Excerpt from document
(S) Summary. Progress under the Security Agreement (SA)
has improved from the early days when a fist fight broke out
between two Iraqi generals. The USG and GOI have worked
through the SA,s joint subcommittees (JSCs) to sort through
alleged "violations" at the working level, rarely needing
high level involvement. The two overarching committees that
oversee the 12 JSCs are marked by the different approaches of
their Iraqi co-chairs, Minister of Defense Abd al-Qadr
al-Mufriji and Minister of Interior Jawad al-Bulani.

Full Document
ClassificationSECRET//NOFORN Header
VZCZCXRO4367
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #1987/01 2040800
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 230800Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4043
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC//NSC// PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
Content
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 BAGHDAD 001987

SIPDIS
NOFORN

NEA/I FOR BETTS, NSC FOR VROOMAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/23/2019
TAGS: PREL, IZ, MARR, KTIA, EAIR, PGOV, MASS
SUBJECT: PROGRESS CONTINUES ON SECURITY AGREEMENT
IMPLEMENTATION

Classified By: Charge d'Affairs Robert S. Ford for reasons 1.4 (b) & (d
)

1. (S) Summary. Progress under the Security Agreement (SA)
has improved from the early days when a fist fight broke out
between two Iraqi generals. The USG and GOI have worked
through the SA,s joint subcommittees (JSCs) to sort through
alleged "violations" at the working level, rarely needing
high level involvement. The two overarching committees that
oversee the 12 JSCs are marked by the different approaches of
their Iraqi co-chairs, Minister of Defense Abd al-Qadr
al-Mufriji and Minister of Interior Jawad al-Bulani. Gradual
Green Zone transition has preserved US security interests,
and is marked by Iraqi commitment to emulate U.S. standards
and agreement to continued presence of U.S. military advisors
at each checkpoint. The PM's office has used the process to
control the disposition of bases being turned over by the
coalition--forestalling the MOD,s desire to take all the
bases. The JSCs have also focused on a range of other issues
to include frequency returns, and import and export issues
(including air/seaport improvements). The JSC on detainees
has reflected GOI desires for slow release of detainees,
which we must balance with domestic pressures from Sunni
groups to increase releases. There has been no pressure from
the GOI on defining purposely ambiguous jurisdictional
issues. Additionally, the GOI has grudgingly accepted the
two-year statute of limitations that the Foreign Claims Act
dictates for third party claims against the USG. End summary.
----------------------------------------
Committee Structures Generally Effective
----------------------------------------

2. (C) The SA provides for two overarching committees, the
Joint Military Operations Coordination Committee (JMOCC) and
the Joint Committee (JC), to oversee SA implementation. The
JMOCC and its four joint subcommittees (JSCs) deal with
issues that are primarily military, and the JC and its eight
JSCs handle issues that have a military connection but are
less directly related to U.S. military operations. (Note: A
top-level body, the Joint Ministerial Committee (JMC), which
would include PM al-Maliki and the U.S Secretaries of State
and Defense, has not met, and no JMC meetings are
contemplated currently. End note). The JMOCC has met five
times (most recently on July 16) and the JC three (most
recently on June 11, though the body agreed to meet quarterly
moving forward), where USG and GOI principals lauded progress
on SA implementation and the amount of issues resolved at the
JSC level), but in practice these bodies have served as
progress review panels; most progress occurs in the JSCs and
through direct USG interaction with GOI officials.

-----------------------------
MOTL: High-Profile JSC
Serves as the JMOCC Workhorse
-----------------------------

3. (S) The work of the Military Operations, Training and
Logistics (MOTL) JSC leads the agenda for the JMOCC. We have
successfully steered the MOTL away from MOD pressure to
discuss operational issues such as the June 30 "combat troops
out of the cities" plan (elevating this dialogue to the
senior policy level); instead, MNC-I and Iraqi Military and
National Police commanders concentrate on:

-- establishing a Joint Liaison Cell, to provide a
centralized point of contact for issues related to the SA
Implementation Committee process, pass requests for U.S.
QImplementation Committee process, pass requests for U.S.
forces combat support to the appropriate authority,
facilitate the submission of SA complaints involving combat
operations that could potentially be a violation of the SA,
track those complaints and facilitate the provision of
response at the lowest possible level;
-- contributing to a Joint Security Assessment Study that
details security threats, Iraqi Security Forces (ISF)
readiness and capabilities, and measures to mitigate
capability gaps in advance of the June 30 deadline;
-- discussing training needs and programs, including the
fielding of new small arms (M16 and M4) and mortars as
additional training and accountability measures are
implemented;
-- looking at ISF supply and service systems and logistics
sustainment, including automation, decentralization and
delegation of logistics decision-making, and advance
logistics requirements planning; and
-- using the MOTL as a venue for U.S. and Iraqi commanders
to brief the current disposition of their forces, current
security operations, and pending base transfers.

BAGHDAD 00001987 002 OF 005

4. (S) ISF senior commanders at the JSC MOTL have generally
avoided unhelpful rhetoric in response to negative incidents,
such as the highly-publicized U.S. raid in al-Kut in April
that was characterized by the press as a unilateral,
uncoordinated raid that resulted in the death of innocent
civilians. ISF commanders do not avoid addressing the
incidents however, and early in the process presented lists
of "violations" directly to the MNF-I CG. Iraqi commanders
have now agreed to review alleged military operations
violations jointly and privately in existing structures
without resorting to unilateral "monitoring groups."
Additionally, an operations subcommittee was created in the
MOTL to address any unresolved investigations of alleged
"violations."

-------------------------------------
IZ Security: Central Issue of Concern
for GOI and Diplomatic Community
-------------------------------------

5. (C) The Green Zone Security JSC has met fifteen times and
has made the most progress of any JSC. ISF have the security
lead at all IZ perimeter checkpoints, and, with continuing
U.S. mentoring, are conducting professional inspections of
thousands of vehicles and pedestrians crossing IZ access
controls daily. Contrary to local cultural norms which
regard dogs as unclean, Iraqi security personnel have also
enthusiastically employed patrol and detector dogs. The JSC
is currently focusing on contracts for IZ badges and
maintenance of security equipment.

6. (C) IZ road openings, a major symbol of positive change
in Baghdad, commenced with opening of the "sunken highway" on
June 30, allowing freeway travel from Jumhuriya Bridge to the
airport highway, and reducing cross-city transit times and
congestion. Future planned openings will include the July 14
Expressway (expected after Parliamentary elections in January
2010).

-------------------------------
Vehicles, Vessels, and Aircraft
-------------------------------

7. (C) The Vehicles, Vessels and Aircraft Movement JSC is
currently focused on only two issues: DOD exclusive flights
and license plate regulations. US military flights and
"exclusive contract" flights are exempt from landing and
parking fees. Other flights that may be under contract to DoD
but do not fit the narrow definition DoD uses for exclusive
are charged the fees. This issue appears to be resolved but
other charges for ground handling of cargo are on the
subcommittee agenda. The issue of license plates remains
unresolved, partially due to a lack of GOI participation,
though contacts at the MOI have been identified and now seem
eager to begin work.

-------------------------------
Provincial Stability Assessment
-------------------------------

8. (C) The JSC for Provincial Stability Assessment is the
successor to the pre-Security Agreement committee that prior
to 2009 covered transfer of provinces to Provincial Iraqi
Control (a concept that lost relevance with the signing of
the SA). The JSC conducts comprehensive assessments of the
factors affecting stability in each province, including
economic, security, judicial, environmental, governance,
Iraqi Security Forces readiness and threat issues. The JSC
chairs are discussing the possibility of shifting the
committee from under the SA umbrella to that of the Strategic
Framework Agreement (SFA), as the issue is not covered under
the SA and the committee,s status is more a gesture to GOI
Qthe SA and the committee,s status is more a gesture to GOI
unilateral planning.

----------------------------------------
Detainees: GOI Favors "Go Slow" Approach
----------------------------------------

9. (S/NF) The Detainee JSC is attended on the U.S. side by
MNF-I Chief of Staff MG Swan, and Task Force-134(MNF-I's
detainee operations unit) Commander BG Quantock and on the
Iraqi side by MG Ayden (Deputy Minister of Interior), as well
as MG Adb al-Kadeem Jasim (MOI Legal Committee), MG Munim
Saaid (General Director of Criminal Evidence), and MG Dhiya
Haseen Sahi (General Director of Criminal Investigations).
The positive relationship between MG Swan and MG Ayden has

BAGHDAD 00001987 003 OF 005

helped the JSC navigate the GOI desires for slow release of
detainees, which must be balanced with domestic pressures
from Sunni groups to increase releases. The names of all
detainees scheduled for release and their case files are
submitted to the GOI via JSC members in advance. For
low-threat detainees, the GOI has one month after receiving
the summary case file to either produce a warrant or
designate a detainee a Person of Interest (POI). TF-134
expects approximately 750 releases and 250 transfers per
month to remain constant for the next few months. There is
support from the GOI for the U.S. "Blue Cell" criminal
investigative effort to build substantive cases against high
threat (red) detainees.

10. (S/NF) Since January, 3890 current detainees have been
released with 840 transferred to Iraqi custody. The GOI has
issued warrants for all Third Country National (TCN)
detainees. As of the end of June, 42 TCNs had been
transferred, with 91 remaining in US custody. The U.S. has
provided 15,043 detainees electronic fingerprint files to the
GOI. MNF-I will begin releasing medium-threat (amber)
detainees without warrants o/a September 1. Few released
detainees have returned to violence; reports of recidivism
are anecdotal, and do not represent an overall trend.

----------------------------------------
Agreed Areas and Facilities: Base
Handovers Continue, GOI Capacity Growing
----------------------------------------

11. (C) MNF-I, MNC-I and Embassy staff meet regularly with a
small GOI group, led by PM al-Maliki's Chief of Staff Dr.
Tariq Abdullah, to work out facility handover or closing
modalities, guaranteeing inventory of valuable property on
the bases and transferring them in a systemic fashion.
Inclusion of the PM's office works to "referee"
inter-Ministry disputes over ownership and control of the
facilities. One sticking point had been the MOD,s desire to
take ownership of all bases being returned to the GOI. PM
al-Maliki named the Receivership Committee to take ownership
in order to mitigate the MOD,s land grabs and power plays
over the MOI and other ministries. The JSC has agreed that
MNF-I and MNC-I will conduct paper transfers of facilities
and areas to the real estate officials under Dr. Tariq
Abdullah. The JSC provided the GOI with List II of Agreed
Facilities and Areas on June 29 2009, the day before the
deadline for U.S. combat forces to be out of cities, villages
and localities. In total, the USG has returned 101 agreed
facilities and areas as of June 29, and List II includes 357
agreed facilities and areas, including 28 that were returned
previously to the GOI but have U.S. forces as tenants to
assist ISF in training and advisory roles. Of the 357
facilities, 107 are under USG control, while the other 250
are controlled jointly.

--------------------------------------
Claims: GOI Agrees to Defer Discussion
--------------------------------------

12. (S) The Claims JSC has met twice. The GOI has
grudgingly accepted the two-year statute of limitations that
the Foreign Claims Act dictates for third party claims
against the USG. Per the SA, U.S. claims law governs Iraqi
claims, but the U.S. considers Iraqi investigations and
statements in adjudicating cases. At the last meeting, the
chief of client services from MNC-I educated the GOI members
about the claims process for meritorious third party claims.
They agreed to meet informally to facilitate understanding
QThey agreed to meet informally to facilitate understanding
about the claims process and claims that the various GOI
ministers have received from Iraqi citizens. There are not
any terms or open issues to implement and the committee may
not have to meet frequently. The JC discussed the operations
of 24 claims processing centers set up throughout Iraq, and
the USG provided contact information to the GOI to pass to
the Iraqi public for each center.

------------------------------------------
Entry/Exit: Technical Discussions Continue
------------------------------------------

13. (C) As per Article 14 of the SA, the Entry/Exit JSC is
currently discussing lists of names for U.S. forces and DoD
personnel as described in the Security Agreement. The GOI is
planning to station an immigration officer on the military
side of Baghdad International Airport (BIAP), which may allow
for quicker processing of most passports and staff (but may
complicate entry for certain third-country national

BAGHDAD 00001987 004 OF 005

staff--this issue is being worked by the Management Section),
once the GOI has the infrastructure and personnel in place.
The JSC is also discussing the placement of a GOI immigration
official at Sather Air Base as a pilot program.

----------------------------------------
Imports/Exports/Mail: Progress Continues
Despite Bureaucratic Glitches
----------------------------------------

14. (C) The Import, Export and Mail JSC meets infrequently,
generally just to manage disputes. There have been
working-level discussions on inspection of official cargo
containers at ports of entry, and access to support
activities services (such as AAFES or MWR services) by Iraqis
and non-USG entities. The JSC has recently engaged in
discussions between MNF-I and Ministry of Transportation
officials on cargo delays in the port of Umm Qasr, and
facilitating negotiations with courier service providers such
as DHL. The GOI also submitted a list to the JSC of
prohibited items for imports, including items such as
toothpaste and pasta. The USG has made it clear that the
list is unacceptable and needs to be re-examined before it is
even considered by the JSC. Due to the recent resignation
and arrest of former Minister of Trade al-Sudani, the GOI has
yet to name a new JSC co-chair and PM al-Maliki has
temporarily assumed responsibility for trade issues--but has
not consulted the JSC.

----------------------------------
Jurisdiction: Plans for the Future
----------------------------------

15. (S) The Jurisdiction JSC has met once. There has been
no pressure from the GOI on defining purposely ambiguous
jurisdictional issues. In the future, the subcommittee will
work to refine jurisdictional arrangements and procedural
processes. JSC participants are currently focused on
establishing procedures for the committee, and the mechanisms
to address jurisdictional issues.

--------------------
Frequency Management
--------------------

16. (S/NF) The Frequency Management JSC is working to
gradually turn over management of frequency bands, one band
at a time, when the GOI has the capability to manage each
band. Co-Chairs Minister of Communications Faruq Abd
al-Rahman and BG Brundidge briefed the JC on June 11 that 50
percent of High Frequency (HF) bands were allocated to the
GOI, and 47 percent more of Very High Frequency (VHF) bands
were given to the GOI on July 8, giving them a total of 88.7
percent control of VHF bands. While CPA Order 65 directed
the Iraqi Communications and Media Commission (CMC--the Iraqi
version of the U.S. Federal Communications Commission) to
control frequency bands, the CMC is a technical agency with
less political weight than the Ministry of Communications,
which also wants to control the electromagnetic spectrum.
The JSC has created a working group to review potential
handovers, frequency by frequency, and starting with lower
frequency bands first, to ensure that the appropriate GOI
actors can manage frequencies without harming critical MNF-I
or Embassy systems performance. The GOI occasionally
expresses a desire to move faster on frequency handovers, but
has backed off plans for distribution of frequencies for
commercial use, instead focusing on security and emergency
frequency needs. MNF-I foresees the need to maintain U.S.
management of some portions of high-frequency bands to ensure
operational capabilities are not degraded. (Note: The Embassy
Qoperational capabilities are not degraded. (Note: The Embassy
received an MFA request for a list of all communications and
encryption equipment. Post is considering sending a list of
radios but will not send a list of encrypted
radios/encryption equipment. End note).

----------------------------------
Surveillance and Airspace Control:
Closing Iraqi Capacity Gaps
----------------------------------

17. (C) The Surveillance and Airspace Control JSC has been
working to coordinate Iraqi airspace control
capacity-building and implement the airspace transition plan
signed by State, the U.S. Air Force, and the GOI in December
2008. The subcommittee is currently focused on critical air
traffic control (ATC) system support and training, to allow
Iraq to fully resume safe control of all its airspace. The

BAGHDAD 00001987 005 OF 005

Iraqi airport and air traffic system currently receives ATC
services and training through a State-funded contract, which
was slated to end, absent Iraqi funding for renewal, in
late-June. At the JC on June 11, the Minister of
Transportation announced that the contract renewals had been
signed that day, and that the JSC is awaiting the release of
funds by the Minister of Finance. The GOI had promised to
provide funding to renew the contracts, but until the JC, the
Iraqi Transportation Minister had declined to sign the
contract renewals, putting Iraq's ATC system at risk.
Embassy Baghdad has signed an agreement with the GOI that
obligates GOI to provide DoS with $9,000,000 (US) for
continued services under the existing DoS contract. DOS has
applied $600,000 in bridge funding to the contract which will
be repaid when the funding is received by the GOI. If GOI
funding is not received by the end of July the contract
services will be terminated. Such a termination would likely
cause significant political fallout in Iraq as they would not
be able to provide ATC services in their airspace. Embassy
Baghdad's Transportation Attache office is working to resolve
the issue.
FORD