Excerpt from document summary
(C) Charge met December 15 with the pro-Abdallahi senator
of Mbout in Gorgol Province, Youssouf Tijani Sylla, who
renewed his October warning (REFTEL) that Afro-Mauritanians
were prepared to take up arms against the coup. Sylla, who
is half White Moor and half Sonnike who presents himself as a
champion of Black Moor Haratines and Afro-Mauritanians.

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Content
S E C R E T NOUAKCHOTT 000739

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/17/2013
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, ASEC, MR
SUBJECT: RISK OF ETHNIC-BASED ARMED RESISTANCE?

REF: NOUAKCHOTT 582

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Dennis Hankins for reasons 1.4 (b and
d)

1. (C) Charge met December 15 with the pro-Abdallahi senator
of Mbout in Gorgol Province, Youssouf Tijani Sylla, who
renewed his October warning (REFTEL) that Afro-Mauritanians
were prepared to take up arms against the coup. Sylla, who
is half White Moor and half Sonnike who presents himself as a
champion of Black Moor Haratines and Afro-Mauritanians.
Sylla told Charge, "we are prepared to wait six months (i.e.
until early February) and, if the military is still in power,
we will take up arms." He confidently said an armed uprising
would be quick and effective saying, "this isn't a real army.
Once two shots are fired they'll hide their weapons, take
off their uniforms, and run away." Sylla said he had already
met with the Malians and would meet with the Algerian
ambassador later in the day and that he was confident those
countries would support an armed uprising. Sylla, who in
October said he was in contact with FLAM in Senegal, said he
could not count on Senegalese support because of President
Wade's apparent acceptance of the coup.

2. (C) As in October, Charge firmly told Sylla the U.S. did
not support any idea of armed resistance. Sylla's concept
that an uprising would be fast and effective seemed a fantasy
-- particularly if largely White Moor military leaders saw
this as a black versus white conflict. Charge ran through
the various international, domestic and economic pressures on
the regime that made the departure of Aziz a real
possibility. Even if Aziz stays on, Charge warned that a
strategy to remove him based on violence was fraught with
risks and uncertainty -- risks that could end up in a
situation far worse than before.

3. (S) Comment: The two meetings with Sylla are the only
two open indications of any possible planning for
ethnic-based armed resistance. We sent a Mission delegation
for a week-long run through the largely Afro-Mauritanian
provinces along the Senegal River looking for signs of
bubbling ethnic tensions and found none. That said, there
are clear baathist sentiments among many of the junta's
leaders that would tend to shift Mauritania back to a
strongly pro-Arab identify from the "Arab / African
Crossroads" image advocated by Abdallahi. Reporting in other
channels has suggested the delivery of at least one shipment
of small arms to FNDD militants. While potentially
significant, we have too few data points at present to judge
this a serious short-term risk. End Comment.
HANKINS