Excerpt from document summary
(C) Ambassador received a message from Presidential
protocol the afternoon of August 9, inviting him to meet with
individually with General Aziz. Once US and EU Ambassadors
determined that General Aziz preferred meeting with us
individually rather than to receive the joint demarche, the
ambassadors agreed that each would attend the meeting, hear
what the General had to say

Full Document

O 110947Z AUG 08
FM AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7471
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Content
C O N F I D E N T I A L NOUAKCHOTT 000421

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/10/2018
TAGS: PREL, ASEC, CASC, EAID, MR
SUBJECT: SITREP 6: COUP IN MAURITANIA

Classified By: Ambassador Mark M. Boulware for reasons 1.4 (b and d)

---------------------------------------------
Saturday Demarches on General Aziz
---------------------------------------------

1. (C) Ambassador received a message from Presidential
protocol the afternoon of August 9, inviting him to meet with
individually with General Aziz. Once US and EU Ambassadors
determined that General Aziz preferred meeting with us
individually rather than to receive the joint demarche, the
ambassadors agreed that each would attend the meeting, hear
what the General had to say, reiterate our respective general
national positions of condemnation and decline to discuss the
situation more concretely until we were able to deliver our
joint demarche.

2. (C) Ambassador Boulware was received at 5:30 pm just after
the French Ambassador. President Abdallahi's protocol staff
appeared intact and the Ambassador was initially received by
holdover Chief of Staff of the Presidency Cheyakh Ould Ely.
General Aziz received the Ambassador in President Abdallahi's
ceremonial office and launched into the now well-rehearsed
litany of Abdallahi's supposed incompetence, corruption,
abuse of power and neglect of national security. He
indicated that he had proof that President Abdallahi had
personally authorized bribes to members of the national
Assembly to keep them in his PNDD/ADIL party (note: previous
assertions of corruption had focused on Abdallahi's family
and associates). He claimed that President Abdallahi had
illegally abused his authority by refusing to accept the
National Assembly's petition for a special session on the
grounds that it was signed by the Vice-President rather than
the President of the Assembly. Conversely Aziz claimed that
Abdallahi's own decree firing the military leadership was
illegal in that he had not routed it through the Minister
Secretary General of the Presidency, the "only legal means
for issuing a decree." Not dismissing the officers in person
and in the presence of the Minister of Defense also made the
firings fatally flawed.

3. (C) Ambassador Boulware noted Secretary Rice's strong
condemnation of the coup, recalled the views he expressed in
his initial conversation with Aziz and observed that the
same strong message had been passed along through the
Mauritanian Embassy in Washington. As had been agreed with
EU Ambassadors, Ambassador Boulware urged that the group be
received as soon as possible to receive our collective
demarche. Aziz indicated that he "understood" the position of
the US and the EU. He said further that President Abdallahi
was well taken care of and being seen by his personal
physician and asserted that he wished no harm come to anyone.

4. (C) The French Ambassador confirmed that other
appointments had followed the same lines and that Aziz had
assured him that he agreed in principle to receive he group
the following day. Although no journalists were present,
Ambassadors were photographed and filmed entering the
Presidency and seated with General Aziz. Firms clips were
shown on Mauritanian television newscasts simply noting the
meetings had taken place and captioned photos, without
commentary, were published in the official press.

----------------------------
Sunday Joint Demarche
----------------------------

5. (C) On the afternoon of August 10, Ambassador Boulware and
UNDP Resident Representative Ribeiro joined with French
Ambassador Vandepoorter, as leader of an EU group (including
Spanish Ambassador Polanco and German Ambassador Schanz and
the acting head of the EU Commission) in a joint demarche on
General Aziz. Ambassador Vandepoorter noting broad
international support made the agreed upon demarche. He
emphasized international condemnation, the release of
President Abdallahi along with access to him, the rejection
of unilaterally organized presidential elections, and a
return to constitutional order. He urged that the General
consider the very negative impact of the coup on Mauritania's
image and the potential for the country to be isolated from
the international community. Ambassador Boulware underscored
that the USG associated itself completely with the demarche
and each of its elements, urging that the junta take quick
action in the hopes that our current suspension of assistance
not become definitive.

6. (C) General Aziz repeated yet again the now standard
string of grievances that he had articulated to Ambassador
Boulware during their individual meeting yesterday. He
insisted that President Abdallahi had brought the coup on
himself through his actions, omissions and excesses. He
emphasized even more the highly irregular late-night measures
undertaken by the President--at the residence, not even in
the office and much less through any official chain--to fire
the complete military leadership and to replace them with men
who were incapable of leading their command and who very
attempt to do so could have provoked "catastrophe." Aziz
claimed that the junta had not sought power but that faced
with emergent and very dangerous circumstances took the
"decision that seemed best" for the country. He said that
he understood the condemnation and that a coup was by nature
condemnable, but also warned that condemnations gave aid and
comfort to those who had "another agenda." The French
Ambassador urged an end to extra-constitutional rule that was
not good for the country and noted that Mauritania's friends
were ready to help to find a way out of the current crisis.
The Spanish Ambassador urged that the junta better articulate
its intentions as the basis of a possible dialogue. In
concluding the exchange Ambassador Vandepoorter again urged
"concrete acts" upon the General recommending, in particular,
freeing President Abdallahi immediately. Aziz promised to
continue to keep the door open for dialogue.

7. (C) Comment: Aziz was clearly less at ease and more
defensive in the group setting. International pressure is
clearly having some impact on him and his description of the
coup as a course that "seemed best" at the time might
indicate some tentative second thoughts. The articulation of
a strong common position is a very positive development but
we continue to believe that international pressure would work
best if complemented by the engagement of a well placed,
friendly interlocutor who might actively help the Generals
think out an exit strategy. At present, it is clear that
they have little at all in the way of a strategy and are
continuing to improvise.

--------------
The Envoys
--------------

8. (c) Representatives of the Maghreb Arab Union, the Arab
League, the African Union and the United Nations have all
visited Mauritania in he past few days. While the African
Union and UN have taken a hard line relative to the coup, the
Arab organizations have left the country with public remarks
stating they were reassured after meeting with General Aziz
that Mauritania remains on the path of stability and
democracy. Aziz met Saturday morning with Arab League Deputy
Secretary General Ahmed Ben Hilli who, like Secretary General
of Maghreb Arab Union Lehbib Ben Yahya on Thursday, made
tepid statements highlighting the assurances General Aziz had
provided for an early return to democracy. Statements by UN
Special Representative for West Africa Said Djinnit took a
tougher line in public comments raising the international
community's rejection of the coup while offering good offices
to re-establish democratic government. Ambassador met
evening of August 9 with Djinnit after his meeting with Aziz.
Djinnit noted the strong reaction of the international
community but noted the U.N. works more slowly than the AU
which had quickly taken firm action to what Djinnit termed
"the continuation of the same (2005) coup." Djinnit
indicated he was working closely with the AU and, responding
to the weaker positions taken by the Arab League, said his
experience with the Arab League when the AU suspended
Commoros was that the Arab League will follow the AU lead if
somewhat reluctantly.

-------------------------------------------
The Case of Ahmed Ould Sidi Baba
-------------------------------------------

9. (C) DCM met August 9 with Mohedyn Ould Sidi Baba, son of
detained President of the three-week old Economic and Social
Council Ahmed Ould Sidi Baba. The younger Sidi Baba, who has
been perhaps the Mission's most important working-level
contact as Director for Cooperation in the Ministry of
Finance and Economy, sought Embassy assistance in obtaining
information concerning his father.

10. (C) The Father: Ahmed Ould Sidi Baba is a long-term
behind the scenes politician for decades. He has been a
friend of President Abdallahi since the 1950's and, according
to his son, is one of Adballahi's few friends who can say
"you are an idiot" to his face. According to the son, there
is no logical political reason for his father to be arrested
since the father held no position of authority or influence
-- rather, the arrest was a punishment for political
opposition to Aziz. Reportedly, the elder Sidi Baba stood at
a large political confab early in the political crisis
leading to the collapse of the first Waghef government to
say, "This is bull, we all know the crisis is all because of
the generals. It is time for the President to start acting
like one and stand up to them." The message was reportedly
passed to Sidi Baba the same night that Aziz saw this as a
"declaration of war" to which Sidi Baba said essentially
"bring it on." President Abdallahi's decision to name Ahmed
Ould Sidi Baba to the Economic and Social Council on July 23
was seen by Aziz as a direct affront according to the son.
Talking to his father between President Abadallah's
announcement sacking the generals and his own arrest, Ahmed
Ould Sidi Baba said, "Abdallahi is an idiot. He knows
nothing about the security forces and has no idea how they
will react." Since his arrest, Ahmed Ould Sidi Baba has had
no verbal contact with his family although messages have been
transmitted asking for clothes, medicine and reading
material. 68-year-old Sidi Baba is said to be in good health
needing only eye drops on a regular basis. He reportedly cut
his hand prior to being arrested for which the family sent
anti-tetanus medication.

11. (C) The Son: Mohedyn Ould Sidi Baba has been a vital
player in building Mauritania's relations with the IMF, World
Bank and donors. His tireless work was instrumental to
Mauritania's consideration for the MCC and re-establishing
confidence with the IMF. The appointment of new Economy and
Finance Minister Sidi Ould Tah, who Sidi Baba termed "one of
the generals' ministers," was already indicating his exit as
the Minister had termed him "a liability." Sidi Baba was
already being by bypassed and expected to be fired. He noted
that former Minister Vezzaz, "was scared -- he tried playing
both sides and failed." Sidi Baba noted that his father's
political position always drew attention to him and that the
Deputy Secretary General (General Ghazwani's first cousin)
constantly scrutinized his work to find something to catch
him on. Sidi Baba predicted he would be arrested soon for
tying to pursue his father's case. Indeed, a room-mate from
his hometown showed up at the cafe where DCM and Sidi Baba
were meeting 5 minutes after the meeting started and
immediately assumed a "minder" position nearby. Sidi Baba
said it was no coincidence.

12. (C) The Political Situation: Sidi Baba did not see the
coup as a surprise saying the generals had been planning
something for months. He noted, however, that Abdallahi's
decision to fire the generals (something his father said
should have and could have been done during Abdallahi's early
honeymoon period) had caught them off guard and had forced an
immediate coup by force versus the longer-term
"constitutional coup" they had been trying to put together
where, after some show investigations for corruption, would
have led to impeachment. Sidi Baba noted that while
Abdallahi may have underestimated Aziz's reaction, the coup
was not going well for Aziz. He cautioned the U.S. not to
see the lack of mass protests as a sign of public
indifference noting that, unlike past coups, there were - in
fact - some counter demonstrations and, more importantly,
significant public opposition by key political leaders, civil
society and elites. He noted that several minister had said
they would resign and that a number of governors and regional
military commanders had refused to recognize Aziz's
authority. Sidi Baba also said Aziz had misjudged his
international support saying Aziz had told the military
hierarchy recently that "France and the U.S. support me"
pointing to an extended trip he made to France and the
then-pending visit of a number of U.S. generals under NDU's
Capstone program. The strong negative French and U.S.
reaction, then, was a surprise. Sidi Baba noted that French
President Sarkozy's reference to holding the coup leaders
"personally responsible" could be very effective since both

Aziz and Ghazwany have a significant personal assets -- he
indicated both had profited handsomely in the sale of a
cellular phone license to Sudan's SUDATEL that resulted in
the Chinguetel cellular phone network. (Comment -- In a
subsequent call, Sidi Baba noted his deputy Secretary General
(Ghazwany's cousin) had called asking what the French might
be talking about with "personal responsibility." Sidi Baba
outlined the types of travel bans and asset seizures that had
been used in other situations and told DCM the possibility of
personal sanctions had caused significant concern among the
coup leadership. End comment.) Sidi Baba noted that while
western and AU response to the coup has been strong, the Arab
response is weak. Morocco is seen by Sidi Baba as, at least,
complicit in the coup. Sidi Baba sees Col. Vall as "the man
behind the generals" suggesting Aziz and Ghazwany may still
be getting their orders from him. Sidi Baba indicated Vall
has reportedly ended his intensive English course in Ireland
and is now consulting with the Moroccans. Sidi Baba is not
overly optimistic of a political turn-around, but stressed
that Aziz has not pulled off an easy success. Continued
strong criticism from abroad with internal passive resistance
may, in his view, force Aziz to look for an out. Exile in
Morocco could be an option but is not viable unless and until
Aziz (and perhaps the Moroccans) see the coup as a failure.

-------------------
Other Reactions
-------------------

13. (SBU) President of National Assembly denounces coup: In
an August 10 press conference, President of the National
Assembly Messoud Ould Boulkheir refused to recognize the new
High State Council saying it was widely condemned and
anti-constitutional. He rejected any effort to amend the
constitution to legitimize a relationship between the
National Assembly and the High State Council and declared
that President Abdallahi was the only legitimate president
and that there could be no solution to the crisis without
freeing him. Boulkheir rejected any new presidential
elections as illegal and a clear breach of constitution.
(Comment: Boulkheir's statement poses perhaps the most
difficult challenge to Aziz who is desperately seeking a way
to establish a veneer of legitimacy for the coup. Having
pledged not to interfere with the parliament -- he now faces
a substantial roadblock. End comment.)

14. (C) Provincial Reactions: A quick roundup of political
leaders outside of Nouakchott highlights deep-set, albeit
non-vocal, opposition to the coup. Pro-coup rallies have
been reported throughout the country with little to no overt
opposition outside of Nouakchott. Comments by prominent
provincial leaders include:

Mayor of Boghe: Ba Adama Moussa (Pular). The coup of August
6 is unacceptable, because "it will open doors to countless
other military coups."

Mokhtar Thiout (Wolof leader), President of development
association in Trarza. General Aziz is "the best student
of Taya." "All the progress made on slavery and on the
solution of the Afro Mauritanian issues, will be blocked."

Idoumou Ould Kharchi (White Moor), a businessman in Aioun.
Investors will leave Mauritania, at least during the
transition period, "and that we don,t know how long that
transition will be."

Sid,Ahmed Ould H,Meymed (White Moor), Mayor of Atar. The
country is in trouble. Knowing Aziz very well and his
capabilities, "He can,t do any positive things for
Mauritania."

Mohamed O. Allali (White Moor), Mayor of Oualata. What
happened on August 6 will show to Mauritanians that all the
seeming progress seen after the coup of August 2005 was an
illusion. "The military will never leave power."

Moham Vall Ould Youssouf (Black Moor leader), Deputy Director
of SOCOGIM (state house building company based in
Nouakchott): "No matter who is elected as President in
coming elections, if elections will be organized, no-one,
inside or outside the country, will believe that the winner
is the real president."

-----
EAC
-----

15. (C) The EAC met morning of August 10 to review the
security situation which remains peaceful. The EAC noted the
French had issues a consular warning urging French citizens
to defer travel to Mauritania; however, absent any incidents
of violence ) particularly violence directed against
foreigners ) the EAC saw the French guidance as driven by
policy considerations rather than a worsening security
situation. The EAC saw no need for any change to Mission's
current security posture or guidance to American citizens.
Boulware