NOFORN Header
VZCZCXRO7731
PP RUEHSD RUEHC
DE RUEHGB #2736/01 2841421
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 111421Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5027
INFO RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY 2274
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 0661
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY 0010
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 0086
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0083
RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH PRIORITY 0268
RUEHYN/AMEMBASSY SANAA PRIORITY 0028
RULSDMK/DEPT OF TRANSPORTATION WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHDIR/RPO DUBAI PRIORITY 0087
Content
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 002736
NOFORN
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR NEA, NEA/I, PM, PM/I, PM/WRA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2029
TAGS: AF, IR, IZ, PARM, PGOV, PINR, PK, PREL, PTER, XD, XF,
YM, ZR
SUBJECT: POST PROPOSES SHOULDER-FIRED MISSILE ABATEMENT
PROGRAM FOR IRAQ (MANPADS REDUCTION)
BAGHDAD 00002736 001.2 OF 003
Classified By: Pol-Mil Minister-Counselor Cameron Munter for reasons 1.
4 b-d
1. (U) This is an action request. Please see paragraph 9.
2. (S/NF) SUMMARY: Embassy seeks to develop with the
Government of Iraq (GOI) a Man-Portable Air Defense Systems
Reduction Program (MANPADS Program). The program would
follow a "host-country model", used in Yemen and Pakistan,
through which Post would partner with GOI and use Department
funds to pay rewards for the surrender of MANPADS outside of
GOI control, after verifying the authenticity and disposal of
the weapons. Post wishes to support the safe conduct of
civilian and military flights in Iraq by enhancing air space
security, and mitigating the MANPADS threat is a critical
step. The Iraq MANPADS Program implemented through the GOI
would seek to reduce the number of MANPADS in Iraq that are
held by non-state actors. This cable proposes a course of
action that would advance that Mission objective and requests
support from the Department on the proposed approach. END
SUMMARY.
NEED FOR THE PROGRAM
--------------------
3. (S/NF) Regional Security Office (RSO) at Post conducted a
Threat Assessment Study of Baghdad International Airport
(BIAP) in September 2009. While the assessment suggests
surface-to-air missiles, particularly MANPADS, remain a
prevailing threat to aircraft flying into and out of BIAP, it
rated the overall threat level for MANPADS against civil
aviation as low. This is due, in part, to the fact that
several hundred aircraft have flown into and out of BIAP over
the past five years with no reported MANPADS incidents.
4. (S/NF) Although the rate of MANPADS attacks has declined,
there could be a large number of MANPADS systems held in
storage throughout Iraq. MNF-I reported that it made 17
MANPADS-related recoveries (mostly batteries and other parts)
since 2008 as part of ongoing operations to recover weapons
caches. There have been 200 incidents of MANPADS being used
in Iraq since 2003, but there were only 8 MANPADS attacks
against military targets in 2008. The Iraq MANPADS Program
would simultaneously help diminish the threat and improve our
information if it enables more MANPADS to be recovered for
exploitation by IC experts.
PROPOSED MODEL
--------------
5. (S/NF) Department's Weapons Removal and Abatement Office
(PM/WRA) has developed substantial experience running black
market acquisition programs through host nations' internal
security forces. PM/WRA currently manages black market
acquisition programs in three countries: Afghanistan,
Pakistan, and Yemen. Of those, the governments of Pakistan
and Yemen implement the programs through their internal
security infrastructure. In these cases, PM/WRA provides
funding and oversight, and the U.S. Embassies manage the
host-nation relationship, disperse payments to the host
governments, and verify destruction of acquired systems. In
the Iraqi context, it might make sense to work with the MOD,
but MOI and other departments would either have to be
Qbut MOI and other departments would either have to be
involved or made aware to prevent internal disputes. In
consultation with PM/WRA, a model for the preferred option is
below.
PROGRAM OUTLINE
---------------
6. (S/NF) The Embassy's Political-Military Affairs Section
(Pol-Mil) would engage GOI interlocutors in order to develop
a USG plan whereby Iraqi officials collect black market
MANPADS, and U.S. military or intelligence officials then
confirm the possession and destruction of the weapons. This
BAGHDAD 00002736 002.3 OF 003
paragraph outlines the roles that each section and office
would play in the proposed program.
-- Pol-Mil would manage our relationships with the GOI
partners.
-- PM/WRA would fund and oversee the program, and Pol-Mil
would manage its implementation at Post.
-- Pol-Mil would also facilitate delivering funds to the GOI
partnering agency that administers the program and pays
individuals who surrender MANPADS.
-- Officials in the Office of Regional Affairs have indicated
willingness to lend experts to the process of verifying that
the surrendered items are actual MANPADS weapons or weapons
parts, and in verifying that they have been rendered inert.
PROPOSED COURSE OF ACTION AND TIME FRAME
-----------------------------------------
7. (S/NF) With prior PM/WRA support for the initiative, Post
would take the steps that this paragraph outlines as the
proposed course of action.
October - November, 2009:
-- Pol-Mil engages GOI interlocutors in the Iraqi national
security architecture (such as National Security Council or
Prime Minister's National Operations Command) in order to
identify an acceptable GOI body (presumably MOI, MOD or both)
that would partner with the USG to collect MANPADS and
administer the program.
-- Pol-Mil works directly with PM/WRA in laying out the scope
and operational details. PM/WRA would provide guidance on
how MANPADS programs in other countries function within our
embassies.
December, 2009:
-- Pol-Mil would engage the preferred GOI partner to
establish an official channel to surrender MANPADS, laying
out the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that would allow it
to happen. Pol-Mil would request the GOI partners to ensure
that it had achieved "buy-in" with other parts of the
government to prevent conflict or turf battles.
-- As the Iraqi Parliamentary elections approach in January,
Pol-Mil will assess the sustainability of the program within
the Iraqi government and ensure that the MOD, MOI, and the
national security architecture have sufficient awareness and
offer sufficient institutional support to permit the program
to survive political vicissitudes.
January, 2010:
-- Launch the program with initial meetings and signings of
relevant MOUs.
February, 2010:
-- Start the program with an awareness campaign, regular
meetings, and finalize operational details.
March, 2010:
-- The host-country program becomes operational, and
host-country takes over operations with Pol-Mil support.
ADDRESSING CONCERNS: POTENTIAL RISKS, SHORTCOMINGS
--------------------------------------------- -----
8. (S/NF) Working through IC partners, PM/WRA's review of
available analyses suggests that incentive-based efforts to
remove MANPADS from the Iraqi black-market are unlikely to
draw missiles into Iraq because:
1) Iraq likely already has a comparative glut of MANPADS.
The IC assesses that more than 2,000 missiles and a smaller
QThe IC assesses that more than 2,000 missiles and a smaller
BAGHDAD 00002736 003.3 OF 003
number of gripstock launchers remain errant from the former
Saddam Hussein-era stockpile, giving Iraq potentially the
heaviest existing distribution of black-market MANPADS in any
country today.
2) Iraq's neighbors have relatively tight control of their
MANPADS stockpiles. Jordan, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey
are assessed to have adequate control of their own MANPADS
stocks, making them unlikely sources of weapons flow into
Iraq by arms traffickers.
3) Existing evidence of MANPADS exploited by the IC indicate
Iraqi or Iranian origin. The Iraqi weapons are pre-existing
and the Iranian systems are supplied for political reasons,
not for profit, and therefore not drawn by black market
considerations. Assessments from Post's analysts support
this conclusion.
REQUEST
-------
9. (S/NF) Post requests Department support for this plan
through a program funded and overseen by PM/WRA. Post
welcomes PM/WRA input on the program outline, course of
action, and timeline detailed above.
10. (U) Point of contact for this program until May 1, 2010
will be Ben Reames at ReamesBN@state.gov and
ReamesBN@state.sgov.gov or by phone at 1-240-553-0581 (x2683).
HILL