Full Document
VZCZCXYZ0034
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHLB #0408 0791530
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 191530Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1333
INFO RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 4331
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 1292
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 3697
RUEHNC/AMEMBASSY NICOSIA IMMEDIATE 3124
RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH IMMEDIATE 3431
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 1327
Content
S E C R E T BEIRUT 000408

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

STATE FOR DS/CC; DS/DSS/ITA, DS/IP/NEA; NEA/EX

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/19/2018
TAGS: ASEC, PTER, LE
SUBJECT: BEIRUT CORE EAC MEETING MARCH 18, 2008

Classified By: CDA Michele Sison for reason 1.4(d)

1.(S) At 1430 hours of March 18, 2008, Charge Sison convened
a meeting of the Core Emergency Action Committee (EAC).
Present were CDA, RSO, POL, DAO, CONS and RAO.

2. (S) The Core EAC met to discuss additional concepts being
considered to augment the security practices for Embassy
personnel unofficial movements off compound. The Core EAC
agreed to adopt a proposal that would allow Embassy personnel
to travel to a variety of locations within the greater Beirut
vicinity on unofficial moves while simultanously attempting
to increase the randomness in tavel patterns of Embassy
personnel. Embassy motorcades will now be permitted to
travel for unofficial purposes in established geographic
zones, selected at random by RSO on a weekly basis. All
travel will continue to be done with armed Embassy bodyguards
in armored vehicles. As stated in previous EAC cables, when
conducting unofficial moves no more than three Americans will
be permitted in one vehicle and no more than six Americans
will be allowed in one location at the same time.
Limitations on numbers of personnel in one location for
official movements remain subject to review based upon the
diplomatic initiative being advanced. An all hands country
team meeting was held on 3/19 to provide information to
Embassy personnel, and Embassy employees are being cautioned
to utilize stringent operational security practices in
discussions regarding this policy.

3. (S) Also under review by the Core EAC was a policy that
limited the arrival of US military aircraft to Beirut
International Airport (BIA) to the hours of darkness. In
light of recent threat reporting against US naval vessels in
the region, specifically the USS Cole, it was agreed that the
policy would remain in effect until May 15 when the policy
would again be reviewed.

4. (S) The EAC also reviewed the broader topic of travel of
all personnel on commercial airlines through BIA. RSO
strongly recommended that as an additional security measure,
movement to and from BIA was best conducted during the hours
of darkness. Limitations in the number of flights to and
from BIA might limit the application of this procedure, but
all permanent personnel were to be advised of this scheduling
preference, and control officers were to be instructed to
advise TDY personnel of this preference as well.

5. (S) Since March 22nd is the upcoming traditional end of
the forty day mourning period of Hizballah terrorist leader
Imad Mughniyah, EAC believes that there is cause for concern.
However, in light of our current robust and heightened
security posture, no significant changes are warranted at
this time. CONS also believes that another warden message is
not required, since the last warden message dated March 4th,
cited the recent escalation of the threat level.

.
SISON