Excerpt from document summary
(C) General Aziz, accompanied by his Director of Cabinet,
Cheyakh Ould Ely, and Presidential Diplomatic and Security
Advisor, Ould Michel, received visiting AF DAS Todd Moss and
DoD Principal Director for African Affairs, Michael Dumont as
well as Ambassador and DATT. DAS Moss underscored that the
objectives of his visit were to insure that the junta
understood the USG's position, that it was a whole of
government position, and to explore possibilities for the
resolution of the crisis.

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Content
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 NOUAKCHOTT 000439

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/17/2018
TAGS: PREL, MR
SUBJECT: SITREP 10 - VISIT OF U.S. ENVOYS TO MAURITANIA

Classified By: Ambassador Mark M. Boulware

--------------------------------------------- ---------------
DAS MOSS MEETING WITH GENERAL AZIZ
--------------------------------------------- ---------------

1. (C) General Aziz, accompanied by his Director of Cabinet,
Cheyakh Ould Ely, and Presidential Diplomatic and Security
Advisor, Ould Michel, received visiting AF DAS Todd Moss and
DoD Principal Director for African Affairs, Michael Dumont as
well as Ambassador and DATT. DAS Moss underscored that the
objectives of his visit were to insure that the junta
understood the USG's position, that it was a whole of
government position, and to explore possibilities for the
resolution of the crisis. Moss noted that the US and the
broader international community's considered Mauritanian
democracy not only intrinsically positive but also as an
important example for the rest of Africa and the Arab world.
He said that assessment resulted not only in broad goodwill
but into the significant financial support pledged at the
Paris Consultative Group meeting last December. Observing
that while USG assistance was relatively modest, several
initiatives were underway that would likely have led to
several hundreds of millions of dollars of military and
development assistance.

2. (C) DAS Moss reiterated that the USG could not accept a
military coup both for reasons of principle and US law. He
noted that 2008 was nothing like 2005, that Africa was moving
on and the era of coups was over. Underscoring the urgent
need to find a solution, he said that little time remained
before the current suspension of assistance became formal and
final. He assured General Aziz that the USG did not want to
see Mauritania isolated from the international community and
did not want to see a window of opportunity opened for Al
Qaeda. He expressed his hope that we could explore some next
steps that would necessarily include the liberation and
restoration of President Abdallahi and an honorable
arrangement for the Mauritanian military. He stressed the
USG's comprehension of the importance of the military as an
institution and as a partner. Moss lamented the fact that
our strong military cooperation was now in jeopardy and would
necessarily be curtailed if constitutional order was not
quickly restored.

3. (C) Expressing thanks for the USG's interest, Aziz
insisted that what happened in Mauritania was not a coup. He
accused President Abdallahi variously of corruption (citing
specifically Transparency International's ranking),
incompetence, authoritarianism, loss of political support,
including Islamists and communists in government,
indifference to national security, and creating government
paralysis and political deadlock. He condemned both the form
and substance of President Abdallahi's decree dismissing the
military leadership calling it an illegal order that
threatened to spark violence. He said that four-fifths of
parliamentarians wanted to bring Abdallahi to trial and that
the "reality of Mauritania" was that Abdallahi was flatly
rejected by the people. Aziz said that our military
relationship was important and that it was he, not Abdallahi,
who had strengthened it. As only the "executive" was touched
by this move, the military relationship could continue.

4. (C) DAS Moss observed that democracy was a messy process,
not always highly efficient and that even established
democracies faced similar challenges. He said that what
mistakes President Abdallahi and his administration might
have made, this removal and arrest were even bigger mistakes
and the international coup not help but consider this a coup.
He stated that our bilateral relations had been strong not
because of President Abdallahi personally but because
Mauritania was a democracy and they could not remain the same
under these circumstances. An immediate first step was to
restore democracy and that none of the alleged problems he
cited could justify the coup. He repeated that broad
international goodwill, international support, and the
military relationship with the US were now all very much at

NOUAKCHOTT 00000439 002 OF 006

risk.

5. (C) Reiterating the solidarity between the US, France, the
EU and the AU, Moss urged Aziz to "talk to us about a way out
of this crisis." He opined that there must be some way to
restore President Abdallahi and to address military concerns
and also to engage with a willing international community to
address Mauritania's many problems including corruption.
Moss said that a good place to start and a gesture of
seriousness would be to allow him to visit Abdallahi before
leaving Nouakchott and that he was would rearrange his
schedule to accomplish that, if permitted. Noting the
personal interest on the US side of the President, Secretary
Rice and Deputy Secretary Negroponte, such a gesture could be
"an important signal."

6. (C) Asked to contribute a Department of Defense
perspective, Principal Director Michael Dumont noted that,
speaking as a former military officer and a lawyer, anytime
an elected leader was removed and arrested by the military
that constituted a coup d'etat He noted that the coup
created a stain on the military's honor that the Department
of Defense could not overlook and that only General Aziz
could remove.

7. (C) Aziz reiterated his thanks for USG concern, indicated
that he "understood" our position and would seek to maintain
a dialogue. He regretted, however, that "internal security"
concerns precluded visiting President Abdallahi at this time.

8. (C) Comment: General Aziz, seen dressed for the first
time since the coup in a business suit, was visibly
uncomfortable and laid out his litany of accusations against
Abdallahi in a less orderly and polished manner than he had
when receiving previous demarches. Although he seemed to
hesitate somewhat when DAS Moss first raised the possibility
of visiting Abdallahi, in the end he refused, leaving us with
virtually no starting point for the dialogue he professes to
welcome.

--------------------------------------------- --------------
MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER WAGHEF
--------------------------------------------- --------------

9. (C) Deputy Assistant Secretary Todd Moss and DOD
Principal Director for Africa Michael Dumont, accompanied by
Ambassador, met August 15 with Prime Minister Yahya Ould el
Waghef, President of the National Assembly Boukheir and
President of the Economic and Social Council Ahmed Ould Sidi
Baba at the Prime Minister's private residence.

10. (C) The Prime Minister described a situation of
"impossible pressure" being exerted by the military junta on
the Mauritanian people and its political leaders. We noted
that both the Presidents of the National Assembly and Senate
were being threatened with investigations for alleged
mismanagement and corruption if they did not side with the
junta and added he himself had been threatened if he did not
join in the investiture of the "new" Prime Minister Laghdaf
and side with the junta -- which he has, of course, refused.
The Prime Minister noted that "only a few" can withstand the
pressure and added that the junta is controlling the media as
a 24 hour barrage of pro-coup propaganda. He opined that
average Mauritanians, after decades of succeeding coups, were
disheartened and tended to offer little resistance to the
coup since they saw such efforts as futile.

11. (C) Waghef saw the response to this coup as "the one
chance for Mauritania and Africa" to once and finally break
the practice of governmental change by force. He said that
if we yield to the coup again -- led by the same leaders of
the coup of 2005 " there would be no chance for real
democracy in Mauritania." He said "the coup MUST fail" for,
if it fails, no military leader with ever try again in
Mauritania -- perhaps not in the region. He cautioned not to
accept any discussion of "new elections" since that would
only legitimize the coup. Waghef called for rapid targeted

NOUAKCHOTT 00000439 003 OF 006

sanctions against the military putschists and their civilian
collaborators and for a firm position of the international
community to cease "all possible contact" with the junta. We
also called for the Security Council to take strong action
against to putsch. Waghef also urged that the international
response not be limited to freezing development assistance,
but stopping military cooperation as well indicating this was
a measure that would concern Aziz more. He suggested he was
particularly concerned about the French position on military
cooperation.

12. (C) President of the National Assembly Boukheir said the
military had taken power in a completely unconstitutional
manner and was attempting to manipulate the national assembly
to legitimize its actions. He argued that the transition
process for legislative elections had been manipulated by the
military just for this eventuality. Of the 95 seats in the
Assembly, 50 had been filled with "independents" financed by
the military. He dismissed arguments of a two-thirds
majority of the parliament being in favor of the coup saying
that any parliamentarian who willingly abandons his
commitment to the constitution loses their legitimacy and is
no better than the putchists. Boukheir said he had refused
to cooperate with the military in their efforts to manipulate
the parliament telling them, "if you're going to stage a
coup, you might as well dissolve parliament and the political
parties as well." Boukheir noted the first decree of the
High State of Council not only overturns the presidency, but
exerts the right to over-rule the parliament should their
efforts at parliamentary manipulation fail. He added that if
the coup succeeds, there can be no chance for democracy.

13. (C) Ahmed Ould Sidi Baba dismissed General Aziz as one
lacking "the education, intelligence or experience" to head
the military -- much less the country and asserted that the
idiocy of the current situation is that it stems from this
one individual to accept a legal order dismissing him. Sidi
Baba argued the past 16 months of democracy had seen a
flourishing of liberty and the beginning of international
investment interest ) all of which was at stake now because
Aziz was trying to make himself a "new Emperor Bokassa."
Sidi Baba asserted 80 to 85 percent of the population opposes
the coup though few have the courage to say so openly.

14. (C) Sidi Baba said the situation of the country was
extremely fragile and that, if the crisis was not resolved
within weeks, it would be the Mauritania people who would
suffer. He added that the only person who could negotiate a
resolution was Abdallahi himself since neither he, the Prime
Minister, nor the President's of the Senate and National
Assembly had the constitutional legitimacy to do so. Sidi
Baba called on the U.N. to try the putschists as they have
those guilty of genocide.

15. (C) Deputy Assistant Secretary Moss assured the
Mauritanians of a firm U.S. position based on:

(a) Complete repudiation of the coup,
(b) Demands for the immediate release and restoration of
President Abdallahi,
(c) A commitment in this visit to tell the junta this coup
will not stand,
(d) The rejection of the junta's calls for &new8 elections,
and,
(e) The continued suspension of assistance which, if the coup
is not reversed very rapidly, will become permanent with the
funds going elsewhere.

Moss said the U.S. would stick to this position as a matter
of principle, as a reflection of our hopes for Mauritania,
and as a matter of U.S. law. He said his goal was to
convince General Aziz that he could not recreate the coup of
2005. The time of coups in Africa is done as we are seeing
to the strong response of the U.S., France, the E.U., the
A.U. and even of Algeria and Saudi Arabia. Moss added that
any political negotiation must necessarily start with
President Abdallahi back in the Presidency (Moss repeatedly

NOUAKCHOTT 00000439 004 OF 006

returned to these points in subsequent meetings and during
his August 15 press conference). Ambassador highlighted that
the participation of the Defense Department's Mr. Dumont in
the delegation was to convince General Aziz that there would
be no "under-the-table" arrangement placing security
cooperation above our priority for the restoration of
democracy.

---------------------------------
Meeting with Ould Daddah
---------------------------------

16. (SBU) Deputy Assistant Secretary Moss, Principal Director
Dumont along with the Ambassador, DCM and PAO met with the
formal leader of the opposition (a ministerial-ranked
position in Mauritania) Ahmed Ould Daddah (RFD) along with
several other party members at RFD party headquarters in
Nouakchott.

17. (C) Daddah presented his party as the foundation of
resistance to the military since the creation of the movement
in October 1991. Daddah's father, Moktar Ould Daddah was
Mauritania's first head-of state ruling from November 1960 to
April 1979 -- spending his last two years, following a 1978
coup, as head of the "Military Committee for National
Recovery." Daddah reiterated his view of the evolution of
the conflict and stated both his political opposition to the
coup but also his opposition to reinstating President
Abdallahi. He recognized that the coup as the natural
teleological end to a government led by a president who had
lost his legitimacy for two principle reasons: 1) not having
been democratically elected (in that he was propped up by the
military which had rigged the voting) and 2) throughout his
presidency he failed to establish good governance that would
help him gain legitimacy. He indicated that he had put
conditions forward to the military for the next steps;
however, did not go into detail on what such criteria were.
He also frankly and forthrightly stated that from their
perspective, everything was negotiable except for the return
of President Abdallahi to power and offered himself as an
interlocutor in any future negotiations.

18. (C) Daddah, as is prone to do as an avid intellectual and
thinker, used esoteric quotes to illustrate his philosophy in
invoking Latin maxims and Voltaire. One of Pascal's Pensees
made while overlooking the Pyrenees mountains separating
Spain and France summed up his view of the coup and its
fallout: "What is truth on one side (of the Pyrenees) is
error (a lie) on the other." Ergo, what the United States
and the international community saw in Abdallahi, a symbol of
democracy in its youth and promise, was perceived entirely
differently in Mauritania. That, he believes is the crux of
the impasse between Mauritanians and the international
community currently. In a society that has lost faith in the
rule of law, security, and leadership, democracy has lost
meaning. While the international community remains attached
to this false notion of democracy, Mauritanian politicians
see themselves as elected parliamentarians as potentially
helping to find a solution -- since they are the last remnant
of democracy that has not yet eroded. One member of the
party noted that historically legitimacy exists only when
three conditions are met: 1) the law is on one's side, 2)
the performance of one's government is on your side and 3)
the national consensus is on one's side. President
Abdallahi, having lost all of the three aforementioned
criteria, had, in effect, become illegitimate.

19. (C) DAS Moss provided Daddah with the U.S. position as
noted in Para 15. He stressed that the U.S. response was a
function of law as well as policy and that no
"interpretation" of the coup as something else could turn
back the clock. He repeated that the return of President
Abdallahi was a necessary requirement for any future
arrangements that might help Mauritania move forward -- and
stressed that any arrangement that derived from the military
structure put in place was not viable.
------------------------------------

NOUAKCHOTT 00000439 005 OF 006

Meeting with Parliamentarians
------------------------------------

20. (C) The U.S. delegation met with 12 members of
Parliament, senators and deputies, 2 women among them. As
DCM had met with several earlier in the week, much of the
same sentiment was echoed in this meeting. Unfortunately,
most of the time was co-opted by one parliamentarian who
reiterated his viewpoint on the evolution of the coup, the
same story repeated time and again. That parliamentarian was
cut off by his colleagues when he became abuse and began to
rant against American "threats." Absent from the discourse
was concrete steps to move forward, and ideas for the US and
international community to work with them on resolving the
current impasse. Again, the bottom line of the
parliamentarians remained that, while they are not in favor
of coup d'etat on principle and are in favor of democracy,
they saw President Abdallahi as blocking the democratic
process that might have reined in what they saw as his
abuses. For them, the coup was the only way out to restore
democracy. They are looking towards the international
community to help them develop democracy, the Mauritanian
way. They highlighted again that international precepts of
what democracy is cannot be transposed on the Mauritanian
situation, as it is distinct, and, as such, distinctly
complex. Mauritania is weak and young and plagued by
problems that the West cannot understand. Within this
specific context, they see the military as one of the three
key elements in Mauritanian society. Their concern remains
to be Mauritania, and if the international community is in
discord, they still believe they must do what is right for
the country, money aside. Not all of the parliamentarians
shared such a hard line and potentially isolationist
approach, others thanked the U.S. for having been a
historical friend and for working together currently to find
resolution to the impasse. Several noted that they will be
the first to protest if the military steers away from its
commitment to restore democracy "soon."

-----------------------------
Meeting with Diplomats
-----------------------------

21. (C) The U.S. Delegation met separately with French
Ambassador Vandepoorter and later, over lunch, with the
French, German, Spanish, EU and UNDP representatives to brief
them on the U.S. position, provide a readout of the earlier
meeting with General Aziz, and hear their views on the
situation. The French Ambassador spelled out what he saw as
the current military tactic. From their perspective, they
believe they are establishing constitutionality. With the
return of the parliament for a special session to start
August 28, the military will secure an organic law granting
legislative blessing for the High State Council and the
constitutional amendments established by the Council. He
expected that Aziz would release Abdallahi once the
parliament has conferred "legitimacy" -- releasing Abdallahi
as a private citizen once there is a "legitimate" president,
prime minister, and legislature. The diplomatic corps agreed
that a legislative outcome under military control could not
be seen as credible.

22. (C) XXX told DAS Moss that he
personally saw President Abdallahi as fatally flawed. There
was just enough substance to corruption charges (at least
against his wife) to seriously tarnish Abdallahi's
reputation. He said any thought of Abdallahi coming to
complete his presidential mandate was "unrealistic." At
best, he saw Abdallahi as returning but temporarily as part
of a negotiated package deal that would include his
resignation. Over lunch, the remainder of the diplomatic
corps was equally ambivalent over Abdallahi's political
future although they agreed on the principle of having to
return to a constitutional "save point" from which some
political deal could be arranged. Several Ambassadors noted
that this coup had, until now, followed the normal bloodless
tradition of past successful coups. They agreed that this

NOUAKCHOTT 00000439 006 OF 006

was not running as past coups in that there was substantial
internal opposition and a firm international rejection. They
worried that, if the situation remains unresolved for some
time, there was significant risk of violence whether from a
second coup, a forceful crackdown by the junta, social
unrest, or opportunism by either Al Qaeda or transnational
criminals who would profit from a destabilized Mauritania.
XXX noted his concern that the most ardent
supporters of Aziz tended to be White Moors while
Abdallahi,'s strongest public base was Afro-Mauritanian --
running the risk of social violence along racial lines.

-----------------------------
PRESS CONFERENCE
----------------------------

23. (U) Prior to his departure, DAS Moss held a press
conference outlining the U.S. position pre Para 15. The
conference included some 20 journalists include
representatives of Al Jezeera and Al Arabiya TV -- the most
heavily watched Arab-language networks in Mauritania.
National television broadcast parts of Moss, statement in
its first French news broadcast but dropped it from later
French and Arabic editions. Al Jezeera repeatedly showed
Moss, comments ensuring that most Mauritanian elites clearly
heard the U.S. position. At least one local paper provided a
verbatim transcript of the press conference.

-----------------
COMMENT
-----------------

24. (C) DAS Moss' visit succeeded in impressing upon the
junta and all political leanings that U.S. resistance to the
coup is firm. DOD participation in the trip was particularly
effective in dissuading General Aziz from believing that the
U.S. public stance might have a back door based on security
cooperation. General Aziz did not fold and that was not
expected. Now put on notice, we believe Aziz will feel even
more boxed in than before. Our goal is to push him to look
for an exit strategy.

25. (U) DAS Moss did not have the opportunity to review this
cable prior to his departure.
Boulware